











Introduction - (i) Christian Ethics and the terms "revelation
and" "nature" 1-4
(ii) The Reformation emphasis upon "faith" and
the consequent problem of authority. 4 ~ 7
(iii) The Reformers and texts selected for study. 8-12
(iv) Outline of the argument. 12 - 14
Chapter I - The Decalogue as the basis of Judaistic and
Christian Ethics.
(i) The place of the Old Testament in Christian
Ethics. 15 - 20
(ii) The Decalogue in the Old Testament - a
principle rather than a "code". 20 - 26
(lii) The Christian interpretation of the Deca¬
logue. 26-29
(iv) The gfwoth of medieval "scribalism". 29 - 36
(v) The cultivation of the idea of personal
responsibility in Christendom. 36 - 41
(vi) "Natural" law and the divine sanction. 41 ~ 5^
Chapter II - The Emergence of the Reformed View of Christian
Faith and Conduct.
(i) Liturgical Reform. 51 ~ &4
(ii) The Political opportunity for reform. 64 - 75
(iii) The consolidation of reform in preaching. 75 ~
Chapter III - The Early Reformers.
(i) Martin Luther, "Von den guten Wercken",
1520. 89 - 106
(ii) Philip Melanchthon, "Loci communes seu
Hypotyposes Theologicae", 1521. 106 - 117
(lii) William /
Pages
(iil) William Farel, "Summaire briefue declara-
Oi
tion daucuns lieux fort necessalres,
etc.", 1524 117 - 122
(iv) Huldrich Zwingli, "De vera et falsa reli-
gione commentarius", 1525 122 - 131
(v) John Calvin, "Christianae Religion!s In¬
stitution, 1536. 131 - 148
Chapter IV - The Theological Basis of Christian Conduct.
(i) The theological problems of Calvin's con¬
ception of "faith". 149 - 155
(ii) Calvin's Bibliciam. 155 162
(iii) The problem of abrogation. 162 - 172
(iv) The implications of the guilt of men. 172 - 182
(v) Judicial law. 182 - 192
(vi) Natural law. 192 - 194
Chapter V. - Christian Citizenship.
(1) The Uses of the Law 195 - 212
(ii) Justice 212 - 226
(iii) Personality 226 - 239
Chapter VI - The Divine Law.
(i) The "general survey". 240 - 247
(ii) The first table of the Law. 247 - 262
(iii) The second table of the Law. 262 - 279
(iv) The adequacy of the Decalogue. 279 - 285
Chapter VII The Wider Issue.
(i) Bucer1 s "De Regno Christi", 155^-




(i) Christian ethics and the terms "revelation"
and "nature".
(ii) The Reformation emphasis upon "faith" and the
consequent problem of authority.
(iii) The Reformers and texts selected for study.
(iv) Outline of the argument.
(i>
The problem of the Decalogue "belongs equally to dogmatics
and to ethics. It is, to use an analogy, a sort of hinge
joining the two areas of a "believing person's interest. As
a human being^ the believer belongs to an order that may be
called "nature" or the "world", an order conditioned mostly by
physical or quasi-physical standards] but as a believer he rests
upon a hope beyond this world, the certainty of which derives
from a revelation of a Being Who is unaccountable in natural
terms. There is a certain exclusiveness about each experience.
Some would say it was absolute, and would stand dogmatically upon
1 S
the materialist or the spiritual side. Others, refuting both
attitudes as essentially negative and pessimistic, are still
forced to admit that between the two experiences there exists a
tension irresolvable except by a faith that looks beyond the
present to an origin and a consummation in the divine but in¬
scrutable Will. This tension may be called "duty". It forces
the human being out of dispassionate contemplation of circum¬
stances into the creation of new circumstances by the operation
of his choice. Creative activity is inescapable and even by
withholding action we exercise choice. The rules upon which
we /
_ .. _ _
e.g. in recent literature both extremes have been expressed -
the Freudian as the materialist and a revived interest in
Gerald Winstanley the spiritual. See Note l.at end.
2
e.g. Kant. The tension is discussed by Frof. C. C. 3". Webb
in "Kant's Philosophy of Religion", (Oxford, 1926.)
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we base our choice form the subject matter of "ethics" or
"morality". There is no real, distinction between ethics and
morality. The Greek L0os and the Latin "mos" refer equally to
custom, and it is precisely on the question whether custom refers
exclusively to what has as a fact been done or/ includes in the
fact a reference tcnwhat "ought" to be done that naturalism or
supernatural ism in moral philosophy turns.
In Christian ethics - that is the moral philosophy of faith
in Jesus Christ - the "ought" is dogmatically linked, with the
action of God.. The d.elimitation of permissible action which
we human beings call "ought" is the direct "Thou shalt not" of
the Decalogue"5" or the positive "Thou shalt" of its summaries
in the Old. and New Testaments? Moreover, Biblical^ ethics
offers a. reason or a sanction for this distinction between the
permissible and the possible in human choice, the reason, namely,
of the divine Will itself. In short, Christian ethics is an
active pattern, rather than a passive philosophy, of conduct.
To take up the analogy of the hinge again: the Christian
believer, being part of the organism of nature, has also mad.e
himself - or been made by his Maker - part of the organism of
faith, part of the d_oor and part of the door-post. The door
and. the door-post can exist independently, 'but when joined, by
the /
1
EXODUS, XX: DEUT.$ V.
2
BBIT., VI, 5: X, 12: LEV., XIX, 18: MATT., XXII, 37 ff.
3
i.e. ethical thought based upon the Old as well as the New
Testament, thus assuming the relevance of the one to the
other.
3
the hinge become a third, functional unity. The divine
pattern of conduct which the Christian obeys in his natural
surroundings is the hinge joining the divine purpose and human
actuality.
There are two main problems involved in Christian ethics,
namely, the problem of "nature" and the problem of "revelation".
* 1
Professor Brunner, in the introductory remarks to the "Divine
Imperative" describes their relationship. The very terms
"Christian" and "ethics" introduce the dogma of a particular
revelation and the assertion of personal responsibility as a
universal factor in human history. On the one hand, that is,
the Christian asserts that his experience of God in Christ is
"true" although it may not be shared by others, and on the other
he denies that it is private in the sense of being impossible
for non-believers. They, he says, "ought" to know God in
Christ. He may admit as a fact of experience that "many are
called but few are chosen", but at the same time he is assert¬
ing that, in God's purpose, all are called, because all are
responsible to their Maker. Thus the Christian uses the term
"nature" of human responsibility; but whether he uses it in the
same sense as the non-believer is another question.
ii greater difficulty arises from the relationship of Christ
to the divine Law. Does He abrogate it? If by "abrogate" one
wishes to mean to "destroy" there is the best authority for
disclaiming /
Note 2 at end.
4
disclaiming the term. And yet on the same authority there is
a distinct criticism of the established Law."' Can the two
interpretations stand together? The question can be answered
only by distinguishing between the abrogation of particular laws
and the maintenance of the underlying principle of law which
they profess to maintain. In the interest of equity, for
example, it might be claimed necessary to maintain capital punish¬
ment, but an equally potent argument, based on precisely the same
grounds, can be adduced for its abolition. The Christian inter¬
pretation of the Decalogue depends upon the primary question
whether the Decalogue is to be regarded as a code of law or as an
expression of God's desire for our obedience. A code of law is
a human exiDression, and of course every ideal has to be codified
in order to be made actual, in order even to be tested; and
Christian obedience would in that sense be a code as much as the
laws of Hammurabi were a code. But the obedience of the Christian
always refers back to the divine Authority as to an interested
Spectator of human action. The danger of human codes is that
3
they may be themselves deified and. made absolute.
(ii)





MATT, V, 21 ff.
This was presumably the criticism of Jesus against the Pharisees.
It is the criticism that Brunner lays against modern
absolutism. "Justice and the Social Order". (1945) pp. 15 ff.
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rested upon the urgency of their "faith". By faith a man stood
in direct contact with his Maker without priest or church
between. Thus in the life of faith the believer referred
solely to the Will of his God and not to any edict of the church
or any judgment of its ministers. This direct reference was
possible only on the assumption that God had given a revelation
of His Will apart from the human struggle to interpret it. This
revelation was of course to be found in the Bible, which was
regarded as self-explanatory, as offering, that is, to the
believer, a pattern of obedience. The pattern however was not
a code, because it referred to a divine and not a human
institution. Thus the early Reformers attempted to avoid the
slavery of seribalism and maintain the balance between the eternal
law of God and the Spirit Who is its ultimate and only Inter¬
preter.
The main theme, of Christian authority may perhaps suitably
receive some slight further introduction. To the twentieth
1 7
century student there is always the doubt that the Reformation
is dated, and that its contribution to the vital problems of
Christian obedience now is of only academic interest. There can
be little doubt that in two respects the Reformers made assump¬
tions which are no longer self-evident. In their passionate
desire /
I '
E.g. Rupert E. Davies, "The Problem of Authority in the Continent¬
al Reformers" (Epworth, 1946) gives this impression. T. 3.
Eliot in his "Idea of a Christian Society" is also guarded
in his praise of classical systems.
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desire for civil law and order they spoke in medieval language.
Chaos was abhorrent to a civilisation which had a strong memory
of its horrors and thus a strong desire for stable government.'1'
To-day civilisation is itself so discredited that we seek in
personal human values a primary force for reconstruction of
social principles which have lost their authority. We there¬
fore conceive toleration to be a greater virtue than any
medievalist or Reformer would have allowed. For them individual
human nature was subject to the over-ruling principle of "con-
cupiscentia", and was thus not to be trusted. At the same time,
the Reformers were children of the Renaissance in their implicit
trust in documentary evidence and historical reference. The
proofs which they offered in disputation were the ".one plain and
2
simple sense" of Scripture backed up by patristic lore from
sources earlier than Jerome^That is not evidence that would con¬
vince to-day because by an odd reversal of values we have lost
our intellectual assurance about truth - as distinct from our
casual acceptance of technical dexterity - in almost the same
degree as we have revived our faith in individual - as distinct
from group - perfectibility.
But the Reformers, with the discerning believers of every
age, believed in the relevance of the divine Will to every human
circumstance. /
^ Expressed particularly in Macchiavelli "The prince": Bodin
"De Republica." and later Hobbes "Leviathan". See Cambridge
Modern' History. I, cap. 6.
Melanchthon.
3 Jerome had, particularly because of his standard edition of the
Scripture (the Vulgate) to a large extent standardised medieval
Biblical studies. The Reformation, of course, led to renewed
activity in translation e.g. the English Authorised Version.
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circumstance. It has "been said of Calvin that he held as a
"fixed ideal" the relationship of the old and the new Israel.
"Under the old dispensation the children of Israel had "been the
people of God: now in these latter days their mantle had fallen
upon Geneva". Every Reformer might be credited with a similar
ideal, for their "faith", although primarily a spiritual and
moral experience,had an intellectual and social significance
too. The medieval idea of history had been that it was done and
2
irrelevant to the present; the world was travelling away from
its golden age and could recapture only a reflection of its bliss
in the faithful repetition of the Mass. The Reformers in re¬
jecting the Mass rejected more than its pretended oblation. They
rejected its historical implication. Reformed worship was not
a bodily presence at the performance of a ghostly mystery. It
was active participation in a creative relationship with the
Deity Himself in the Person of the Holy Spirit. History thus
came alive because the God of the Israelites was the God of the
Reformers and thus what He said once was an important indication




R. IT. Carew Hunt "Calvin's Theory of Church and State",
Church Quarterly Review, Vol. CVIII.
•2
„ / \
Robertson Smith, "The Old Testament in the Jewish Church,"(1892)
p. 8
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A somewhat arbitrary selection of Reformation personalities
has been made, suggested by Dr. Warfield's introduction to the
if 1
American edition of the "Institutes . Calvin, he says, was not
the only thinker struggling to formulate the doctrines of
Christian faith and conduct. Melanchthon, Zwingli and Farel had
all put their hand to the task. Examination of the works
mentioned shows that, whatever the point of departure, each
writer was feeling after the same end, namely the authority upon
which Reformers could repudiate the two extremes of spiritual
revolt against the divine Will, the ecclesiastical totalitarianism
of the pope and the anarchy of the Anabaptists. Perhaps indeed
this agreement of objective is the bond that keeps these diverse
arguments under the same denomination of "reformed"; and to
illustrate this common interest Luther has been cited in addition,
as the fountain of reformed thought"., find Bucer as the point where
reformed thought had passed from its phase of opposition to its
position of political control.
Calvin however is the main personality under review; and
g
rightly so. He was of the second generation of Reformers but in
himself grasped the implications of the movement more firmly than
perhaps any before or after him. Even in his first edition of
the "Institutes"' he set out the main issues at stake, and in the
later /
^
Vol. I, pp. xiv ff.
2 v /
Warfield, op. cit. 3o also M.E. Cheneviere, "La Pensee politique
de Calvin",^Geneva, 1937^ agrees that Calvin's work was
unique, over-shadowing all its precursors.
3 Written in 1534 or 1535, either at Angoul&ne or at Basle, but
before his first visit to Geneva. The first chapter is
headed "De Lege, quod Decalogi Explicationem continet".
I1
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later editions the doctrines with which he surrounded his first
thesis remained subordinate to it. Although he discussed
more fully than the others the question of our knowledge of God,
for example, he restricted his interest to the central question
he had originally posited, namely the proper obedience that we
owe to God in Christ. At the other end of the discussion he
refers to the impact of Christian obedience upon the natural
relationships of Christians with one another and with unbelievers;
but he does not offer any definite teaching about the composi¬
tion of the right state, whether monarchy or otherwise.^ The main
problem is always the obedience of the individual believers.
Something might usefully be added about the main texts that
form the basis of the study. Luther's treatise "On Good Works"
came into existence from a series of sermons which he preached
on the same subject, and which were worked up into a statement of
Reformed moral teaching for the eye of the Elector of Saxony.
References are from the Weimar edition of his works.2
Melsnchthon's "Loci Communes" had an even more casual origin.
Appointed to the chair of Greek in Wittenberg, he soon fell under
the influence of the Reformer, and like Colet earlier in England,?
lectured upon the Greek New Testament as part of his ordinary
course. In 1520 the lectures on ROMANS were published without
his consent by some of his students from notes they had made.
These lectures - which he called "Lucubratiuncula" - concerned
some /
"He preached the divine right of the established order" - Lagarde.
^ Referred to as W. A. jweimar^f Ausgabe^
F. Seebohm, "The Oxford Reformers" (1867).
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some common topics of theological science. In 1521, having
failed to suppress the unauthorised edition, Melanchthon himself
published the first edition of the "Loci Communes" which was a
composite work based upon the Lucubratiuncula and other notes
on the epistle. The references are from the Corpus Reformatorum.
Farel's "Summaire briefue declaration daucuns lieux fort
necessaires" seems to make a reference to Melanchthon's "Loci"
in its "very necessary places". The original work published
in 152/+ is now lost, and the edition of 1537, reprinted in 1552,
t>ecw
had not re-edited until Professor J. S. Baum of Strasburg
did so in I867. It was published by Pick of Geneva, and a
partial copy is possessed by New College, Edinburgh. Bucer's
"De Regno Christi" is also scarce. It was his last work,
2
written for, and presented to, the young Edward VI in 1550.
It was not published in England. In 1557 Bucer's secretary
collected his "Scripta Anglicana Omnia" for publication in Basel,
and a second edition appeared in 1577. Edinburgh University
is fortunate in possessing a copy of both editions. The work
has not been translated into English but its importance is
marked by the interest of pamphleteers in the 17th and 18th
centuries who quote it, and by the translations of particular
portions which were made, by Milton for example, and
the /
^
referred to hereafter as "C.R."
2 On the basis of this presentation copy, Edward himself -attempted
an outline of reform, "Discourse on the Reformation of Abuses"
^ e.g. Bishop Ussher's pamphlet on "The Originall of Bishops and
Metropolitans". (See Chapter 7, section ii.)
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the summary which Jeremy Collier included in his "Ecclesiastical
History" of 1714- The references here are from the second edition
of the "Scripta Anglicana".
Calvin is represented mainly by his' chapters on the "Moral
Law" in the 1559 edition of the "Institutes". As has been said,
they can almost be called the core of the work. The first
edition, designed to refute both the Romanists and. the "turbulent
Anabaptists""'', made the Decalogue the first step in the argument;
and in later editions it remained the point to which the theological
doctrines of the earlier chapters moved and from which the practical
doctrines of church and state emerged. If further evidence of
its importance were needed the facts that he wrote a long commentary
O
on the "Harmony of the Pentateuch" a very large part of which
is devoted to a harmony of the various preceptual passages under
the headings of the Decalogue,- and that between 20th March 1555
and 15th July 155& He preached a series of two hundred, sermons"^ on
DEUTERONOMY, of which sixteen were specifically concerned with the
Decalogue and were later published separately, would surely pro¬
vide it. It is clear that for Calvin at least, the problems
of private and pub'ic conduct that were thrown up by the pursuit
of Reform not only required, treatment on the basis of divine
authority but that in the Scripture they had received it. The
importance /
1
". . . . Anabaptistes ac turbulentes homines, qui perversis
deliriis non Religionem modo sed totum ordinem Politicum con-
vellerent ..." Preface to Commentary on Psalms.
2
C.R., XII, pp. 209-729.
^ Lobstein, "Die Ethik Calvins", (1377) P» 45 (n) » gives 20th May
as the date of the first sermon.
12
importance of the Decalogue was thus that it was the epitome of
Scriptural revelation ahout conduct.
(iv)
The argument followed is divided into seven chapters. The
first reviews the place of the Decalogue in Judaistic and Christian
ethical thought, the object being to show that the Decalogue has
always had a strong revival v/henever there has been a serious re¬
turn to personal faith. In other words, the Decalogue is to be
regarded not as a human code, not even a human "ideal", but as an
ethical actuality to be lived out by believers in a living God.
The second and third discuss the particular revival of the 16th
century. As Troeltsch says-1', the Deformation movement was a
"Church" and not a "Sect" movement. The Reformers did not seek
the perfection of selected souls, but the reformation of the Church
herself, and they very soon discovered that Church and state were
so intermingled that reform of the one meant revolution in the
other. The Reformation was a religious and not a political or
social movement; but the life of Europe was in its process changed
p
from top to bottom, from the idea of monarchy to the idea of the
home. /
Social Teaching of the Christian Churches (E.T. 1931)> II, pp. 691
ff. This is a generalisation. The ''sect-type" influenced the
Reformers also, but their main end was always the achievement of
the same total authority as had been sought by the medieval
church. The difference was that they sought to achieve it
through the influence of those who professed and were willing to
practise a dynamic faith.
2 Trevelyan, "English Social History", 99 ff • » gives an example, Wtt
but they could be repeated for other Reformed countries. Cer¬
tainly Scotland was revolutionised. Graham, "Social Life in
Scotland in the 18th Century" (1900) abundantly illustrates the
fundamental Calvinism of the national mind. Troeltsch on.cit.,
p. 691+ quotes Harnack (' Dogmengeschichte", III, p. 902+,) 'that which
divided between the cloister and the world in Catholicism the
Reformers desired to unite in common labour".
13
home. The implications were not seen all at once, however, and
a distinct evolution can be traced from Luther to Calvin and beyond.
The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters discuss the main theme, which is
Calvin's doctrine of Christian citizenship. The basis of the argument
is the section of the Institutes (INST., 2: 7 and 8) in which Calvin
treats the Moral Law. Chapter four refers mainly to INST., 2: 7, para¬
graphs 1-5, that is to say, with the problems of Christian interpreta¬
tion of Scripture, and of the universal need of man, whether under the
Old or the New Covenants, for grace. Chapter five brings the discussion
to a more practical issue, referring to paragraphs 6 - 17 of Chapter 7,
which concern the three uses of the Law and which thus involve Calvin's
idea of Christian justice and the value of personality. Chapter six is a
treatment of the Decalogue itself, first under a general survey (2: 8: 1-5)
and then under each commandment. Parallel reference is made in this
chapter to relevant passages in the Sermons and in the "Harmony" of the
Pentateuch. The point which it is desired to make is that Calvin,
like the other Reformers, but more consistently, attempted to rear a
Christian social system upon the revealed Word of God in Scripture.
Finally, reference is made in chapter seven to Calvin's immediate
contemporaries in the larger world beyond Geneva. Bucer in his "De Regno
Christi" was painting a canvas for a nation, not a city state. Could
he succeed in deriving his principle of right conduct from Scripture,
and Scripture alone? Or was it necessary to invoke, as the Monarcho-
machists invoked, the dangerous principle of the sovereignty of the
people?
CHAPTER I
The Decalogue as the basis of Judaistic and Christian Ethics.
(i) The place of the Old Testament in Christian ethics.
(ii) The Decalogue in the Old Testament - a principle rather
than a "code".
(iii) The Christian interpretation of the Decalogue.
(iv) The growth of medieval "scrihalism".
- Pauline moralism and pagan sacrifice
- Augustine and the division between priest and laity
- the social conditions in Western Europe that
favoured the distinction.
(v) The cultivation of the idea of personal responsibility
in Christendom.
(vi) "Natural" law and the divine sanction.
!5
(i)
It has already "been said in the introductory remarks that
"Christian" ethics is a conception with two widely diverging
references. Perhaps it is an expression of human that
religion and conduct are so frequently kept separate, the gods
"being placated with ceremonial while man attends to the business
of daily life. Dr. Brunner remarks in the introduction to
"Revelation and Reason"-*- that this particular order of the terms
is unusual even in Christian exposition, and yet it is the correct
order where faith in the God and Father of our Lord is a factor to
he considered. The first postulate of an ethics that claims to he
Scriptural is that the relevance of God shall he maintained not
only in worship hut equally in conduct.
This dogmatic assumption has two aspects. Firstly, the
"ought" of Christian conduct is always the "Thou shalt" of God:
secondly, again to quote Brunner,2 "the law of God sends man out
into the world as "the place where he is to prove his obedience to
God." Thus Christian conduct is a mean between activism and
quietism. A third implication may he derived. The ultimate
basis of the "ought" which philosophers may trace to "nature", and
from which they may then proceed to deduct a universal system, is
identified by the Christian with God's Own Word; consequently when
a Christian speaks to a non-Christian about what he - the non-
Christian - ought to do, it is still in the Name of God that he
speaks. The Will of God for the Christian is totalitarian not
only /
1
See Note 3 at end.
2 Mediator (1932 E.T. 1937), p. 475-
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only for the man in Christ "but for the man who denies Christ.
One might call this point of view a Christian "fiction of
belief"-*- in order to emphasise that it is based upon a distinctive
principle of faith. Such fictions are common enough in legal
thinking; in religious thinking they are sometimes called "myths".
The Romans referred all law to a hypothetical twelve tables, and
rather remarkably, 17th century lawyers2 in England built up a hard-
headed democratic constitution upon a completely romantic view of
Magna Carta. In the same way the Hebrews referred all law to
Moses, all poetry to David, and all wisdom to Solomon. Our own
bleak rationalism has attacked these myths on the ground that they
are historically inaccurate, overlooking sometimes that the fact
of the existence of the myths is itself a historical fact worthy of
attention. Supposing, for example, that the Decalogue had not been
"really" given to Moses on Sinai, but that it evolved out of the
desert circumstances of the pilgrimage upon the general lines which
governed the Hittite law or the laws of Hammurabi,^ would that be
a sufficient dismissal of the matter? Historically the fact that
a group of people accepted them as of God through Moses is itself
important, and theologically, if we are to say we believe in the
Bible, we are surely bound to give some consideration to its own
estimate of itself. As Brunner says, revelation is often dis¬
counted by Christian thought itself. Brunner himself, however,
seems to fall into the same error. The Decalogue, he says, is a
useful /
1 W. Robertson Smith, on. cit. pp. 38U ff-
2 G. M. Trevelyan, "History of England", (1.926), pp. 172: 381.
3 An example of this type of reasoning is Buber's "Moses" (19I4.6).
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useful "paradigm" of love;1 it has a "catechetical"2 use for
Christian faith; in the final issue, apparently, the Christian
depends upon a certain immediac^ of divine revelation. No doubt
the Spirit must guide and direct our actions; "but if we are to
place such absolute trust upon His interference now, why should
His historical utterances he relegated by implication to a
secondary place in our faith?
This apparent conflict between the present working of the
Spirit and the historical evidence of Scripture is the crux of all
Christian theories of ethics, and particularly the thought of
Calvin^- and his Reformation contemporaries, since their problem
of authority lay very distinctly between the Scylla of ecclesiasti¬
cal absolutism and the Charybdis of Anabaptist libertinism. The
only safe course for "faith" was in the assumption of a direct
relevance of Scripture - that is, the historical dealings of God
with His people - to the people of His choice in Jesus Christ.
This disillusioned generation may find the Reformers' acceptance
of documents at face value somewhat naive,5 "bUt the description of
r
Calvin as uncritically bound to a mechanical theory of Biblical
inspiration is itself misleading. Calvin was not bound in the way
that /
1 Divine Imperative (1932: E.T. 1937), pp. 13/4. ff.
2 "Justice and the Social Order", pp. Ill ff.
3 "God and Man" (E.T. 1936) pp. 95 ff. see Note 4 at end.
k e.g. Brunner - ... "Justice and the Social Order", p. 112,refers to
'"Luther's assertion, explicitly repeated by Calvin, that the Old
Testament law can have no direct meaning for us as a rule of
conduct . . . ".
5 Fairbairn in Cambridge Modern History II, p. 357, says "without a
document he (Calvin) can decide nothing; he needs a written law
or actual custom". The appeal to documents was a Renaissance
trait and a necessary corrective to the mere authority of an
inspired papal authority.
6 Rupert E. Davies, op. cit., p. 114.
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that "fundamentalists" to-day appear to he hound. Compared with
medieval interpretation his is rational - that is, it appeals to
the common sense of the reader for verification. Nor is he ahove
eschewing what he calls fanciful interpretation of Scriptural
references.^ He could even dismiss some of the Old Testament pre¬
cepts as set aside because of their merely local significance.2
Such boldness of interpretation is itself open to question, hut it
does refute the suggestion of mere mechanism. Calvin was a
Christian and therefore tested all Scripture,as we are hidden to do,
by the standard of Jesus Christ.-^ It is Christ Who is Sovereign,
and therefore what He ordains is to he accepted without question
even if such obedience is sometimes also without clear understanding.
If Calvin therefore retained the Decalogue in Christian usage it was
a'St
because, after due sifting, he found it expressly®, the Will of
Christ for His peoplej and since Calvin did not altogether repudiate
reason,^- it was not to him a sure indication of error that the
Decalogue, the revealed Will of God, should he intelligible to human
reason. Quite simply, the Decalogue was an indication that God's
Will /
1 References will he found hereafter. A notable example is his
refusal to discuss the Old Testament tabernacle in too elaborate
typology.
2 "E.g. "Consilia" OR XXXVlUa, 2i+6. "La loy de Moyse est politique
laquelle ne nous astraint point plus oultre que porte equite et
la raison d'humanite." Significantly, this remark applies to
the problem of usury, about which Calvin was never very happy.
3 e.g.rbid,,154,"dunom de Dieu et son invocation". - "Quant nous parlons
de i'Escriture il fault distinguer entre le vieil Testament et le
nouveau, car quant est de la loy et des Prophetes: combien que
le tout sort procede de Iesus Christ en tant qu'il a tousiours
este. l'Ange souverain et principal ambassadeur par lequel
Dieu s'est communique aux hommes," etc. So that whoever appears
to speak - M0ses or David, for example, - actually it is God
Himself.
k As an instrument of understanding permitted to sinful humanity by
the general grace of God. Reason of course in no sense can be
said to "save" us.
 
19
Will for mankind had always he en the same,-1 that indeed it was what
made man man and nothing else.2 He thus did not altogether share
with modern Calvinists the requirement of irrationality in the
divine revelation.^
These problems, and particularly the problem of the relation¬
ship between the universal authority of the divine Will and the
particularisation of that Will in Jesus Christ, will recur in later
discussion. For the moment the question is to be pursued how far
Calvin might be considered justified by Biblical tradition in seek¬
ing this particular interpretation of the Decalogue. Is it true,
for example, as Calvin says it is,^ that the Decalogue was part of
the Covenant to the Israelites, leading them on to Christ? Or was
it merely the law of Sinai, a law given once and only by a stretch
of interpretation made the basis of subsequent law?-' Again, did
Jesus set the Decalogue aside in favour of some other principle of
conduct? /
INST. U:20:15. The Moral Law is the true and eternal rule
of righteousness prescribed to the men of all nations and all time
who would frame their life agreeably to the will of God. The
reference "INST" is to the 1559 edition.
2 E.g. INST. 1:15:1. We cannot know God without knowing man also.
In the 1536 edition the opening words are "Summa fere sacrae
doctrinae duabus his partibus constat: Cognitione Dei ac
nostri" This chapter is headed, "De Lege .
3 D, m. Baillie "God was in Christ" (19U7) discusses the problem
of modern radical theology; see pp. 22:37:i+9> etc.
^
INST. 2:7:1 ff. Wilhelm Niesel, "Die Theologie Calvins (1938)
lays considerable emphasis upon the view of the law as a
IMWi*, 86 ff. He quotes further examples from Calvin's
works.
3 So that Moses would be like Hammurabi, what Niesel calls "the
creator of a so-called religion of lav/" (der Schopfer einer
sogenannten Gesetzesreligion). On the contrary, Moses was
"the prophet of the covenant of God" (der Prophet des
Bundesgottes, der Kinder Seiner Barmherzlgkei t und Treue)
ibid,88. Compare Wilhelm Vischer, "Das Christuszeugnis des
Alten Testaments", I (1935) pp. 112 ff.
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conduct? And again, is it justifiable to say, as is sometimes
said,1 that Christendom - that is the Christian faith of North West
Europe - simply identified the revealed Law of God with the lex
naturae of the Stoics? These questions must he answered if a
right estimate is to he made of the interpretations which Calvin
offered are to he correctly estimated.
(ii)
For the Hebrews the Decalogue was the Law par excellence, the
Law of Sinai, the moral badge, as circumcision was the physical
badge, of God's covenant with them. There is no other suggestion
in the Old Testament; and when the prophets condemn the "nations"
for the: breach of the divine commandment,2 it is not on the
grounds that they, the nations, belonged to the "general traditions
of south west Asia",^ hut on the ground that Jehovah had planted
His Law before their eyes also. The point at issue therefore is
whether the Hebrews may be justly said to have regarded the
Decalogue as something more permanent than a mere code of law,
something to which they could return as to a first principle when
particular codes became outworn by circumstance or inadequate for
the /
1 This view has been taken by Troeltsch, op. cit.I,pp!50 ff, 238-9:
39°, etc. and repeated, for example, by N. Micklem "Theology
and Politics", pp.60 ff: R. H. Murray, "Historyof political
science from Plato to the Present", p. li+U. Doumergue, in an
article "Calvin - Epigone or Creator?" contributed to the
symposium "Calvin and the Reformation" (1909) p. 19, questions
this view.
2 E.g. AMOS, caps. I - III.
3 The sort of description a scientific mind might offer.
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the restraint of "wrong" practice, a regulative principle, in
short, which could remain regulative because expressive of un¬
changing revelation.
The first point to "be made is that the Decalogue was regarded
as having "been "written" "by the finger of God upon tables of
stone.1 Legislation for the Israelites was, like all primitive
legislation, built up of oral judgments upon particular cases
given either by the ancients from their tribal memory or else by a
man of God making his direct interpretation of the Will of God
from his physical evidence through dreams or some other accepted
means. Such is the case of Zelophahad's daughters,^ which, inci¬
dentally has been described^ as an example in modern law of the
Christian reference to divine principle. The authority in this
particular case was two-fold. The judge - and he might have t>een
prophet or priest, judge or king - spoke in the Name of God as his
Inspirer, but he spoke also in the name of tradition. In other
words, the judgment given directly for this particular case was an
expression of a principle recognisable in the Decalogue, namely the
paternal honour. In this sense the Decalogue stands at the base of
all the codes in the Old Testament. Each one rested its authority
upon its superior interpretation of the revealed Will of God. Thus
the earlier codes which permitted a diversity of religious centres
were /
1 DEUT. ivfljJV.22 : IX, 10 : X. l - U. EX. XXXT18 : XXXII. 16 :
XXXIV" !; 28. Compare the reference in LUKE XI, 20 to the finger
of Christ as the medium of divine power.
2 NUMBERS XXXVI. Robertson Smith, op. cit., 335 ff* gives some
other illustrations.
3 Lord MacMillan "Law and Religion", a paper delivered to the
Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, 193^.
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were set aside by Josiah^" "because they allowed in their letter
misunderstandings and abuses of the divine Will. Later reforma¬
tions worked on the same principle. Ezra, for example, associated
his reforms with a revived emphasis on the feast of taberttacles
which thereafter became associated with the reading of the Law.
O
There is even traceable in the prophets^ a tendency to distinguish
between the "moral" and the "ceremonial" implications of the Law
as if the Decalogue could be isolated as the true pattern of the
divine Will, sacrifice being its symbolism. It was this spiritual
interpretation which John-3 and Paul emphasised as the true Messianic
interpretation. Jesus himself made a different emphasis. All
human interpretations depended upon the breakdown of the divine-
human harmony which made true obedience an impossibility. Conscious
of mediating the spirit of forgiveness, He spoke not of the letter
of the Law which the Pharisees were in danger of making a talisman,
and not of the spirit of the Law as it must appear to human insight,
namely as condemnation, but of the spirit of the Law as the man in
Christ could see it.^
The problem for Christian theology is to decide whether Jesus,
in opening up the new point of view, was in fact setting aside the
Decalogue /
1 T. H. Robinson "A History of Israel" (1932) I, pp. Ul8 PP.
2 AMOS II, 1<S, V, 25. MICAH VI, 8. JER. VII, 21 PP.
3 ST. MATT. Ill, 7 PP. horn. 111, 28.
^ Hence an ethics which was "impossible" and yet "relevant", as
Niebuhr brings out in "interpretation of Christian Ethics" (1936).
23
Decalogue altogether. In other words, does the Law in any sense
save, or does it merely condemn? The latter alternative may he
ignored as wholly contrary to Scripture; hut it might he argued
that the Law was Biblically intended simply to heat sinful man to
his knees in order that, when there, he may turn for salvation to
Christ and enter upon a new way of life, the life of the Spirit,
not of the Law. This is not quite Calvin's view.1 Both because
he insisted that what God revealed cannot simply he set aside, even
by Christ - for Christ in God was at the creation of the earth - and
also because he rejected the idea of Christian perfectionism, he
held that the basis of Christian conduct2 no lees than that of the
"Fathers" of the Old Testament, was equally to be taken as the Law
3
revealed once for all in Scripture.
Robertson Smith's article on the "Decalogue" in the famous
1877 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica raised the critical
issue of its identity. In contradiction to the hitherto current
view that the tables of stone contained the Decalogue as we know
it, /
The purpose of the Law was, of course, to produce godly despair
(INST. 2:7:8). But Calvin emphasises (a) that the Law was Moral
Truth, i.e. part of the universe to which man must conform if he
is to be other than mad (INST. 1:3:3 "The worship of God is . . .
the only thing which renders men superior to brutes . . .") and
(b) that Christ was in the Law and not simply opposed to it.
INST. 2:7, 1-2).
2
e.g. "Consilia"sC.R. XXXVIIIa, 200 "... Parquoy il 'est a con-
clurre que frere Matthieu Orris banissant la Loy des dix parolles
de l'eglise christienne blaspheme trop villainement contre Dieu,
qui en est lautheur, foullant aux pieds son authorit£'."
3 Fbifl« "Quant l'Escriture diet, que les Chrestiens sont afranchis
de la servitude de la Loy, cela s'^ntend avec les conditions et
qualitey qui y estoient apposees, a ce qu'elle ne nous tienne
plus en sa rigueur pour noujs condamner.
But "... Dieu a donne sa Loy pour gouverner noz ames".
2k
it, he pointed out at least two other possible bodies of contents.1
Even in ancient Israel therefore there seems to have been a dif¬
ference of opinion about the identity of the primary Law. His own
interpretation of the origin of Israelite law is that it grew up by
the accumulation of cases decided by the judges of each generation,
but ultimately deriving from the ordinary bedouin principles of
retaliation and compensation. In so far as the question is one of
legal mechanics, this view may be assumed in preference to the
rigid doctrine of revelation which he was contesting. It may also
be pointed out that analysis of Calvin's treatment of the Decalogue
shows a clear division into three parts, the constitutional part
being concerned with the practical issues of life, family and
property. But it is incorrect to assume,even allowing for the
assertion that the Decalogue was not the only document written upon
tables of stone, that when the judges judged, they referred to a
principle of righteousness which was simply bedouin custom. In
their case, custom was sanctioned by the living God. It is mis¬
leading to trace the Law back to natural law without taking account
of the factor of revelation. The Law would certainly not be rele¬
vant to human situations were it not based upon the principles of
p
human existence; but the argument which stops at that statement is
mere /
1 Robertson Smith op. cit., p. 335. Art. "Decalogue in Ency Brit.
1877. See also articles "Decalogue" by W. P. Paterson (Hastings
Dictionary of the Bible): L. W. Batten, (Encyclopaedia of Re¬
ligion and Ethics).
g
Such as family, state, agriculture, trade etc.
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mere tautology; it has not begun to answer the question why this
Law became so influential in human affairs; why, in fact, it has
been regarded as a religious as well as an ethical ultimate by both
Jews and Christians.
Two enlightening examples of similar thinking may be culled
from medieval Christendom. Trevelyan1 suggests that the character¬
istic loyalty of man to master, together with the characteristic
equaliterianism that are the best features of Western culture, de¬
pend partly upon the Homeric virtues of the Germanic tribes. Glutb
Pashs^makes a more specific claim for bedouin hospitality as the
basis of medieval "chivalry". But Christendom modified these
principles, and others taken from other sources,^ into a system con¬
formable with Christian faith. This same factor of "faith" has
to be assumed by Christian theologians as a dogma when they are dis¬
cussing the Decalogue. It may be true that, as Dr. Rankin says,4
the makers of the Midrashim felt free to offer the most untrammelled
interpretations of Holy Writ, provided only that the central unity
of God were observed, but it would hardly be true to say that5
"things which, if they were not written in the Law would on grounds
of reason have to be written", unless the grounds of reason were
fimly /
1 History of England 67-8.
2 J. B. Glubb, "The Story of the Arab Legion" (1948)
n>
and notably the Aristolelian teachings which St. Thomas built
into his "Summa". Etienne Gilsen, "Reason and Revelation in
the Middle Ages", (1939) pp. 38 ff.
4 Dr. 0. S. Rankin, in an unpublished paper, "The Interpretation
of the Old Testament in the history of Judaism and of the
Church".
5
G. P. Moore,"Judaism" II (1927) pp. 6 ff.
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firmly identified with the Word of God itself. The argument has,
in short, worked itself hack to the two principles originally
stated, that the Decalogue in Christian ethics must he regarded as
the contact of faith with practical issues and at the same time the
contact of conduct with revelation.
(iii)
Two extremes of wrong interpretation have emerged, the identity
on the one hand, of revelation with a fixed, mechanical principle,
and the identity on the other of revelation with human reason.
The alternatives are obviously directed against one another.
"Literalism" depends upon a justified distrust of human nature as
a moral force, and "rationalism" upon the equally justifiable con¬
cern to find an expression of faith in the creative activity of daily
conduct. Circumstances foster one or other principle. For
example, the scribes, whatever the freedom of their Midrashim,
nevertheless felt constrained to close the Canon. Their motive might
justly be ascribed to a sense of constraint. Israel was no longer
in control of her own affairs, and at the same time was threatened
by materialistic Hellenism. It is not, therefore, surprising
that she lost faith in her ability to mould the nations and
turned in upon her own traditions, a Church nourished by the
revealed truth of its principles, not a state or empire creating
new expressions of justice.1 In such circumstances the Law became
a /
1 This remark is based upon the obvious division of opinion between the
Davidic revival expressed in the term "belovedSon" (PSi il) and the
role of the Suffering Servant. Neither, of course, abandons the
hope that by one or other means God will vindicate Himself among the
nations. That is to say, the one is not pessimism as distinct
from the optimism of the other, unless the pessimism is restricted
to the means of the Divine vindication.
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a dead symbol of a creative past. It could be true that "the Torah-1-
was the foundation of all Jewish ethical reading",its observance
»
"per se effective in establishing and maintaining a right relation¬
ship between God and man", "the means of attaining eternal life",
"the medium, and its study of the condition of immortality"; the
Torah could be described even in terms of personality; yet in fact
the Law of God could become a dead letter, dead because identified
with a historical, ideal situation, and a letter instead of a con¬
tinuing spiritual reality. If new treasures were not continually
found in the Law^it was a code in the worst sense, being not only
archaic but in itself sanctified. saul of Tarsus and the rich
young ruler were both led away into the error of imagining that
obedience to the Decalogue meant obedience to its literal require¬
ments, and that such obedience should bring some msgic transformation
of their life.
The Christian solution to thie spiritual impasse of scribalism
was by a re-invocation of the Holy Spirit's energies. While the
Pharisees were tithing mint and rue and cummin, and the more liberal-
minded were distinguishing between the revealed Law and the reason
of men, Jesus was boldly re-interpreting the Decalogue with the
prophetic authority, "I say unto you". It is an under-statement to
limit /
■*"W. 0. E. Oesterley, 'i'he Jewish Doctrine of Mediation (191°) pp.68-9.
2
Perhaps this is what Jesus meant when, despite His frequent attacks
on Scribalism, He nevertheless seems to respect the careful scribe
(Matt. XV, 52). Dr. T. W. Manson Q'Mission and Message of Jesus"
(1937) pp. 490—1J doubts however whether this balance can be
maintained apart from the Evangelist's own view.
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limit the work of Christ to an expression of "the ethical teach¬
ing of Judaism ... in terms of permanent worth" and a relegation
of "its ritual and ceremonial features to a relatively insignificant
position". The synagogue had already made this change in Judaism,
O
using the Shema and the Decalogue to represent the spiritual, and
the prayers of the sacrifice>the sacrificial^ aspects of Hebrew
tradition.^ What Jesus offered was a spirit of life. His dis-
k
ciples were to be no longer servants, but friends, knowing the
counsel of their Master. There is no suggestion that they were
brought under a different Law, whether spiritual or sacrificial.
The- sacrificial Law itself was for the Christian still relevant;
only it was fulfilled in the perfect sacrifice of Christ Himself.-'
The Law in fact may be described as a revelation in the sense that
i'D is a disclosure of the nature of God Himself, and not merely
the imposition which He is pleased to lay upon mankind. The
Christian interpretation of this situation would be that the man in
Christ knows that there is no inevitable separation of man from God.
He can, as it were, pass through the veil into the divine Presence.
The veil, however, remains for those not in Christ, and it is surely
this /
^
B. H. Branscornb, "Jesus and the Law of Moses" (1930) p. 270.
2
Liturgy and Worship, 63: article, "Synagogue Worship in the 1st
century" by Paul P. Levertoff.
^
Ibid, 51: article, "Worship in the Old Testament" by W. 0. E.
CTesterley.
ST.. J OHM ,XY", 15.
J
Hence the importance of HEBREWS, particularly for Reformation
doctrine, e.g. Calvin "Consilia" C. R. XXXVTIIa, 200 ". . . quant
1'Ecriture diet que la Loy a prins fin a la venue he Jesus Christ,cela s entend des^ceremonies: come e'est une doctrine si claire
qu'elle est tournee quasi en proverbe: Que la Loy moralle dure a
jamais, combien que la loy ceremonielle soit abolie.
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this alternation "between faith in Christ and knowledge of sin that
makes the double voice of Paul about the Law.1 Because of the law -
that is the fact - of sin in my members, I am outside the veil,
knowing the Law only as a divine imposition, but not yet aware that
there is any access to the Almighty. The only hope in such self
knowledge is oblivion. But so long as I cling by faith to my
Saviour I am on the inner side of the veil, still under the Law, but
under the Law on the same side as, and under the power of, the
living God. In short, Jesus replaced a nation which was politi¬
cally reduced to a church, with a church that was to go out and
2
conquer the world for a spiritual Kingdom.
(iv)
The Pauline joy of salvation did not remain in the Church as
a permanent characteristic. The Christendom which the Protestant
Reformation transformed was a second period of scribalism. The
search for one plain and simple sense of Scripture in place of the
medieval four-fold interpretation was a search for a living spirit
of obedience to replace the idea of Christian obedience which the
Church had misappropriated.
What had happened to Christian liberty? The permanence of the
Pauline letters in the New Testament Canon is a measure of his
triumph over the Judaising influences which they mention. It is
also a measure of the dependence of the Christian faith upon the
Jewish /
1
See note 5 at end.
2 A. R. Yidler, "The Orb and the Cross" (1945) p. 11.
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Jewish tradition. Even if all Paul's converts were not first Jews
or Gentile "God-fearera",^ no one could hope to reach an adequate
understanding of his teaching without constant reference to the
Old Testament.2 Perhaps that reference belongs to the Christian
faith itself, and is not only a Pauline trait; Marcionism did not
triumph. Even in number and distribution the influence of Old
Testament Christianity was wider than one might at first think.
There is evidence of the Minim in Rome for example.3 Moreover,
the influence of Paulinism upon the synagogue itself was profound.
Some scholars say that the synagogue liturgy was modified in order
that any Pauline interpretations might be eradicated and crypto-
4
Christians exposed. The repetition of the Decalogue and the Shema
was dropped for these "anti-Christian reasons".
But while Judaism was being modified by Christianity, the
Church was being modified by the world. Perhaps the tensions in¬
volved in the Pauline mysticism were too exacting for the Apostolic
Fathers. They fell under the influence of current non-Christian
influences, both Judaistic and Hellenistic, to the extent of re¬
interpreting the Gospel as a new Law, a higher morality than that
of the "world" perhaps, but nevertheless a law which was a burden
to be borne as the Law was a burden to the Pharisee, with all the
consequent /
1 ACTS XIII, 43.
2 So that "Barnabas" can deny to the Jews all right to the Old Testa¬
ment. The "new Israel" were the true heirs of its promises -
see "Liturgy and Worship", pp. 67-69.
3 Ifcld* p. 68. Article "Synagogue worship in the 1st century". The
reference is to a note quoting MIDRASH, Ex. R. 30.
4 IMA, pp. 69:73:75, quoting G. Kittel "Rabbinica", and P.P.Levertoff
"St Paul in Jewish Thought".
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consequent danger of pride in meritorious obedience.1 The salvation
which for Paul had "been the joy of the Lord,2 sheer fellowship
with the risen Christ^ and partnership in His redeeming obedience,4
became a mere enabling power for the achievement of personal
righteousness.
The origin of medieval scribalism may thus be traced to a
negative and a positive cause. The negative cause arose largely
from circumstances. According to a student of missions,5 the
missionary who preaches a doctrine of free grace without first making
reference to the need for obedience, will produce one of two un¬
desirable results. Either his converts will establish the Gospel
as a system of Law, or else they will fall into a sickly sentimen¬
tality. The best primer for Gospel teaching, he says, is a thorough
grounding in the precepts of the Decalogue. Thus, in a situation
such as Livingstone reported amongst the Bantus5 - who showed a clear
understanding of at least the second table - or in a situation where
there appears to be no moral sense at all, there is or must be
created the moral need which the Gospel exists to meet. This
method, incidentally, was being used by Jesuit missionaries'7 in the
time /
1 T. P. Torrance, "The doctrine of grace in the Apostolic
2
e.g. ROM., XIV, 17. GAL., v> 22J PHIL.. I, 4: IV, 1, etc.
3 e.g. EPH.. Ill, 1 ff. Presumably this fellowship is implied also in
the apostle's reference to a (private?) "word of the Lord".
I THESS.. IV, 15.
4 COL. I, 24.
5 Godfrey E. Philips, "The Old Testament in the World Church", (1942)
pp. 7: 42.
N. Micklem, op. cit.. pp. 56 ff.
^
e.g. St. Francis Saviour - see "Life of St. Francis Saviour" by
Edith Anne Stewart (1917).
ihthers"(l9j|8)
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time of Calvin, and had indeed teen used by the missionaries to the
West in earlier centuries. But, by the time Christianity reach<«L
the pagan West, it had already taken on sacramental references and
political ambitions. What Paul had taught, therefore, as primarily
qXSC
a personal faith had become - inevitably perhaps - a political and
social creed e&sgz. in the mouths of such missionaries as Augustine of
Canterbury. The Lord's Prayer and the Decalogue were no doubt
taught and taught even in the vernacular, but they were sharply dis¬
tinguished from the Mass itself. The priest, brought in by the
monarch and standing in the court as a scribe and adviser, could
hardly help being more concerned with the conversion of society rather
than with the conversion of individuals or the mere witness of his
faith independent of society. Augustine of Canterbury was chosen
as the example to be quoted because in England his influence finally
met and conquered the other at Whitby.1 The pattern of Church life
in Christendom was thus early stamped as an order "of this world"
and indeed claiming dominion in it.
The positive and the important cause of the medieval error was
the readmittance, in the first place, of the idea of physical sacri¬
fice into the Christian mystery. The appeal to current sacrifice
as a "kind of Old Testament"2 for the pagan converts inevitably re¬
introduced the veil of the Temple which had been rent in twain.
However one might distinguish the man from the office, the fact
that /
1 A. R. MacEwan, "A History of the Church in Scotland" (1913)
Vidler, op. cit.. Chapter I passim.
2
Liturgy and Worship, p. 96: article "The Eucharist in East and West"
""""Frank Oavm.
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that an action such as the performance of sacrifice became associated
with the fellowship of the Lord's Table inevitably canalised the
means of grace into the hands of the performers of the ritual. It
may be admitted that the error was never absolute or unchallenged,
and it may also be admitted that it was understandable. At the very
lowest level of interpretation, the Lord's Supper commemorated an
act of sacrifice which could be homiletically interpreted in terms
of an actual practice of sacrifice in the Old Testament. For the
pagan convert especially, therefore both the question, "Who was to
officiate?"^ and the personal sacrifice of penitence, thanksgiving,
witness, generosity to the needy, and so on tended to recreate the
atmosphere of the temple which he had left. Meanwhile, the Church
in its struggle for existence in the midst of Hellenistic culture,
was trying to express the Christian doctrines in universal terms.
The difficulty, as Paul had already found, was t o do so without
denying the particularity of the Christian revelation. Augustine,
the greatest Christian thinker since the apostle himself, succeeded,
according to Karl Adam^by "ascribing to the Eucharistic Flesh an in¬
dependent value apart from the res sacramenti, the Spirit". In
short, the memory of what had been done once for all was to be re¬
placed by something which was done often. As Barth? commenting upon
the trust which the Reformers placed in Augustine, remarks, he him¬




^'Die Eucharistielehre des hi. August!n" (1908) p. 163.
3
Barth, "Nein" - E. T. "Natural ffiheology" p. 101.
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not upon a personal response to God.
Whatever the actual history of the error, the Reformation
assumes its existence. When Cranmer spoke of the young Edward as a
"second Josiah"^ he implied that the Church which Edward was called
upon to purge was fallen into the paganism of Josiah's "Judah..
Q
Luther*s analysis of the error was in terms of "oblation" and if one
is to draw any conclusions about medieval Romanism from contemporary
apologetic, the very essence of the Mass is that very act of obla¬
tion made by the priest for the people.3 "The sacrifice of Calvary
and the Mass are the same sacrifice, only the manner in which they
are offered is different. On Calvary our Lord's Blood was really
shed and He really died: in the Mass His Blood which is really
present, appears to be shed, and His death represented". The con¬
nection between actuality and repetition depends upon the words of
consecration. The part of the people is adoration.
The condition which encouraged this ecclesiastical scribalism
in Christendom was the power, political as well as spiritual, which
the Church controlled.
The domination by the Church of Western Christendom is not dif¬
ficult to explain. Like the African continent in recent times, the
regions beyond the frontiers of Rome were given over to civilisa¬
tions hundreds of years behind the society within the frontiers.
As in our own times, too, the bearers of the higher culture were, at
first /
1 at his coronation.
2 "Everything that signifies oblation is to be repudiated" quoted in
"Liturgy and Worship" p. 140.
3 "A Short Introduction on the Holy Mass" published by the "Catholic
Truth Society".
35
first, missionaries of the Cross of Jesus Christ.^ It is not there¬
fore surprising that the subtle distinctions of the New Testament
were not altogether understood "by the Germanic warrior chiefs.
Christianity to them was associated with the culture of Rome, and
the Christian priest was the "bearer of intellectual, and therefore
political, power. If the emphasis upon the individual was obscured
in the churches of the Roman Empire by the transformation of that
Empire into a Christian order, how much more was it obscured by the
pathetic loyalty of the Germanic chiefs to the mere idea of Rome
which they came to protect.2 Christ Himself to them was Romanised,®
and His obedience therefore an imposition foreign to the understand¬
ing of life that they accepted as natural. The terms of the laws
of Ine, for example, certainly provide for an observance of "Chris¬
tian" obedience, but with sanctions which plainly show that its
meaning was little understood. Christian baptism, abstention from
labour on the Lord's day, and the sanctuary of the Church were the
badge of the new world of opportunity, and were imposed by force upon
the Homeric ethical codes of "the gallant thegns of the North".
There grew up, therefore, a double standard of morality. Loyalty to
one's lord, readiness to meet death in battle, courage, magnanimity
when in power, were distinguished as natural decency from Christian
faith./
The opinion is advanced by R. H. Tawney and others. See "Re¬
ligion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926), pp. 34 ff.
2 Bryce, "Holy Roman Empire", e.g. pp. 17 ff. (I86I4).
3
Trevelyan, op. cit.. 66 note.
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faith. "Anglo-Saxon poetry, like much medieval and modern poetry,
is 6incerely Christian when religion is specifically mentioned, "but
is pagan in tradition and pure human in feeling.^ This is not alto¬
gether a fair estimate of either the age or the faith. It ignores
the genuine attempts to express the Personality and the work of
Christ in native terms that were made "both in art and in religious
practice, and which were stultified by the desire for universal
obedience to Rome, but it does indicate the real division between
layman and priest that held in the middle age. Not until the Pro¬
testant reformation in Europe did the native genius2 achieve the
expression of a Christian faith truly natural to itself and its con¬
ditions of life.
(v)
The Decalogue played a large part in the fostering and final
*2
expression of this genius. "From the ninth century onwards was
developed on this (i.e. the northern) side of the Alps and Pyrenees...
the vernacular office of the "Prone." This consisted of all or some
of these items: bidding and intercessions for living and dead
a general confession, amiabsolution, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer,
and the Decalogue, each with exposition and admonition". This
tradition was especially strong in England4 where the teaching of the
Creed /
1 Trevelyan, op. cit., p. 67 ff.
2 K. Latourette, "History of the Expansion of Christianity" (1940)
III, 429.
3 "Lit. and Worship", 139-144, article "History of the Book of
Common Prayer down to 1662" - Brightman and Mackenzie.
4 Ibid• But not only in England. Latourette, op. cit., 378 indi¬
cates that the concern of the Church for lay~Tnstruction was
general.
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Creed and Lord's Prayer was repeatedly enforced from the Council of
Cloveshoe (747) onwards:, Peckham's Constitution, "Ignorantia Sacer-
dotum" (1281) required also the teaching of the Decalogue. Words¬
worth and Littlehales, in their "Old Service "book of the English
Church"1 mention also the existence of "very numerous treatises in
prose and verse, and other sermon helps" designed to clarify the
teaching given to the laity, especially mentioning the "Hamus Chari-
tatis" or "Angle-book of Love" which in its 1491 edition included
four sermons on the principal ways by which man may attain to the
knowledge of God, namely, knowledge of the Lord's Prayer, the Creed
and Decalogue, the sacraments, "dedes of mercy" and the various parts
of penance. Thus was built up what Dean Perry0 ascribes to English¬
men "a natural instinct for duty". Significantly, however, the
Church kept such instruction distinct from the Mass, so that the
"good life" of the layman was something other than the "good life" of
the religious. Luther complained3 that his youthful idea of salva¬
tion had been formed by the picture of the "heavenly vessel" manned
entirely by priests and monks, who threw out life-lines to the
struggling laity, the obvious conclusion being that only the clergy
were living the truly good life. This implication had for long
enough been denied both by the patent scandals of clerical life and
also by the common sense of an emerging Western Europe. Chaucer in
England /
pp. 285-6.
2 "The Scottish Liturgy"(1929) pp. 88-9.
3 T. M. Lindsay, "History of the Reformation" (1907), I, p. 198.
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England poured scorn upon the S^gfeEEfesasar clergy, with the exception
of the selfless parish priest, and significantly appeals "beyond the
sanctity of any ordination to the standard of "Cristes lore"-*- as
the absolute standard of the truly good life. Such a view is of
p
course itself capable of sentimentality. Luther's description of
the German peasant as "upright, simple-minded, reflective, and in¬
telligent. . . . skilled in Bible lore, and even in Church history,
and knowing as much of Christian doctrine as 'three priests and more'"
is pure romance and in fact received a terrible blow at the Peasants'
revolt, but it indicates the natural root of the Reformation in
Christendom. Too often the movement is described as a sort of
imposition upon an ideally unified Christian society of hypocritical i
creeds masking secular ideals such as national or commercial ambition?
The fact rather is that the Reformation had not only religious ante¬
cedents in such movements as those of Wyclif and Hus, and intellec¬
tual impulse in the humanist denunciations of Chaucer and Erasmus
and political preparation in the silent growth of Roman legal in¬
fluence, but also a condition without which no revolution can ever
be decisive, the spiritual longings of the nameless multitudes.
Such longings existed everywhere in Europe, notably in England and
in Picardy, the home of Calvin. Perhaps, like Nicholas of Cusa, men
desired reformation not re-formation of the Church, but their disgust
at the expressions of the medieval faith undoubtedly led to a criti¬
cism of the very nature of that faith.4
Von /
1 Prologue 1. 527, cf. the "Personne's Tale" with its assertion "hurrble
folk been Cristes freendes" para. 65.
2 Lindsay, op. cit.. I, p. 302.
3 Ttewney, op. cit.. p. 87.
4 This kind of argument is found in Calvin's criticism of the Churchi
See below gp.. 182 ff.
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Von Hugel complained1 of the Lutherans that they were too
"brainy" in their conceptions, that they were more Pauline than Paul.
If by "brainy" he meant that the Reformers were conscious of pur¬
suing an absolute end called "Truth" he was correct in his judgment.
The Reformers believed that they were breaking through ecclesiastical
accretions and were teaching the pure Gospel, that is to say, the
Pauline Gospel of "faith" as distinct from a pseudo-Petrine Gospel
2
of good works. They opposed, in other words, the medieval principle
of priesthood with a principle of disciplined personal belief.
Augustine had spoken of the Decalogue lyrically,® - "that psaltery
of ten strings, Thy Ten Commandments, 0 God, most high and most
, 4
sweet". Hans Luther, Martin s father, took a more practical view.
At the public dinner to celebrate the entrance of the young Martin
into the Augustinian monastery of Erfurt, he replied to his son's
eloquent apologia "even in the presence of the doctors, masters and
other ecclesiastics at table" with the blunt question, "Have you not
read in Scripture that one shall honour one's father and mother?"
Hans was not a Protestant, and his son's later inclinations away
from the Church were as vexatious as his earlier monastic aspirations;
his /
1 "Essays and Addresses", ii, pp. 97-99. In this connection Barth's
denunciation of Brunner in "Nein" is significantly written at a
window on the Monte Pincio in Rome where he could see the Vatican
"over there". The weakness to which Brunner is open, he says, is
just that his opposition to Rome is not absolute. "Natural Theology"
pp. 95: 99.
^ Calvin relegated Peter to the Roman tradition, remembering no doubt
his Judaising tendencies. but Paul was "our" apostle. INST.4:16:5
3 Confessions III, 8.
4
James Mackinnon "Luther and the Reformation", (1925), I, pp. 48-9.
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his criticism of the Church absolutism, therefore, and the basis
upon which he rested it, is all the more significant of the awakening
consciOwecof Christendom.
The absolute which the Reformers sought, then, the "faith" about
which they spoke so much, was a personal relationship between the
individual and his Maker. Modern Calvinists1 find it necessary to
defend the early Reformers against the charge of stultifying Bibli-
cism, and Choisy can pass the unsympathetic criticism that Geneva
Q
was not a theocracy so much as a "bibliocracy , corresponding to the
dead scribalism of the medieval Church and the later "orthodox"
Protestantism. Trevelyan's description of the new England is better
evidence of the true nature of Reform. There was an exaltation of
the married state and a dedication of business life, "in reaction
against the medieval doctrine that the true life of religion was
celibacy and monastic separation from the world: . . . the religious
home was the Protestant ideal, with family prayers and private Bible
reading in addition to the service and sacraments of the Church."
The medieval division of society into religious and lay was ended.
The family, at morning and evening prayer, did what the monk and
priest had been set apart to do as a profession. The work of prayer
and the work of the world were performed by the same persons, and
justified /
1
e.g. Brunner "Philosophy of Religion" especially pp. 31 ff.
2 Choisy, "La theocratie a Geneve au temps de Calvin", (1897) pp. 261:
277. Troeltsch used the same phrase in his lecture, "Die^Bedeu-
tung des Protestantismus fttr Enstehung des modernen Welt' 0-906)
p. 52.
g
"English Social History" pp. 127: 188.
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justified "by the same faith.^ The Counter-Reformation itself was
influenced "by the new emphasis upon personal faith.2 "Since the
16th century . . . the Roman Catholic has been able to 'hear' or
* assist* at Mass in various ways. He can use the opportunity to
meditate on the mystery of the Rosary, to pray in his own words, to
follow the service itself in his private prayers, or to occupy him¬
self with other private or corporate acts of devotion".
(vi)
Mention has been made of two possibilities of wrong interpreta¬
tion in Christian ethics. The first, what has been called "scriba-
lism", has been discussed, and one need add only this, that it was
sincerely, if mistakenly, religious in intention, whether in Judaism
or in Christianity. The other error is "rationalism", the accep¬
tance of human reason as the basis of right conduct. There were
two possible sources of this self-dependence in European thought,
namely the natural virtues of the Germanic clans, and the influence
of Stoicism. The Germanic founders of modern Europe had some
definite problems to solve and some definite equipment with which to
do so. Their military problem of security against invasion from
Slav and Arabic sources affected the life of every component nation in
rz
Christendom, but particularly the marcher states from the Mediter¬
ranean /
^
So Luther in the "Treatise oh Christian Liberty" - "a Christian man
is perfectly free, lord of all, subject to none" - out at the
same time "a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all".
2 Liturgy and Worship, p. 126. Article "Eucharist in East and West".
® Sir Frederick Pollock, "History of the Science of Politics", (1890)
pp. 47 ff.
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Mediterranean to the Baltic, whose state of alertness required^ a
greater degree of centralised authority than existed, for example, in
England. Particularly after the enforced peace and the guaranteed
security of the Norman 4ww, England developed the equalitarian
aspect of the original clan kinship, and fostered the tradition of
p
consent in government.
The culture of Greece and Rome encouraged a theoretical interest
in government, particularly useful when there arose a practical
interest in its cultivation. The political claims of the Church,
based upon her authority as the guardian of the divine Law and the
transmitter of culture, aroused in the growing states an opposition
which sought expression in such terms as could invoke authority above
these absolute ecclesiastical claims. This authority was found in
the ethics of Stoicism and . Its potency lay in their
antiquity and in their Classical reference. And certainly there was
in Roman law a basis for controverting the claims of the Church;
for the Imperial tradition of pagan Rome gave the secular ruler the
undoubted grasp of at least one key, and it was only by false
documents5that the church laid claim to it when the collapse of
imperial /
Even in Reformation times there was a constant fear of Turkish in¬
vasion. Lindsay describes it as "always before their eyes".
Vienna had been successfully defended in 1529, but in 1545 Soli-
man captured Buda ►
2
Doumergue, op. cit.. recalls Montesquieu's comment (Esprit des Lois"
XX, 7) that "they are the people of the world who have best known
commerce and liberty." Latourette, op cit.. 435 quotes Evelyn
Underhill, "Worship" pp. 319-22 and Dean Inge "The Platonic Tra¬
dition in English Religious thought , pp. 4-5 for much the same
individualism, practicality and conservatism.
3
e.g. the "Donation of Constantine".
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imperial power gave the opportunity. Western Europe, however,
never reached a stable absolutism either in Church or in state.
Europe was Christian. Thus the equalitarian clan kinships were
supported by the Christian doctrine of individual worth and were not
allowed to be gathered up into any imperial necessity. Again, the
doctrine of personal responsibility,which the Church herself taught,
fostered the lay criticism which she so often resented. Men were
conscious that behind all institutions lay an absolute Power, The
question is whether they thought of this Power as a "natural11 law or
whether they identified it with the revealed Will of tftniB God.
The actual practice of medieval Europe may first be traced in
a little more detail.
"The law was, during the middle ages, primarily the custom of
the community".''' When, therefore, the king or emperor "made" laws,
he did so only as the respresentative of the people, and it was
against such an idea of justice that political authority was judged.
There was nothing specifically Christian in this idea of justice,
which was held also by the Romans. "The authority of the Prince"
in short2 "was . . . derived from the people". The emperors them¬
selves were shy of the ascription of divinity, and it was only "when
it was found necessary that one man should take charge of the affaire
of /
^
A. J. Carlyle "Political Liberty" (1941) PP» 13 ff. quoting Digest




of the commonwealth" that "a prince was created, and . . . given
authority, that what he established should "be held valid";"1" thus
Pomponius and many other Roman jurists and philosophers. But in
fact Justinian could with equal justice claim to he the sole ruler,
because in fact, if not in theory, he initiated all laws. Until
the "Reception" of Roman law in the later middle age such a view of
monarchy would have been regarded in the West not as true kingship,
but as tyranny, and even when the Roman idea did impinge upon
Western European life, it was met with varying degrees of resistance,
and finally was vastly modified even by those nations which had first
accepted it. The reason for the m&BStSBBXL undoubtedly owes much
to the Christian conscience, whatever secular causes may be adduced
in this secular age. It may be quite true, for example, that
Cicero spoke about slaves in much the same language as St Paul, but
Cicero's views never prevailed in the state as St. Paul's have since
done; it may also be true that the Saxon origins of Europe were,
within the limits of the manorial system, equalitarian, but the
question remains to be answered why the idea of equality has become
the key idea of the "Western" way of life. The only reason is that
medieval thought and practice were impregnated with Christian ideas.
In the 13th century, when Europe was yet "innocent and ignorant'® of
Roman law, Christian priests were instructing her peoples in the
idea of a revelation of God in Jesus Christ, and in the books of that
revelation, /
Ibid quoting Pomponius, Digest 1:2:2; Theod. II, Valentinian II,
Justinian.
2
Maitland in his introduction to Gierke "Political Theories of the
Middle Age" (1913 )> P* xii.
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revelation, Holy Writ, the traditions of the Fathers, Augustine's
"Civitas Dei", and other expositions.1
It was the theory, as distinct from the practice, of law that
required the conception of "nature". It is only reasonable to suppose
that jurists and philosophers should make obeisance to the superior
culture of Antiquity and try to fit their own customs and problems
into its terminology. Superficially there was much in common between
the law of <&©d and Stoic nature,;. Christians could agree with the
2
Stoic phraseology that law "radiated from a principle transcending
earthly power, . . . and (was) yet true and perfectly binding" and
they could say therefore "before the state existed the Lex naturalis
already prevailed as an obligatory statute, and that immediately and
mediately from this flowed these rules of right to which the State
owed even the possibility of its rightful origin", and that even-'
"the highest power on earth was subject to" its rules - including
Pope and Kaiser. But Christendom had received its first knowledge
of Greece and Rome from Christian priests; for Christendom, therefore,
the sanction behind the Lex naturalis was a personal Deity, the Creator
of the ends of the earth, and at the same time the ultimate Judge of
men. Dante thought of society as^ "a community which God Himself had
constituted and which comprised all man kind". It is thus in the
identity of "the whole" from which every partial whole derives intrinsic
value, that Christian thought differs from Stoic.
In /
1
Gierke, op. cit. , p.2.
2





In identifying the Author of Law with the Christian God,
Christian thought "began to develop distinctively Christian interpre¬
tations of law. The fact of human failure, for example, and human
suffering, were associated with the doctrine of God's act of creation
and man's fall from grace, and this interpretation of human nature
and origins gave a distinctive colour to the theories of law. Into
the classical distinctions of natural law, positive law, and the laws
of nations therefore was inserted another distinction dividing the
whole from top to "bottom, namely that "between God's revelation and
man's reason.^ "A creative act performed by man is supposed more
or less explicitly by most of the theorists ... To produce the
state in conformity with the type of organisation which Nature
supplies was in their eyes the work of human reason"; out "Nature"
end "reason" were scarcely distinguishable from "God" and "faith".
Even when the state was struggling from the control of the Church,
and distinctions were being drawn between the Law of God a^ "communi¬
cated in a supernatural way for a supra-mundane purpose" and the
law of nature as "implanted in Natural Season for the attainment of
earthly ends," even when the idea of a secular monarchy distinct in
rights both from Church and common law was urged, the ethical as
distinct from the legal duties of the ruler were stressed. In
other words, the Western idea of the divine right of kings differs
from the Soman in that the Western king could only be the servant
3




3 See note 6 at end.
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terra "nature" itself thus emerges, namely as referring empirically to
things as they are, and as referring to Creation as an act of God.
Putting these ideas in terms of the Decalogue, the conclusion
is that this act of divine law-giving, while of necessity standing
by itself as "revelation" distinct from any other conceivable means
of knowing the right, nevertheless exercised a controlling effect
even upon the idea of "natural" law. The Decalogue was divine law
in the sense that it came to Christendom from the faith of the
Church, but it was not confined to the practice of the Church, as
was, for example, the Mass. It was the touch-stone of lay, not
only clerical, morality, ana was relevant, therefore, to the pro¬
blems of home and state in a way that the edicts of the Pope could
not be, especially when his authority began to be questioned. Hans
Luther, indeed, could criticise the Church specifically in terms of
the Decalogue, making the Decalogue a norm of conduct opposed to
the advice of the Church; but at the same time, his appeal to that
law, rather than to a secularised law of nature, emphasises the
influence which faith retained even upon anti-clerical opinion.
The law of reason was itself subject to the law of God.
It is this double reference which characterises the use of the
Decalogue by the Reformers. As Christians they returned to the
Scriptures for their moral authority but as inheritors of Germanic
custom and of Classical culture, and of the more complicated civili¬
sation of the emerging society in which they lived, they had to
handle also legal and philosophical problems arising from its
greater /
kQ
greater complexity."*" The distinction between nature and revelation
could not be rigidly maintained either in the sense that the medie¬
val Church claimed, that is by the maintenance of the power of both
keys in the hands of a priesthood, nor yet in the sense of the
o
extreme Protestants who damned out of hand the powers of human
reason and the systems alleged to derive therefrom. The Reformers,
especially Calvin, were aware of the two sides of the problem,
namely the need for personal responsibility towards God, and the
need for a practical interpretation of God's will for the conduct
of world affairs. When they took the Decalogue as the basis of
Christian conduct they were conscious of building upon a foundation
of revelation, but they were also conscious that the truly Christian
life concerned the home, business, and even the affairs of nations.
3Brunner dislikes a suggestion put forward by Troeltsch and
followed by Bohatec, that a distinction can be drawn between " the
absolute law of nature - of individualistic rationalism, both Stoic
and modern" and "a relative law of nature" by which Christians assert
the idea of the just in itself as it occurs in sinful, historical
reality. No doubt it does obscure the problem of natural law,
regarded as a problem of absolute significance. But, regarded as
a historical problem, a problem, that is, concerning the way in
which people did once think, rightly or wrongly, there may be some
importance /
*
e.g. Usury, clerical marriage, and particularly the responsibi¬
lities of a democratic society.
2
e.g. Gerald Wlnstanley in 17th century England.
3 "Justice and the Social Order", p. 243.
importance in the distinction, "because, after all, men do act, to
quote a word of Brunner himself, in an "immediate" response to a
situation rather than according to a preconceived plan. One of course
agrees with Brunner's main theme that the reduction of the idea of
justice from an absolute to a relative importance in human affairs
is deplorable. But this reduction marches step by step with the
loss of the personal and individual faith which, to go no further,
the Reformers preached. In their preaching, they put revelation
first and made nature a relative principle, or reference to the
divine Creation subordinated by their reference to the Crucified
and justifying Christ. The main point of their reference to nature
then is the emphasis upon the total responsibility and the total
failure of man. The primary content of their teaching was the re¬
velation of God in Christy in Scripture and^to a less extent, in
Christian experience.
Prom this point of view, therefore, the relativity is not in
the Christian revelation but in the Stoic philosophy. Both agree
that law must have an absolute sanction as well as a particular ap¬
plication. But Stoicism and all "natural" theology, seeks the
absolute in man, either in his own nature or in the world which he
inhabits. It follows, if one begins at this point, that the idea
of creation, which is relative in Reformed thinking* assumes absolute
significance; and, like East and West, never can these twain meet.
*
e.g. His doctrine of morals was "enforced by all the sanctions of a
religion whose word was law and whose assertions were truth" -
A. Mitchell Hunter, "Teaching of Calvin" (1943) p. 220.Calvin's remarks upon Jerome illustrate his confidence in reach¬
ing the Truth - "what Jerome thought I care not: let us inquire
what is the truth", namely Scripture, INST. 2: 7: 5.
CHAPTER II.
The Emergence of the Reformed View of Christian
Faith and Conduct.
(i) Liturgical reform.
(ii) The political opportunity for reform,
(iii) The consolidation of reform in preaching.
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(1) LITURGICAL REFORM
The Reformation, like every significant historical movement, may
"be compared to a growing plant. Its roots may "be traced out as dis¬
tinctive influences leading inevitably to this particular flower at this
particular time. But the flower is significant only if the roots are
firmly embedded in the ancient soil, the compost of a multitude of
separate efflorescences. The richer the soil and the firmer the roots,
the more brilliant and free is the blossom that waves above ground.
Moreover, this plant, however individual in its emergence, is finally
disseminated, by its fruit and its very substance, into the texture of
the soil. The student in his subsequent dissection may underrate the
size of the flower or the size of the roots and soil, and the Reforma¬
tion movement has suffered as badly as any historical event from such one¬
sided criticism. In the generations of the first Reformers, however,
there is to be traced quite clearly a movement - sometimes a reluctant
movement - away from established custom. It appears most forcefully
in the liturgical development. There was equally a conservatism of
spirit amidst the flowing tide of social and economic revolution; and
this can be illustrated from the political background of reform. Its
peculiarity was the belief in the capability of the individual believer
to understand and obey, and by his understanding and obedience, to work
out the divine will on earth; and this may be described in terms of
its preaching.
The significance of the 16th century Reformation for twentieth
century has been clearly indicated by Lr.KPrlBarth. It may be necessary,
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he says, for us, in our endeavour to maintain the essential Reformation
position over against Roman Catholicism and Neo-Protestantism, to make
"more pointed" the statements of Luther and Calvin, since the Romanism
with which they were faced was only the "questionable pelagianising
formulations of the later Nominalism . . . and not the systematic
method and harmony with which St. Thomas Aquinas developed the principle:
f
Gratia non tollit sed praesupponit et perftcit naturam - Santa Maria
supra Minerva." The complaint he has against the Neo Protestants is
that, particularly in their alleged doctrines of nature, they are not
g
sufficiently distinct from those "over there" in the Vatican. The rock
upon which the Reformation rests, he says, is the doctrine of the
"unfree will" of man, to which corresponds the re-creating grace of God
in Christ. It is unfortunate, he admits, that Dr Brunner, with his
theory of natural "ordinances" such as home and state, should "be apparent¬
ly able to cite even Calvin, the prince of the Reformers,for support.
But while we may have to admit in the Reformers a certain slackness in
accepting pagan classical doctrines such as "natural" law, we may not
admit that their acceptance bore to them the interpretations which
Brunner has placed upon them. In other words, Calvin might, for the
sake of preserving order against Anabaptist anarchy, admit more of the
medieval theory of stability than is really consistent with his theology
of salvation, but that acceptance must be recognised as an inconsistency
not /
"Natural Theology!' pp. 100 ff.
He was writing at the window of a house on Monte Pincio, Rome.
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not to "be repeated by his true followers.
If this view of Reformed doctrine is correct, it has to be added
that the doctrine of the "''''i*"1-* will was not, apparently, inconsistent with
the emergence of the great surge of personal significance, which
undoubtedly characterised the period of early Reform. To-day one may
sneer at the Reformation as the established church of the middle classes'1'
serving shopkeepers as Romanism had pandered to the large land owners and
Marxism panders to the industrial workers, but at least even in the sneer
is acknowledged the energy of those who embraced the new interpretation
of Christian faith. To take the Decalogue as an expression of that faith,
one can see how the moralism of the Reformed doctrines became a positive
social force. Unlike the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees
and unlike the righteousness of the pilgrims and monks of the middle age,
the righteousness of the Protestants was interpreted in practical and
2
not frivolous terms. If Protestants were made conscious of personal
sin they were also made conscious of the sinfulness of the priesthood on
which they had rested for salvation, but above all conscious of salvation
by divine grace. The Reformation was thus an age of faith, and like
every age of faith, an age of reconstruction? and again like every age
of faith, an age of confidence and song. The unfree will of man had
been set free by and under Christ.
It /
T~
Tawney, on. cit., p. 111.
2
Trevelyan, "English Social History", pp. 127: 181-8.
3 H. Y. Reyburn, "John Calvin" (1914) gives many references from the city
Annals (ShR.XLIX ) which illustrate the attempt made in Geneva to
give such classes as "serving men" a sense of responsibility to the
church and the community in general.
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It is the "business of this section to indicate the part played hy
the use of the Decalogue in the vocal expression of this faith. The
Decalogue had never, of course, been altogether omitted from religious
observance in the medieval church; but then no doubt the worship of Jehovah
had also been observed in the Temple even before Josiah cleared out the
competitive gods. It is significant that a Christian prince could be
called "a second Josiah" The object of the Reformers was not to destroy
the Church but to purify it; and in the first instance at least, they
did so by an emphasis upon that sort of piety which to the medievalist
was specifically "lay". Several instances have been mentioned of the
anti-clerical repudiation of a sacramental treasury of vicarious obedience.
The temper of 16th century Christendom demanded a clearer interpretation
of the moral standards by which all men, priest and layman alike, were
to be judged. This standard was found in Scripture and expounded by
the early Reformers in terms of the three main parts of the Prone -
2
Decalogue, Creed and Lord's Prayer.
The danger of popular movements is that they become irresponsible.
It is one thing to criticise the established order for its inefficiency
and even its corruption: it is entirely another to re-establish social
order. At first the Reformers were critics, preaching to their congrega¬
tions in Wittenberg, Zurich or Basel, and appealing to them for renewal
of obedience to Jesus Christ. Prom preaching to disputation and from
disputation to local action, against images for example, were still
essentially negative steps, leaving the responsibility of government in
other /
^ Liturgy and Worship, p. 151. Cranmer used the description at Edward VI's
coronation.
2 This was the basic form even of the 1536 "Institutio", which might have beer
expected from its place in the line of developing Protestant theology
to be abstract in its presentation. Chapter III deals with the
development.
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other hands. But when the Reforming party itself took power it was,
perhaps imperceptibly, forced to a change of policy. In the considera¬
tion of specific works of Reformers"'" their respective abilities to handle
this change of responsibility will be noted: meantime it may be as it
were foreshadowed in the fortunes of the Decalogue usage.
The Decalogue is a peculiarly sensitive means of measuring this
change of policy. Its function in Biblical piety - both in Old and New
Testament tradition - has always been a reminder that the Ultimate judge
2
and the Ultimate standard of human conduct is divine. In the visible
5
Church - that is, the human response to God - this relevance has never
been lost sight of, particularly in its relationship to private conduct;
but it has not always been recognised as applying to the conduct of man
in society. The polytheistic cult of the baalismin pre-Josian Judah
and the sacramental principle of medieval Christendom are quite consistent
attempts to apply the Will of God to the social conditions of the times.
The Josian and the 16th century reformations were the voices of the
prophets summoning men to an obedience - which to them was the only true
obedience - based upon personal acknowledgment and response to God.
This is not the place to discuss whether the prophetic voices were
raised in demand for the impossible. If scribalism were the only
interpretation of consistent obedience to the Law then Christians would
have to acknowledge that they are emancipated from the bondage of legalism




^ See Chapter I.
JX
In this sense the Church may be extended to cover at least the
Fathers of the Old Testament.
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endeavoured to show that the scribal obedience was not the only means
of obedience,1 and the Reformers, following him, also endeavoured to
steer a middle course between the spiritual slavery of Romanism and the
anarchy of Anabaptist enthusiasm. The question at issue here is not so
much whether they succeeded as whether, in succeeding, they abandoned
the basis of their original prophetic appeal. In the end, did they shift
their obedience from the divine command to some humanly elevated absolute
like "natural" law? It may be said here in anticipation that the
criticism will be laid against Luther, Melanchthon and Zwingli that in
some measure, explicitly or implicitly, they did appeal to an authority
outside the strict revelation of the Divine Will. It will be argued
farther that Calvin specifically attempted to avoid this error. Whether
or not he succeeded, it is undoubtedly the case that he opposed the
„2
"monarchomachist" tendencies of contemporary Calvinists - in Prance and
England, for example - which sought to justify resistance to
rulers, and in doing so appealed to a "natural" law.
The distinction then must be carefully drawn between the appeal to
the Decalogue as a popular standard of conduct and as an absolute standard
of Christian judgment. In its former position the Decalogue was
thoroughly /
1
e.g., ROMANS VI. It is the impersonal "professional" obedience that
Paul denounces, and the parade of obedience that accompanies such
an attitude. Christians would still be obedient to the essential
requirements of the Divine Will; but their motive would be love,
that is, willing co-operation. His attitude to Rome therefore was
that, contrary to Jewish slander, the Christian was no professional
anarchist, but, on the contrary, a better because a conscientious
citizen. This view was more easily advanced because of the good
will of the contemporary Roman regime. Neither Paul in his letters
nor the early Reformers had to deal with the enmity of the society
in which they were forced to live.
2 See below in chapter VII.
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thoroughly established in the medieval Church, but that very establish¬
ment underlined the limitations imposed upon it. It belonged, with the
Lord's Prayer and the sermon, to the Prone. The main worship was the
Mass which preceded it. The Reformers reversed th^S order
The appeal to the emotions and intellect came first, in order that the
communion might be entered into with the proper knowledge and consent of
the participants. In the first instance the vehicle used was that of
1
singing. The singing of hymns was probably common enough even before
the Reformation but it became at this time the embodiment of the lay
share in worship and obedience. Amongst hymns that were written by
Luther himself was a metrical paraphrase of "die heylgen gebot" to which
he added as a refrain the Kyrie Eleison. This particular use was intro-
2
duced into England by Coverdale, who made a translation which in turn
influenced Cranmer to include in the 1551-2 Book of Common Prayer both
3
the Decalogue and the attached Kyries. The form retained in the present
Book of Common Prayer was completed later when the lesser Litany,
"Lord, have mercy upon us" was added to each commandment with a slightly
longer litany after the tenth.
The movement of Protest required, however, a more definite expression
of its distinctive emphasis in the form of its service, and three distinct
steps can be traced, in Wittenberg, in Zurich and in Strasburg. Luther
himself /
"Liturgy and Worship", p. 178: article "History of the Book of Common
Order down to 1662" by P. E. Brightman and K. P. Mackenzie. W. D.
Maxwell, "John Knox's Genevan Service Book, 1556" (1931), p. 61, says
that singing was "the people's part in the worship." One of the
first innovations in Geneva under Farel and Calvin was that of congre¬
gational singing (Reyburn, "John Calvin" (1914), pp. 63 ff.J
2
Liturgy and Worship, pp. 178: 310-2: article "the Holy Communion
Service" by J. H. Srawley.
3
Perry, op, cit., pp. 88-9.
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himself did not introduce many changes in the form of the service. By
1520 he was still using the Mass as the vehicle of worship, but in the
vernacular. This "Deudsche Messe" was published in 1526.1 The vernacular
q
usage, the hymns, the withdrawal of the idea of priestly "oblation" are
the signs of the new spirit. Meanwhile, from 1523 onward, he was empha¬
sising the need for evidence of obedience in those partaking of the Holy
g
Supper. His handbooks had a wide influence - in England, for example,
where in 1549, that is even before the Interim immigration, Cranmer was
tightening up the practice of Church membership.4 Calvin's catechisms
of 1538,5 the Encheiridion of Cologne (1538) and even the catechism of
the Council of Trent (1566) are influenced by these first works of Luther.
Luther, however, did not introduce the act of repeating the Decalogue
into the vernacular Mass. That innovation required first the work of
6
Zwingli who in 1523 introduced into his Zurich church a service based
upon the Prone and not upon the Mass. In this appeal to the teaching of
Scripture, /
No Reformer, indeed, desired change for its own sake. Lacharet's words,
quoted by Maxwell, op. cit., p. 36, reflects a conservatism typical of
the Reformers. Jhe Mass, he says, "peut et doit &tre ameiiore: il
n'a pas besoin d'etre transforme." Calvin, in every edition of his
"Forme" described it as "a form of prayers and administration of the
Sacrament according to the creation of the ancient church", i.e., he
did not desire to make a new church, but simply to reform the true
church.
2
See above, p. 34 , note 2 .
3 Liturgy and Worship, pp. 140-1.
4 In his first Prayer Book (1549) before the Interim immigrations, knowledge
of the Decalogue, Lord's Prayer and the Creed was obligatory upon any
who should come to the Lord's Supper. Liturgy and Worship, p. 162.
5 See Reyburn, op. clt.. pp. 67 ff.
Liturgy and Worship, pp. 143-4.
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Scripture, he was pointing "beyond the Church as an institution to the
Scriptural authority of the Decalogue and the Lord's Prayer. In short,
Zwingli was concerned to establish in his followers a knowledge of the
faith that was in them, the authority of their opposition both to papal
pretensions and enthusiastic libertinism.
The two influences - what one might call the "sacramental" and the
1
"homiletic" met in Strasburg. In 1524 Theobaldus Niger celebrated a
German Mass, like Luther's little more than a translation. But under
the influence of Bucer and others, "evangelical" forms entered. For
example, the "priester" became a "pfahrrer" and even a "diener". Although
the basis of worship was the Mass - that is, the exhibition of the
sacrificial work of Christ - its direct relationship to the people was
increasingly emphasised. As the authority of the priest diminished the
g
authority of the Word increased. Thus the sermon came into prominence.
The Decalogue as an act of confession, if it was not in the original forms,
3
certainly was by 1539. This was the form which Calvin found on his
arrival in Strasburg,'4 and it was therefore the form which he translated
from German into French for the use of his little congregation. Signifi¬
cantly Calvin seems to have made only one change in this use. His "La
maniere /
^
rblfl•« PP« 141 ff. This Mass was celebrated in the St. John's Chapel
of the Cathedral of St. Laurence, Strasburg on February 16th, 1524.
See also Maxwell, op. cit., pp. 24 ff.
2
The sermon did not appear in either Luther's or Schwarz's Mass.
Bucer introduced it - Maxwell, op. cit.. pp. 24 ff.
3
Maxwell, op. cit., p. 30.
4 Maxwell, op. cit.f p. 32: Liturgy and Worship, p. 142. There had been
a small French community of Protestants in Strasburg since 1533, but
the German municipal authorities had not permitted them a full service
in their own tongue. Calvin's arrival coincided with the lifting of
this restriction, and he was therefore invited to compile a service for
them. Williston Walker: "John Calvin" (1906) p. 220, suggests there
might have been a community of some 600-700.
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maniere de faire prieres aux eglises francoyses" omits any alternative to
the Decalogue as an act of confession.'1' This Strasburg use would appear
to "be the acme of Reformation liturgical reform, and it is still a matter
of controversy whether subsequent retractions in 1542 were desirable or
2
not. The fact, however, remains that on his return to Geneva he chH
3
himself to be influenced by the iconoclastic spirit in certain
matters, including the omission of the Decalogue as an integral part of
4
the service. It is rather strange that the use of the Decalogue should
have been an omission. Farel's "La Maniere et Fasson qu'on tient es lieux
lesquels Dieu de sa Grace a visites", written in 1533, which had been
accepted in Geneva in 1536, contained the use of the Decalogue as part of
5
the order of Public Worship.
The clue to the changes demanded of Calvin is probably to be found in
his /
Otherwise it is simply a translation of the German use. Calvin says,
"Quant aux pri^res de dimanches, i.e., prius la forme de Strasburg
et en empruntey la plus grande partie." Opera X, 894, quoted by
Maxwell, op. cit., p. 22. Calvin's form of the Decalogue, incident¬
ally, seems, like Luther's and Knox's, to have been metrical. Opera
VI, 221. Probably, however, Calvin simply borrowed from Bucer, who
in his Psalter, had borrowed from Luther: Maxwell, op. cit., p. 32.
No copy of the original edition of the "Forme" exists, but the second
edition, edited by Calvin's successor Peter Brully, in 1542, claims
to be simply a reprint of Calvin's work.
o
See Maxwell's article "Calvin's attitude to public worship" in the Church
Service Society's Annual, 1929-30.
® This phrase is also Maxwell's. "John Knox's Genevan Service Book",
p. 19. The text of this Genevan liturgy is given in Kidd, "Documents
of the Continental Reformation" (1911), pp. 615 ff. The Decalogue of
course remained part of the Psalter, Maxwell, op. cit.. p. 70.
4 Maxwell gives other omissions in his article: see note 5 above. These
included the pronunciation of Absolution and the habit of keeeling at
Irayer. It is worth noting that Calvin's use of the Decalogue was, un-ike Bucer s, with ut any attached refrain of Kyriel ison. It was the
Decalogue itself that was resented in Geneva - Maxwell, "John Knox",
p. 32.
5 See Reyburn, op. cit.. pp. 62-3.
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his desire for, and the Genevan rejection of, a weekly communion. Farel
had not used the Decalogue in his order for the Lord's Supper. That is
to say, he emphasised the preaching of the Word more than the administra-
1
tion of the sacrament; "but this marked his limitation as a Reformer, and
it was just "because he knew himself to "be a pioneer "but not a builder that
2
he constrained Calvin in the first place to remain in Geneva. The
integration of the Reformed "faith" into the act of communicating was one
of the reconstructive principles which Calvin perfected during his sub¬
sequent exile in Strasburg. The refusal of the Genevan city council to
accept this usage was partly political and partly, as has been said,
iconoclastic. The political objection will be discussed further in the
next section, but it may be summarised here as the objection on the part
of the city fathers to the clear relationship which Calvin stressed between
personal conduct and administration of the Church offices, particularly as
the right to administer and therefore, by implication, the right to judge,
3
was thus left in the power of the Church. This is the perpetual source of
disagreement between Church and State which has shaken Christian society
4
in Europe in every age.
The iconoclastic objection may be traced to the Guillermin party
g
which supported Calvin's return to Geneva. The very name of the party
indicates the influence of Farel. This party was in a minority against
the other two main parties, the crypto Romanist and the "Artichauds" who
were /
^
As Calvin himself suggested in his dying address to the ministers, see
Kidd, op. cit., p. 649.
2 Reyburn, op. cit., 58 ff.
3 In 1549, when Geneva was becoming restive under Calvin's idea of discipline
the Council ordered Calvin to preach a sermon every day in the week, and
to repeat the Lord's Prayer ana Ten Commandments frequently. The motiv<
was obviously to annoy Calvin and to confine his interests to personal
rather than political affairs. Calvin s reply was their own of 1542,
viz., that over repetition savoured of superstition - Reyburn, 148.
4 An interesting example from the 18th century is Dr Wilson, Bishop.of Sodor
and Man. See Hugh Stowell, "Life of Rt. Rev. Thomas Wilson" (1829).
5 Reyburn, on. cit.. pp. 100 ff.
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were pro-Bernese, but there was sufficient religious, if not political,
agreement"'" between the Guillermins and the Artichauds to advance the
2
judicial implications of .Reform even while Farel and Calvin were in exile.
Calvin was no doubt also influenced by the increasing numbers of refugees
who entered Geneva. They exercised no political power, of course, until
later in Calvin's stay in the city, but since he was spiritually of their
number#, particularly in the darkest days of his isolation, it is reason¬
able that he should have considered their conscience in his own practice.
The two editions of Calvin's "Forme" both found a home in England.
Cranmer's second book of Common Prayer and the Puritan book of Common Order
both received a direct influence from Calvin, the one from Strasburg, the
other from Geneva, and it is perhaps in this confrontation of the two
forms that one can see most clearly the conflict of their implications.
Before 1549 English Reform was, like the movement elsewhere, mainly
Lutheran in its inspiration. But in that year it was approaching a
crisis. Cranmer was calling the young Edward a "second Josiah" and the
3
influx of Continental refugees from the Interim was at its peak. These
men represented the Strasburg school of Reform. Peter Martyr and Bucer,
for example, came from Strasburg to occupy chairs of divinity in Oxford
and Cambridge. Vale'rand Pullainwasa successor of Calvin in Strasburg.
They /
1 :
Berne was Geneva's Protestant neighbour, but she had claims upon
Genevan teritory. The Guillermins stood for an independent
Protestant Geneva.
2
Reyburn, on. cit.. 98 ff, gives some examples of Reforming legislation
during the absence of Calvin in Strasburg.
3
Liturgy and Worship, p. 171.
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They and the returned English exiles like Coverdale and Hooper gave an
impetus to Reform, and the measures they proposed were Calvinist rather
than Lutheran. Bueer's social proposals will be considered as a sort of
postscript to the whole study, but the liturgical proposals are relevant
here. Pullain, for example, translated Calvin's Strasburg rite, which
contained the Decalogue as part of the Communion service. This was the
"Liturgia Sacra" - published in England in 1551. Laski, who had come from
«
Emden, published the "Forma et Ratio tota ecclesiastic® Minister!!" which
was the Genevan rite of Farel called "La Maniere et Fasson, etc." and
Huycke published "The form of common prayer in the churches of Geneva"
which was that which Calvin had finally adopted in Geneva, after 1542,
and which omitted the Decalogue. Of these three Pullain's had the strongest
1
influence on the English use.
Alongside this English use of Calvin's Strasburg rite there was
practised the Genevan use. In Frankfort, John Knox had before him a copy
of both uses, but in his own "Forme" followed the Genevan. The English
Puritan, therefore, omitted, while the Anglican repeated, the Decalogue in
g
the Communion service. In the early (1556) editions of the Frankfort Book,
however, the Decalogue was included in a metrical form amongst the "one
and fiftie Psalms of David" and in 1560 there was added, amongst other
pieces such as the Nunc Dimittis, etc., a prayer after the Commandments
called the "Addition". In 1561 some of these pieces were omitted to permit
an increased number of Psalter pieces in verse, but the Decalogue and Lord's
Prayer /
1 "It was not unnatural that Cranmer, under the double influence of English
tradition and the contemporary practice of highly respected foreign
reformers, should have hit upon the idea of combining the Decalogue with
the Kyrie-eleison as a regular portion of the new rite" - Liturgy and
Worship, p. 178.
This does not mean, of course, that Cranmer drew the English Rite
out of the "Liturgia Sacra". There had been a separate development of
the English service from the Mass from 1547 onwards (that is to say,
before the Interim immigrations and the 1549 Prayer Book). Liturgy and
Worship, pp. 153 ff.
8 C. G. McCrie, "Public Worship of Presbyterian Scotland ( 1892 ), pp. 120-1.
6k
Prayer were retained. The Scottish edition of 1562, however, included a
full Psalter "but no other metrical pieces. This omission does not of
course imply the total omission of the Decalogue in Presbyterian usage.
For example, although Confirmation was not practised in the English Congre¬
gation at Geneva, and no service is printed in Knox's "Forme", yet "none
are apt to be admitted to that mysterie (i.e., the Lord's Supper) who can
not formalie say the Lord's Prayer, the Articles of Belief and declair the
source of the Law."1
The conclusion to which one is drawn, therefore, in this discussion
of the liturgical use of the Decalogue is that it stood at the fulcrum
upon which the balance swung between ecclesiastical and lay jurisdiction
over conduct, and to a lesser degree, the balance between a "liturgical"
and a "simple" service. Characteristically English is the manner in
which the Decalogue has been retained in the Communion Service of the
Anglicans without bringing the conflict which was feared in Geneva. Would
it be true to say that the reason is to be found in the retention of the
little liturgicsl additions to each commandment? Did these effectively
take the point from the Decalogue and return it to a sacramental pigeon¬
hole? These are polemical questions irrelevant to the main discussion,
and no doubt it is according to one's views upon them that one will judge
Calvin's proposals and practice in Geneva from 1542 onwards.
(ii)
Calvin's volte face before Genevan opposition leads directly to the
problem /
1
Laing, Knox's "Works", II, 240.
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problem of his views on authority. He retreated not only on the question
of the Decalogue. He allowed his desire for a weekly communion also to
"be set aside "by the Council. But he was not subservient to the Council.
He carried his insistence, for example, upon the weight of Ameaux' punish¬
ment for vilifying his authority as a pastor.1 jja opposed ^errin in the
very teeth of conservative opposition and secured his banishment.2
again, he on occasion refers for action to the lay authority matters
which to-day are left for the Church to solve as best it can.-^ Clearly
he regarded Church and State as necessary if not always easy colleagues.
The history of Geneva has something to do with this state of affairs.
Calvin was in no way beholden to Geneva. He regarded his first stay in
the city as like the torments of hell;^ and it was at the strong instiga¬
tion of citizens like ^errin, who saw in him the only hope of political
security, that he returned from Strasburg. Geneva needed Calvin. Why?
Geneva, apart from what Calvin made it, was unique. "Ethnographically . . .
connected with both the Teutonic and the Latin races, by language . . .
French, by religious interests and associations Italian, by political
instincts and affinities Swiss, by commercial and industrial genius German,







e.g., matters of doctrine-"Orclonnan.ces. C.R. XXXVm A 18.
^ Herninjard VI, 228: VII, 1+3.
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1
its municipal ambitions. Almost surrounded by Savoyard territory,
and yet independently ruled "by a Bishop, its life was a long series
of agitations and intrigue#* The house of Savoy had obvious ambi¬
tions in the city, and had long maintained the power of nomination
to the post of Vic.edom, that is to say, to the office of the Bishop's
secular representative. But the power of nomination tixs the
bishopric remained partly in the hands of the citizens themselves,
who also retained certain rights of self-government through their
various powers of election to the magistracy. There was thus
a triangular tension amongst the parties, the citizens agreeing
with the Church in its suspicions of Savoy, and yet, like the House
of Savoy, determined to retain as much as possible of the moral and
social authority of the Church in their own hands. So long as the
contest remained three-cornered, the independence of the citizens
was secure. They enjoyed spiritual privileges which did not
exist where the Church's authority remained unchallenged, and with
the help of the Church they held the political power of Savoy at
bay without having to accept the limitations of the Swiss cantonal
system of mutual defence. Their character therefore was
both aristocratic and democratic; aristocratic in the sense that it
remained /
A. M. Pairbairn, article "Calvin and the Reformed Church" in
Cambridge Modern History. II, pp. 342 ff.
Other sources of information about Geneva at this time are
Reyburn, "John Calvin" (1914)
Williston Walker, "John Calvin"
Doumergue, "Jean Calvin," II (1905).
Kampschulte, "Johann Calvin: seine Kirche und sein Staat in
C-enif", (1869-99).
H. D. Poster, "Geneva before Calvin" in American Historical Revia^
1903. "Calvin's programme for a Puritan state in Geneva."
'Harvard Theological Review", October. 1908, # v „ v , r-r-,Hilliet. ''Relation du Procea Crimmel Intente a Geneve, en 1553»
contre Klichel Servet, rddigee d'apres les documents originaux far
Albert Rilliet" (Geneva, 1544), translated into English in 1846
by W. K. Tweedie.
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remained unabashed in the presence of all authority, democratic in the
sense that its instincts clashed with those of its ruling powers both in
Church and in state.
In 1513 the balance of power was broken by a successful intrigue of
Savoy in the appointment of the bishop. "Bishop and Duke," says the
chronicle, "like Herod and Pilate, stood united against the city.""1" The
patriots, remaining - even while Reform was in the air - loyal to Rome,
first tried to wean the Bishop from his unholy alliance, but both he and
his successor remained in the power of Savoy. The Genevans therefore
turned to their Swiss neighbours, Berne and Friberg, proposing a joint
citizenship. Berne, however, was by this time Protestant and hesitated
to come to the aid of an unreformed state. Perhaps for the first time
in their municipal history the Genevans were deprived of all their allies;
and the bishop, Pierre de la Baume, thought the moment opportune to
declare them rebels and call in open Savoyard force. But in this extreme
issue Berne preferred a Roman Catholic Geneva independent of Savoy to a
Geneva subject to an external power. In Geneva too the necessity of
association with neighbours was recognised. Criticism of episcopal
ambitions developed into a positive sympathy with Reform and in February
1534 Protestant preachers, including Farel, were at last admitted into
the city. Their influence produced in 21st May, 1536, the famous decree
of the Council that Geneva would henceforth live "according to the holy
2





Decree of the General Council, 21st May, 1536. C.R. XLIX, 202.
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One might criticise this "conversion" of Geneva as the price of
political assistance. But Farel was certainly not the man to accept a
compromise or tolerate false religion, and there is no reason to suppose
that even the Council secretly wished to retain allegiance to the pope.
Religion was in these days a vital issue, and the political survival of
Geneva obviously lay with Reform; so they administered their new allegi¬
ance firmly against any who hankered after Roman ways. The issue between
Calvin and the Council was never whether Reform ought to be retained.
Rather it concerned the ethical consequences of reform."*" The implications
of the vow to live according to the holy Evangelical law of God meant one
thing for him and another for them; rather, the Genevans wanted a lax
interpretation, Calvin imposed one that was almost too burdensome to bear.
2
He was supported in his view by the "French" party, that is, the refugees
who sought sanctuary from persecution. They did not at first^possess
the voting power of citizens, although Calvin latterly pressed for the
reception of increasing numbers; but their influence as Churchmen was




Rilliet makes the point that the party of "Libertines", much of whose
influence and patriotism belonged to the political interests of
Geneva before its Reform, desired a different kind of prosperity from
that which Calvin enforced. Hence the personal conflict of, e.g.,
Calvin and Perrin. Calvin's support came increasingly from the
"French" group, which included all refugees, and who were understand¬
ably more eager for extreme religious measures than the Libertines.
Latterly Calvin pressed for the admission of an increasing number of
these refugees into full citizenship, i.e., into voting power.
Rilliet, p. 80.
Walker, pp. 355, says between 1549-59, 5017 such citizens were
created.




Calvin's character was also an important factor in Genevan life.
He would have made as efficient an inspector of public nuisances as he
made an administrator of human destinies, says one of his critics.1 His
sense of the just extended to the last degree of his jurisdiction, and he
was at the same time gifted with phenomenal powers of administrative
imagination and zeal. The unfortunate Genevese, therefore, were caught
in the toils of a pastor whom they had welcomed as an outstanding
exponent of the Word of God, "but who insisted in implementing to the last
iota of public and private conduct the demands of that Law. He had
little consideration for human frailty, his own or that of others. Like
2
Moses, says Farel, he maintained his power by the respect he extorted,
not by a love which he could not win. Not surprisingly, two serious
attempts were made to remove him. The first succeeded, and he was banished
to Strasburg. The second, the Servetus affair, did not succeed. Calvin
was indispensable to Geneva, all the more so because he never asked for
3
any personal power. He always fought for a principle.
The /
1




Calvin never held higher office than that of pastor. His political
influence was exerted through his sympathisers in office - so that
the editors of the "Annales" in C.R. XLIX can refer to the election
of syndics as "anti-calvinist" e.g.February 3, 1538 (C.R. XLIX, 221).
He was not even a full citizen until 1559, but he was constantly
referred to in matters of theology and administration and seems to
have been a sort of president at the Consistory, (C.R. XLIX, 396)
Ihe "Ordonnances" and "Consilia" (C.R. XXXVIII, part 1) show the
range of his interests, which covered even the arrangements for
city police (ibid., pp. 125 ff). At the same time his ordinary
pastoral labours - preaching and officiating at marriages, etc.,
were incessant, as the "Annales" constantly show.
70
The principle upon which Galvin worked was the indissoluble bond
between Christian obedience and good citizenship. On the one hand, there¬
fore, he was prepared to accept the verdict of his fellow believers on
matters of ecclesiastical practice,"'" but on the other he insisted that
membership of the church should be distinguished by Christian obedience
in the home, in business and in politics. Geneva was to be a "Christian"
2
city. Its spiritual ancestry, therefore, was to be found in the people
of God; their daily conduct was to be regulated by the same Power as
created the ends of the earth. The argument of the 1559 edition of the
(S.H < OS*** JJ
"Institutes" illustrates this . Book I deals at length with
our knowledge of God the Creator; Book II discusses man's Pall and thus
the necessity of God's redeeming work in Christ. This work is manifest
to the "Pathers" under the Law, to us under the Gospel. Law and Gospel
are not, however, antithetical. The Law is part of Christ's mediatorial
work, His redeeming work before the Incarnation, as if He were reaching
out for man by the means which man could best understand. The Law was
no stranger to the w. Book III deals with "the mode of obtaining the
grace of Christ, the benefits it confers, and the effects resulting from
it." In this section Calvin discusses the doctrine of election in order
to establish the absolute value of divine grace. Christian obedience is
a universal requirement not to be escaped on the grounds of human
distinction. /
^ Not only did he accept the Genevan verdict on weekly communion, etc.
Troeltsch, op. cit.. II, 579 ff, says he was willing to make conces¬
sions in doctrine with other Christian bodies.
2 The outstanding issue was the Confession of Faith which Calvin and Parel
proposed in 1537. Piette "John Wesley in the Evolution of Protestantisn
T1937), pp. 59-60, suggests that this demand was an act of spiritual
tyranny. Unlike the massacres of Paris the punishment in Geneva was
at this time only a request, "aultre part demorer ou il vivront a leur
plaisir (Annales - C.R. XLIX, 216}
3 Reyburn, op. cit., remarks that the 1559 Institutes follow the pattern of
the Apostle' S Creed, whereas earlier editions had followed a simpler
plan. The Apostle s Creed itself, of course, proceeds from God^s
Being to man's experience and hope, and the interpretation here adduced
remains substantially correct. May Calvin's motive in recasting the
argument not have been to emphasise this procedure?
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distinction."'' It is, in short, a Law, binding even the reprobate. The
man in Christ therefore is man as God intended him to be, and in Book IV
Calvin discusses the relationship of this man to other saved men, and
finally, the hardest of all problems, his relationship to the others who
are not, or not yet, in Christ.
Calvin's views upon political administration were, therefore, theo-
2
cratic if by theocracy is meant constant reference to divine authority.
His basic assumption is that every detail of every individual's life in every
generation must be conformable to a rule that has eternal significance and
can yet be known and administered by human intelligence acting under the
3
divine Spirit. Calvin eschewed priesthood whether writ large or small.
He himself had every opportunity to wield personal power but never
4
accepted any title or office other than that of pastor. He even con¬
tinued to do the work of a pastor - preaching, visitation, celebration
of the sacraments and offices of the Church - while engaged on his labours
of higher advice and administration. On the other hand he gave large
5
responsibility to the other orders of the ministry. There were doctors
to /
1
The case of Amied Perrin illustrates this view of Calvin. Rilliet,
op. cit., p. 78, quotes Calvin as saying about Perrin's condemnation
that it had the effect "on the one hand of making it publicly known,
that there was now no longer any hope of escaping from correction . . .
and . . . that I have no other treatment for my friends than for my
enemies."
2 Carew Hunt, op. cit.
This doctrine is particularly brought out in the paragraph INST., 4: 10: 17.
An example of this interaction is given by Doumergue, V, p. 227, in
his description of the election by the Consistory of a minister.
4 .
See above, p. 69,, note 3-
5
See below, Chapter 3, section 5, for a discussion of the "Ordonnances".
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to teach the schools, elders to keep in touch with local members for
ordinary - including disciplinary - purposes, deacons to administer poor
relief. In extreme cases of obstruction there was even the magistrate
or the Council itself to take the responsibility of final judgment and
coercion. Ordained and lay had each his own function. Perhaps the one
was not even "greater" than the other. Certainly the ordained man had
no access to knowledge that was closed to the layman. Calvin always
offered his suggestions to the Council in the name of the "ministers"
as if to imply that the Word had spoken to the group engaged in prayer
and study. Like all the Reformers he believed that the truth could be
reached by plain discussion. Therefore on the one hand he distrusted the
Anabaptist claim to special revelations that one must accept on the
authority of individuals, and on the other he insisted that no one - the
minister, for example - owed a different"1" obedience than anyone else's.
The Bible was to be read by all, expounded by the minister, discussed if
need be in session, and finally was to be obeyed by all in every agreed
interpretation of its Law. Those who would not obey or who carried their
conscientious objection to the point of open disobedience were guilty
2
both of blasphemy and of civil crime. They would not be permitted in a
Christian society and must either leave, or suffer the consequence at
least of restraint and perhaps even of destruction.
Calvin's /
1
i.e., different in quality as distinct from degree. Instances will be
found in Chapter 6 of the necessity of a good example on the part of
the minister. Nor was a minister allowed to take usury, but this
for a practical reason. In marriage a minister was expected to bear
his social burden with the rest of mankind.
2
This conclusion is inevitable, as Fairbairn points out in the article
quoted, from the idea of a "Church - State". Camb., Mod. Hist.. II,3714-5
See also ^3e Crue, op. cit., p. 8, "Rien n'est plus etranger & Calvin
que l'idee de la tolerance religieuse."
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Calvin's doings and sufferings in Geneva have "been discussed in
detail by many eminent writers. They have an obvious bearing upon his
theological thinking. For the purpose of this essay it is sufficient to
say that both in the years of his adversity and in the years of his un¬
questioned supremacy Calvin maintained the right and duty of the Church
to judge of right conduct and to withhold communion from such as the
1
appointed officers of the Church should deem unworthy to partake. What¬
ever one may think of the system one cannot but admire both the consistency
and the personal courage of the man who so often stood alone in defence
2
of his views. Calvin might not, however, as Tawney remarks, have wished
to be called a Calvinist. Tawney means that Calvinism outside Geneva
was not of the same stuff as that which held there in Calvin's lifetime.
But Calvin would also have objected to the term on the grounds that he
was not the apostle of himself but the apostle of Christ. His tenacity
depended upon his certainty of the revelation with which he believed
himself entrusted. It is clear that the theological basis of his thinking
was a serious acceptance of that which has been revealed by God in His
Scriptures and in His Christ, and that his ethical principle was that of
discipline. These emphases will require constant reference in subsequent
chapters, and the final question for this section will be why Geneva
tolerated Calvin and why he stayed on in Geneva.
The /
1
This was the crux of the matter in which Berthelier represented the
opposition of the anti-Calvinists. Calvin's refusal was made at
the nadir of his political fortunes. They were repaired by the
mistake of the Libertines in putting forward Servetus to oppose
Calvin theologically.
2
op. cit.. p. 107.
Ik
The reason why Geneva would always stop short of its persecution at
Calvin's suggestion^- to leave is, as has been said, that Calvin was
indispensable to Genevan prosperity. It was, as it were, a new city,
not quite part of the Swiss cantonal system and determined not to be what
militarily it was in great danger of being - part of the French Kingdom.
The maintenance of Reform, therefore, was important to Geneva both as a
means of retaining Swiss support and of maintaining friendship with the
Protestant states of Germany. Calvin's reputation was thus to Geneva an
invisible rampart. Moreover, commercially, Geneva was reaping the trade,
particularly the financial trade, that had once passed through Lyons.2
The vision of the Genevese morally, therefore, was away from the feudal
restraints of medieval society to which, in a large degree, the Roman
Catholic church and the Lutheran theology were still bound.In a word,
Geneva required Calvin as the defender of usury, upon which the very life
of the city economically depended.
Calvin required Geneva. He remained in the first instance and returned
in 1542 to the torments of residence because he knew Geneva to be the best
pulpit in Europe.^ With an eye to Italy and particularly to France he
set up his college out of which students poured into neighbouring countries,
and /
Reyburn makes this point, op. cit., 157, 164, 194.
2 Tawny, op. cit., 118.
^
Ibid., 105 ff. The same remark has been made in a recent book,
"The Heritage of the Reformation", reviewed in "Expository Times",




and even overseas'*' carrying with them the trained mind and spirit and
the theology which could alone effectively establish the new movement.
g
Doumergue, speaking of Laski's church system in Emden, remarks upon the
characteristically democratic discipline which was practised there. The
influence spread to the Dutch states, Scotland and England, and even to
3
some extent to Poland; and wherever the policy outlined by Calvin was
followed, there grew up a tough core of responsible religious conviction
which politically developed into a democratic nationalism which broke
the great medieval empire#. It is in keeping with the Calvinist spirit
that in our own times Geneva is the centre of international movements.
The Red Cross and the League of Nations, which will no doubt be associated
by the less disillusioned historians of the future with the United Nations
Organisation, both appeal to the consent and support of individuals of
all nations. It is almost a religious appeal, demanding, as Calvin's
preaching demanded, a personal response to a revealed truth. One turns
naturally, therefore, to preaching as the means which Calvin used to
achieve his ends.
(iii)
Preaching played a large part in the life and influence of all the
4
Reformers. Calvin himself preached a very large number of sermons in
Geneva /
1
Mitchell Hunter, op. cit.
2
Jean Calvin, V.227,Carew Hunt, op. cit.
3 Reyburn, op- cit., p. 3O7.
4 '
T. H. L. Parker, "The Oracles of God" (1947) gives an appendix with
the known sermons of Calvin. They are more than twothousand in
number, and thirty-five volumes are still missing.
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Geneva alone, and clearly regarded that side of his work as of the utmost
importance, not only as a means of expounding the Word of God to the
faithful but also as a means of beating out the implications of that Word
for the daily life of Geneva. In February 1545, for example, he wrote
to Viret to say that he had "broken ground upon the internal state of
the city in ten sermons".1 The fact that he chose the means of preaching
for such an analysis of civic conditions reveals much both of Calvin's
and of Calvin's Geneva. Calvin conceived his public to be in the
2
congregations that he addressed. In Geneva at least, therefore, the
political power was to rest with the citizens who were in turn to delegate
it to their elected magistrates. Authority was of God, but it was not
given of divine right to prince or president; it was mediated to them
3
by the voice of God s faithful people; and in turn the voice of the
people was instructed by God's Own Word as preached and studied.
The following paragraphs are not a sermon of Calvin's, but a
consideration of the problems of all Christian preaching with special
reference to the kind of problem with which Calvin as an administrator
had to deal. In preaching, the Christian is both "under God" and face
to face with other human personalities, believers and unbelievers. As
under God he rests in an inescapable certainty that the Word set forth
is, in its essentials at least - for some allowance must be made for
human weakness - absolute Truth.4 But if the human words of the preacher
are /
1




Doumergue, V. 424 refers to this "liberalism" as evolving a "vertu parti-
culiere" of monarchy, viz. eloquence. "Le roi doit persuader ses
sujets plutfrt que les forcer."
4 Parker op. cit., 50 ff.
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ar© to "be tested "by the open Book Before him, the Book Itself is being
tested by the human experience of the preacher and the hearers, for the
task of the preacher is not simply to declaim, "Thus said the Lord"
to some historical situation now past and done with, not even to assert,
"Thus saith the Lord" as if the Word were a mathematical axiom, true
but soulless, but "Thus saith the Lord here and now" to the practical
particular situation in which we live. The preacher is God's "Cadi",
His mouth-piece under the Holy Spirit, and the Word preached, though it
refers often to things said and done "once for all" yet has a constant
living reference to the continually opening present. Not only the
preacher, therefore, but the congregation also,"*" have a contribution to
make to the sermon; for the point of the preacher's exhortation is to
direct believers along a certain line of action, because they have
already accepted so much of God's divine command. It is not altogether
correct to say with Brunner of the prophets that they were "used and
used up",^ nor to conclude that Calvin thought of God's servants as mere
mouth-pieces.3 Certainly he drove himself and others to the utmost,
perhaps he even over-rode individual personality in the pursuit of God's
greater glory, but the God Whom he preached was no impersonal Force
laying unintelligent conditions upon human existence.^ He was the God
and /
1 Under the Holy Spirit Who creates faith. INST.,, i: i|. _ 5.
2 Philosophy of Religion, p. 163.
3 He did, of course, speak of the Canonical books as dictated by the Holy
Spirit 'INS?-., 1: 6: 1 ff: also 1: 7: 1 - 5) also U: 8: 6. The
writers were thus "secretaries" (amanuenses) 4: 8: 9, and their
writings 'oracles' of God, since God "consecrated their mouths and
tongues to His service 1: 5). Also "Calvin and the Reformation",
159 ff.
^ Calvin's distrust of the Anabaptists was precisely that they raised
"private revelations" above Scriptural truth - INST. 1: 9: passim. He
contended that even in the reign of Christ, "the true and full
felicity of the new Church will consist in their being ruled not less
by the Word than by the Spirit of God." 1: 9: 1. Like Paul, there¬
fore, he desired prophesying "to edification" rather than speaking with
tongues. 1 "COR, , XIV, 2ff.
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and Fattier of our Lord, Who spared not His Only-begotten Son. The
greater glory of God was the best life for man.
Ultimately the problem of the preacher is that of the unbeliever.
If the situation contained only believers there would be no suggestion of
a "natural" law, as distinct in essence from a "revealed" law, since all
evidence which our experience throws up would be traced to the hand of
the Creator. The task of the preacher would thus be merely a constant
explication of mundane experience in terms of the revealed workings of
1
God with His historic people. Luther, according to Doumergue,
accepted this delimitation of the Church's task, leaving mundane affairs
to the prince whom he elevated to the spiritual level of a bishop.
Calvin, too, it must be admitted, took little account of individual
claims to dissent. Servetus, Gruet, Berthelier, Perrin, and many more
found Geneva too hot for them, and that not for their moral delinquency,
but for theological opposition to the Reformer. Disparagers of Calvin
ask why their views could not have been tolerated, provided they should
keep the peace; but of course the question is foolish. Calvin's
state was a Christian state, and its peace therefore required the main¬
tenance of Christian standards - theological as well as ethical - just
2
as a modern state has to persuade the conscientious objector to total
war /
op. cit., V.47-8. "II demandait aux princes Chretiens de devenir eveques.'
2
The analogy of the conscientious objector is perhaps the closest to the
16th century heretic, because he is objecting to principles and
actions which are important, both practically and emotionally, to
society. I understand that in National Socialist Germany such men
were beheaded as traitors. The British method of restraint by
adverse public opinion, toleration of religious objection, and im¬
prisonment only in the event of non-religious recalcitrance was equal¬
ly inconsistent, if more humane, for the pacifist ate food brought by
war-like methods, and was thus forced to be inconsistent with his
principles; and at the same time, for security reasons, was not per¬
mitted to seek asylum in a society in which he could conscientiously
live.
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war to stifle his scruples during a national emergency. In the years
that were opening out after Calvin's life such persons could retire to
the empty lands "beyond the oceans, and there live according to the dic¬
tates of their conscience. Many did; both non-conformists"'" to
dictatorial rule and "black sheep" who could continue to sow wild oats
2
amongst defenceless natives without scandal on the paternal door-step.
We have returned to-day full cycle to the problem of accommodation of
the unbeliever that Calvin and his age, cooped up in Christendom, strove
4. 3to solve.
The controversy into which Karl Earth and Erni 1 Brunner have entered
in their famous pamphlets, "Nature and Grace" and "Rein" illustrate the
problem that Calvin was facing. And in the first place, it is signifi¬
cant that Barth thought it necessary to make an "angry Introduction" to
his reply to Brunner. These matters are not merely of academic, dis¬
passionate interest, but the very stuff of faith. Like Calvin, Barth
has to conclude from his very earnestness of pursuit, that an opponent
is not just mistaken but is somehow reprehensible in defending his
mistake. So Barth prefaces his discussion of Brunner's doctrine of
4
"ordinances" with a scornful question, "Who are we, sinners through
and /
E.g., the Puritans of England, although they were unwilling to consider
themselves as non-conformists - E. H. Byington, "The Puritan in England
and New England" (1896); "The Puritan as a Calvinist and Reformer"
(1899). He points out their difficulty in creating a social system
which would not lose anything of the zeal of the first settlers.
Doumergue in "Calvin and the Reformation" (1909) pp. 24 ff, discusses
a suggestion that the Anabaptist zeal could be the real force of such
reconstruction.
^ Thackeray mentions such black sheep in "The Virginians".
rt
And which they did solve, according to Doumergue, e.g., "Jean Calvin" V,
p. 215 in terms of discipline. Knox in Scotland is of course another
example. Details abound in Graham, op. cit.
4
See "Natural Theology", p. 86.
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and through" to assert the "Tightness" of this or that sociological
axiom. But he agrees that the axiom is indeed an axiom. That is to
say, he does not deny the existence of universal sociological custom,
and does not deny the "instincts and reason which both believers and
unbelievers have every reason to allow to function in the life of the
community." What he does deny is the argument that on the basis of
such knowledge alone there can be any conclusion about the nature of the
God and Father of our Lord. Indeed, he goes on,"^" if the concept of
"law" is to be introduced, "the physical, biological and chemical 'laws
of nature"' have a much greater claim to be called 'law' than the
variable practices which form the basis of, for example, marriage.
"Clarity and certainty" are possible about external nature in a manner
that they are not possible about human affairs.
Both Barth and Brunner make their appeal to Calvin, and both claim
to be interpreting Calvin aright. Both also agree that they are
Christian believers, having a concern for the eternal salvation of those
who are not. It is the manner of approach to the unbeliever that
separates them. Brunner wants to speak to the unbeliever of the God
Whom they are "ignorantly" worshipping; Barth wants to preach the mere
dogma of the faith, leaving to the Holy Spirit the task of placing the
2
seed in the ground. Both also agree that the unbelief of the unbeliever





Ibid., 54 ff: 127.
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Truth that is in Christ.
What did Calvin do in his preaching? This is a different question
from that which asks, "What would Calvin say to our situation?", and
perhaps one can say at this point that the multitude of Calvin studies
in our present times are valuable just because Calvin's mind and times
are relevant to our problems. Calvin in his preaching faced no
atheistic dogma. He found life in Geneva akin to the torments of Hell,
but not because the Genevans opposed his doctrine. They needed his
doctrine but they found it hard to bear. They were, in short, Christian
believers, though not yet thoroughly reformed. Calvin took their faith
for granted. Moreover he took their power of reasoning for granted."1"
The Renaissance had introduced a confidence in human intelligence that
no longer exists now that we have discovered the power of deceptive
2
propaganda. Whatever, therefore, Calvin might say about corruption,
he tacitly assumed that the Truth when presented carried its own conviction
g
to hearts that were not dominated by an evil will to revolt. So he
could conclude, the Fathers of the Old Testament, who knew not the fulfil¬
ment of God's purpose in Jesus Christ, were nevertheless in His Kingdom
by the faith with which they pursued the unknown ends of His divine
commands. Moreover, it was possible to say that the pagans had their
"Fathers" who, although cut off from the revelation that was given to
Israel /
1 *
In fact, as De Crue says, Calvin characteristically accepted the
established order, on. cit., p. 12.
2
INST., 2: 1 passim.
3
INST., 2: 10: 23.
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Israel, nevertheless had sincerely pursued the dictates of reason. In
short, Calvin believed that God had not left Himself without witness in
the world to such as had eyes to see. The Holy Spirit may be said to
1
have guided the good pagans along the Way of Christ.
This interpretation seems to favour Brunner; and Barth is wrong in
the implication that he makes of truth as strictly impersonal. For
Calvin, human affairs were not of relative significance. God's Word
was to man, even if man had fallen. As Brunner says elsewhere, if human
affairs are to be relegated to this sub-absolute level, there is an
inevitable descent from an "objective, superhuman standard of justice"
2
to a "subjective law of human reason", and then to a law of Nature where
nature is external to human personality, and finally, by a simple
identification of the state - a particular state - with the reality of
nature, to sheer impersonal totalitarianism. On the other hand, Barth
is correctly interpreting Calvin when he scornfully rejects the analogy
3
of human marriage as a type of eternal natural law. Vi'hatever marriage
may have been "si integer stetisset Adam" it represented to Calvin a
sign of human weakness of the flesh. The marriages which the Reformers
entered and the manner in which they entered them suggest quite the
opposite from Brunner's suggestion that marriage is a sort of sacrament
of /
The subject is not one which Calvin or anyone else at the time pursued.
But Calvin does not seem to have regretted his commentary on
Seneca's"De dementia".
2
"Justice and the Social Order".
3
"Nein". "Natural Theology", 85 ff.
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of nature. Marriage is a sign of the sinfulness of even the priest,
and the Reformed minister entered marriage partly at least as a sign
1
that he was no better than his lay neighbour. Both marrying and the
state might be remedies for human sinfulness, but upon them could not be
erected positive interpretations of God's law. To use the phrases of
the modern controversy, the "Wortmachtigkeit" of man is not so much
indicative of his "Offenbarungsmachtigkeit" as of his guilt. And this
2
is the line that Calvin pursued in his preaching and practice, as will
be further discussed in dealing with the "uses and offices" of the Law.
The unchristian person, in Calvin's view, was the person who was missing
the truth - the unhappy, in fact the mad, person. It was the business
of the pastor to bring home to him the unhappiness of his position, and
it was the business of the Christian state to prevent the escape of the
unbeliever /
"It was the desirability of marriage in itself . . . rather than affec¬
tion for any one person that awoke the thought of his own union in
Calvin's mind." Walker, op. cit., 233. His description of the ideal
wife is described in his letter to Earel, 19th May, 1539.
fHeming^ard, V, no. 7893 • Yet her death remained a living sorrow
\Reyburn, op. cit.. 1463. Zwingli's marriage was a "clerical
marriage". It was legalised in 1525 [Lindsay II, 38j. Knox's
marriage to Marjorie Bowes appears in a similarly theological light
[La^ng III, 394-5 J. Margaret Baxter's character and life is described
by Isobel Butchart. Robert Graves wrote jn novel on "Wife to Mr
Milton". Milton's description of marriage in Eden stresses the
superiority of the husband. "He for God only, she for God in him."
(Par. Lost.. IV, 299).
^ InLMST.I, caps. 6 ff. Calvin argues the self-evidence of God's Word to
the normal person. One illustration has a modern flavour, "Just as
old men, and those suffering from ophthalmia, and all those who have
bad eyesight, if you put before them even the finest book, although
they recognise that something is written, can yet scarcely put two
words together, but if they are helped by the interposition of spec¬
tacles will begin to read distinctly, so the Scripture ..." If
Calvin had known about the Isahara test for colour blindness he might
have used it as an illustration, although strictly it is more aptly
applicable to the distinction he draws between those who can believe
and those who either because of mental deficiency or reprobation, are
"inanus". It would be particularly applicable in those cases since it
raises the question of a possible cure. The problem in preaching is
nothing more than whether the preaching of the Word does interpose the
cure for sin, or, to be more particular, how the preacher is so to
present his message that the "spectacles" are firmly placed.
Qk
unbeliever from his unhappiness into a false delusion which would "bring
him to Hell. Hence in the Church discipline was the very nervejf of its
existence,and hence also in the state there had to "be mutual understanding
with the Church. The problem of the unbeliever is, in short, not whether
as an academic fact he "can" be saved, but why, as a practical fact, he
is not saved. Calvin presumably could admit only two possibilities. The
2
man might be "mad" Of rebellious. Not, of course, that theologically the
Christian would accept even these alternatives to God's will. As
Professor Soucek has pointed out in a recent article^on Barth's "Dogmatik"
sin may be a serious reality for human action but the Christian can never
allow the suggestion that behind the human scenes God is defeated by sin.
These are matters of God's inscrutable Providence. Here on earth we
simply have to act according to the facts and lights which He ordains for
us. The recalcitrant, Calvin bluntly concludes, must be forced to Christian
laws of the Christian state, even if he is incapable of understanding them.
There is, of course, no "explanation" of this antinomy, and Calvin is
content merely to state it as clearly as he can. "If lust, in which sin
has its dominion," he says, "so enthrals us, that we are not free to obey
our Father, there is no ground for pleading necessity as a defence, since
4
this evil is within, and must be imputed to outselves." One cannot, of
course, /
1
INST. 4: 12: 1.
^ "Mento alienati" 2: 1. Barth uses the term "Verruckt",
Nein, p. 25.
® Published in "The Scottish Journal of Theology", Vol. 2, No. 1.
4 There is another good reason for quoting this particular sentence. It
occurs in a passage which does not materially change in any edition of
the Institutes, from first to last. One sentence, indeed, remains
verbatim.
Institutio, p. 45. Nec praetendere excusationem, licet, quod
facultas desit, et velut exhausti debitores solvendo non simus. Culpa
enim nostra est et peccati nostri, quod nos vinctos tenet, ne quod
bene /
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course, conceivably be enthralled by oneself, for "to enthral" implies both
aggression and submission. If "lust" is the aggressor, what is the
victim? Supposing what is elsewhere referred to as "conscience" is the
victim, how can both be said to be parts of the unity of an individual?
If, again, "lust" is the true "I", then there is no real responsibility
since "conscience" is a foreign imposition which could only conquer by
annihilation of the "I". Or if "conscience" is the true "I" then the
question how "lust" comes in at all has to be raised. Tawney finds no
1
meaning in this sort of sentence, but his bewilderment is precisely what
one would expect from a critic whose principle of judgment is human reason.
Calvin here was intending to underline the dependence of his faith upon
Divine revelation.
The acceptance of divine revelation as the basis of Christian conduct
involves some of the hardest problems of theological definition. Christian
revelation has five clearly distinct strands, the Old Testament and the
New Testament as literary sources, the Church and the free inspiration of
the Spirit as the "living" sources, and creation as the intellectual source.
None can be ignored: the question rather is the order of their importance.
Calvin and the Reformers generally subordinated the last three to the
first two. Their primary concern was with the written Word, and on the
whole /
bene aut velim.us agere aut possimus.
INST. 2: 8: 2. Nec nraetendere excusationem licet, quod
faculty's desit, et velut exhausti debitores, solvendo non simus. . . .
Quicquid a nobis exigat, quia non potest nisi rectum exigere,] ex
naturae obligatione obsequendi necessitas nos manet; quod autem non
possumus, id vitii nostri est. A propria enim cupiditate, in qua
peccatum regnat, si vincti tenemur, ne soluti simus in nostri Patris
obsequuium, non est cum necessitatem pro defensione causemur, cuius
malum et intra nos est et nobis imputandum.
Note. The phrase "naturae obligatione". On the view advanced
here, nature is based essentially upon an illogical principle deriving




whole they appealed to Creation only as a system in which God could "be
found as the Author. Again, although they were upholders of the Church
and upholders also of personal responsibility they had every reason, because
of Rome on the one hand and the Anabaptists on the other, to be wary about
Apostolic succession or prophetic utterance. In the matter of Scripture,
however, they were less unanimous, and in this hesitancy they have had
many successors in the Protestant tradition. E. P. Scott's article on
the Commandments in Hasting's "Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels" is
characteristic of the careful avoidance which one makes of any suggestion
that the Decalogue is to be binding upon the Christian conscience. It
is even possible to conclude that a "new" law of life is to be found in
the Gospel. This is a less adequate conclusion than Luther's, namely
that in the spirit of faith the believer will constantly be instructed in
the details of many Decalogues, but it is similar in its desire to avoid
on the one hand a mere submergence of Christ into the Old Testament and
on the other the mere demolitionof all Christian duty CMB.
Calvin's treatment of Scripture will be dealt with more specifically
in a later section, and the present remarks are intended merely to deter¬
mine the standards by which these views are to be received. This prepara¬
tion is important in so;far as criticism of Calvin is associated with a
particular kind of criticism of the Old Testament. Brunner, in an
important article, "Die Bedeutung des Alten Testaments fiir unsern Glauben"'1'
remarks upon the significance of Harnack's last great work, which was a
study /
y- .
Zwischen den Zeiten, 1930, Hft. I, pp. 30 ff.
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study of Marcion. Harnack, Brunner says, reflected Schleiermacher's
views on the Old Testament which he summarises as having only a more
particular reference - a reference of historical causation - to him than
-9 non-Biblical religions. That is to say, it was merely the accident
of history which made the Old Testament relevant to Schleiermacher's
Christian faith. He could have reached the same faith through other
religions provided the New Testament were placed at the climax. As
Brunner remarks, such a view, strictly speaking, gives no meaning for
Christian faith to the Old Testament. It is merely a particular manifesta¬
tion of God to particular circumstances.'5'
Schleiermacher could not, of course, have said what he did about him¬
self had his Protestant heritage not been firmly based upon the relevance
to faith of the Old Testament. It is significant, incidentally, that in
g
the revival of evangelical faith books upon Marcion, but written from the
traditional anti-Marcionite angle, are commoner. Whatever may be the
manner of interpreting the Old Testament - and Calvin invoked the principles
of charity and equity^ - Calvin's Protestantism was firmly rooted in the
particular revelation of God to His own people.4 The Bible to Calvin was
a unity, a tradition into which Christian believers were brought. Therefore
the revealed Will of God - the Decalogue - belonged for him to the body of
eternal revelation which embraces the Creation and the Covenant of Grace,
that /
1
A similar view was noted in Chapter I where pagan sacrifice is suggested
as the "Old Testament of the Pagans", p. 13, note
2
See Expository Times, LXI, no. 8, pp. 238 ff.
3 Brunner, op. clt., p. 241, charity being the New Testament norm, equity
4 the refernce to God.'s timeless command.
INST, 2: ©aps. 9-11, bring out this point decisively. Calvin bases
his argument on the Sculptural implications of God's dealings with His
people, which, Calvin emphasises, always points to a fulfilment be¬
yond the immediate occasion.
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that is to say, in his preaching he might touch on the most diverse
matters of practical import, hut the exhortation derived from the
principles of the divine Will as revealed in Scripture, and to a less
degree, in Christian experience. It was based upon the dogma that the
religion of Jesus as deposited in Scripture, was the only true expression
of the One True God's eternal Will for all mankind.
89
Calvin was not the only one concerning himself with the problems of
Christian discipline in these Reformation years. Apart from any inter¬
est that the Reformers might have in the formulation of their distinctive
views, the problem, of Church doctrine and especially of Church discipline
were of constant importance in the Christian civilisation of the middle
age itself; and particularly in these early years of the 16th century,
when the prestige of the Church was at a low and falling ebb, it was the
concern of serious minded raen to enhance it by a restoration of true
Christian piety. One of the most significant results of the Protestant
Reformation was the work of Calvin's contemporary, Loyola, In re-establish¬
ing lay respect for Rome through the discipline of the priesthood and the
propagation of the faith. Calvin belonged, like Loyola, to the second
generation of those who followed the Lutheran movement, and for that
reason if for no other was able to give a wider view of the whole. The
"Institutes" is generally regarded as head and shoulders above anything
that was done previously and most of what has since been done, to express
the theological and the ethical implications of justification by faith;
but it was not without predecessors and contemporaries in the elucida¬
tion of the fundamental problems. Such a declaration was indeed necessary
by the very nature of the Protestant movement. It had adversaries ,
armed with an authority consecrated by ten centuries, who charged the
movement with blasphemy and with the intention of overthrowing all
order, human and divine; and it had what one now would call "fellow-
travellers" - loose partisans who took what they wanted from the move¬
ment without acknowledging the discipline of membership with it;
these f
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these were the Anabaptists, with whom the Reformers were constantly
being identified and from whom they made the greatest efforts to dis¬
sociate themselves; consequently it was necessary to clarify to the
true friends of Reform its moral righteousness and its social
stability.
Mention has been made of the early development of the Reformed
liturgy. Protestant dogmatics and ethics evolved with the same con¬
servative reluctance to break with the past and the same internal
pressure of conscience to do so. Sometimes the credit for the first
effort is given to Melanchthon with his "Loci Communes" published in
1521; but in this study some consideration will be given first to
Luther's own contribution in his treatise "Of Good Works" which
originated in a series of sermons in 1520. Both of these publications
were accidental in the sense that they arose from material delivered
casually from the spoken word. Zwingli's apologia "De vera et falsa
religione commentarius" published in 1525 was a clearer definition of
the faith made for Italian and French refugees in Zurich. Farel's
"Summaire briefue declaration daucuns lieux fort necessaires a un
chascun Chrestien pour mettre sa confiance en Dieu et ayder son pro-
chain" written in 1524 possibly for his church of French refugees^in
Basel, and later re-edited in 1534 to re-inforce the work which he was
beginning in Geneva, is an example of the explicit defence of the move¬
ment in the French language. Bucer, first of Strasburg and latterly
in England, expressed in his last work, "De Regno Christi", the
problems of Church and state in terms of English history. These works
are /
T :
Heyer, "Guillaume Farel" (1872) pp. 18ff, describes some of these
refugees.
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are not all of equal importance, ana all do not express the same compre¬
hensiveness of design. Zwingli's work, for example, is concerned main¬
ly with the errors of transubstantiation; Bucer's is quite a social
philosophy. But the mark of Reform is upon them all, for they all re¬
turn to the necessity of direct individual responsibility to God.
Luther did not impose himself as a reformer upon the Church. With¬
out any personal ambition he re-ached the position by an inward neces¬
sity. It is not necessary to trace his early life; the point at which
this study can begin is his appointment by the Wittenburg city council
to be the permanent substitute for Simon Heinse, one of the city
pastors. Till then Luther had been obliged to preach only occasion¬
ally in the convent, and had therefore been confined in the expression
of his opinions by the occasion and the limitations of his university
teaching. But his new appointment narrowed his theology to
practical issues and widened it to an application beyond the piety of
convent life. He had now the direct responsibility of setting human
souls unprotected from the world by a spiritual "calling" upon the way
of salvation."1" The responsibility not only crystalised his earlier
teaching; it precipitated his first literary works. In his lectures
on the Psalms, begun in 1513, he had declared his conviction in the jus¬
tifying power of faith; end this view was re-emphasised in his "Epistle
to the Romans" (1515-16). Then in 1517 he published his first
independent work, the "Explanation of the Seven Penitential Psalms" -
his object being to edify the congregation with which he had been
entrusted. In the same year came the famous Ninety five Theses
against /
1 Luch of this preaching concerned both the Ten Commandments and the
Lord's Prayer (i.e. , the traditional basis of lay morality as laid
down in the Prone). Between 1517 and 1519 several of these
sermons were published - see \'L A. 1.
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against Indulgences, occasioned by the competitive offers of salvation
by Tetzel to the people of the torn. Tetzel being on official papal
business the Theses were virtually a challenge to the papacy itself,
but Luther sustained it from the authority which he believed he held
from God for the right direction of God's people to salvation.
Nevertheless the challenge to the papacy meant a challenge to both
the theology and the politics of the Holy See. In the following years
Luther was brought into controversy with a widening circle of scholar¬
ship and began to pour out a series of tracts on such subjects as the
Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, confession, meditation on the
Passion, marriage, usury, the preparation for death, baptism, excom¬
munication, and so on - all subjects which would arise in the mind of
a man wrestling not only with theological abstractions but with the
daily questions of faith in contact with the world. The work selected
to represent Luther belongs to this period. The treatise "Of Good
Works" arose from his interest in the Decalogue .from a preaching point
of view, but in its published form had a wider consideration."1" George
Spalatin was court preacher to the Elector and it was on his recommenda¬
tion that Luther put together his thoughts on the ethics of Reform,
dedicating the work to John, brother of the reigning Elector and
destined to succeed him in 1525. Both the dedication and much of the
contents of the work reflect the same concern as moved Calvin also to
O
dedicate his work to a prince. The Duke of Saxony, George, had heard
Luther preach in Dresden and had formed an adverse opinion of the
doctrine of justification by faith alone on the grounds that it opened
up /
^ See W. A. 71, 166-7 for an introduction.
Calvin and Zwingli both dedicated works to Francis I of France.
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up the opportunity for anarchy; and, whatever the papacy had done or left
undone, its interest was always on the side of authority, so that one had
only to placate Rome to maintain order amongst the faithful. The doctrine
of direct personal responsibility to God alone,however, carried the impli¬
cation that individuals were not responsible to any intermediary, and
this doctrine could be interpreted in terras destructive of civil as well
as ecclesiastical obedience. Some persons had already interpreted the
matter so; and many others were unjustly accused of doing so. It became
necessary therefore for the Reformers to explain that although "good works"
were spiritually useless, yet in fact a Christian believer would be the
best of citizens; for, although good works do not imply the existence of
faith, faith implies the doing of good works.
As might be expected, Luther was conservative in his political views.
The treatise "Of Good Works" is an appeal for personal righteousness,1
the Decalogue being taken as a pattern of the sort of life that God
has shown that He desires men to follow if they would be His servants.
But the appeal is to men and women in their own sphere of life. What
Luther achieves thex-efore is a striking emphasis upon the significance
of personal righteousness even where the individual person has no
political significance. At its best, this doctrine brings into the
existing social group something of the brightness of primitive
innocence ; at the worst it becomes mere platitude divorced from
necessary /
1
In his introduction to the Great Catechism of 1529, he says everyone
ought to know and understand the Ten Commandments, the Apostle's
Creed, and the Lord's Prayer, because they comprise in brief the
content of Scripture. This reference is to the "lay" morality
that has already been described as the object of the Prone
9k
necessary action. The issue depends upon the state of existing
social conditions and the good will of the government. In short,
Luther fits his teaching into the setting of a fairly prosperous agri¬
cultural community which can satisfy its own needs and which is on good
terms with the reigning squire. The situation is remote from the urban
interests and ambitions of Geneva and the doctrinaire ethics of a con¬
gregation of religious refugees. In the one case there was no desire
for self government but the desire for a good prince; on the other,
there was not only the desire and ambition for self control but the
historical and political necessity for it.
The treatise has two strata. In the first place it is an appeal
to believers to exercise their faith in a practical manner; in the
second it is an appeal to the prince to create and maintain the con¬
ditions of the personal good life. In both cases the basis is the
religious factor of "faith". Faith is the principle which distin¬
guishes works that are truly good from those which only appear io be
2
good; but this principle is not equivalent to knowledge of what is
good and what is not good. Knowledge of the good is derived from "the
commandments of God", which lie open to all who have normal understanding.
3
Faith is rather the "reaction" of the human soul to those high
commandments, /
JL i
Luther actually said that man in his primeval innocence had no need of
government, e.g. , W.A. XII, 329, "Wenn nicht bose leut weren, so
durfft man keynen ubirkeytt. " This view of government was the
traditional medieval idea. Sometimes Luther suggests, however, that
even in Paradise there might have been a governmental relationship.E. g. W. a. :.XLII, 62, 'septimo die mane videtus Adam audivisse
Dominum mandantem curam oeconomicsm et politicam cum prohibitione
pomi. "
2 W.A. VI, 204: "Zum ersten ist zUwissen, das kein gutte Werken sein,
dan allein die Got geboten hat". etc.
3
i 205: "dan wie ihr gewissen gegen Got stehet und glaubet, szo
sein die werck auch, die darausz geschehn".
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commandments, and depends upon God's dynamic Spirit rather than His
written Law. The place of the Law in good works therefore is, as Calvin
also agrees, in its fostering of a sense of human dependence upon one's
Creator, and it is this humility which distinguishes truly good works
from those works which are called "good" because of their appearance,
magnitude, number, or the praise they receive of men, such good works
as visiting shrines, pilgrimages to Rome, mere bodily attendance at the
saying of the service, collection of vestments and jewels, "so-called,
1
self elected works". True faith expresses itself in the domestic
virtues of honesty and obedience in the conduct of one's daily labour or
business. The social problem of the times, Luther pertinently says, is
that "virtue" has become a series of ordinances possible only to those
with leisure to perform them - a hobby, in fact - and is no longer that
flavour which should pervade the doing of all duties as ever in the
2
Great Task-master's eye.
Faith is not a mechanical activity. "When a man and woman love
and are pleased with each other, and thoroughly believe in their love,
who teaches them, how they are to behave, what they are to do, leave
3
undone, say, not say, think?" They are controlled not by a "law" but
by love. This idea of f aith was not new. There had long been a
distinction drawn between "fides informis" - the faith of intellectual
acknowledgment /
T Ibid. , 211.
2
Ibid., 205: The distinction is between the work a man does as his trade
and religious actions like praying, fasting} etc. Luther's view is
that all works done in faith are good.
g
Ibid. , 207: This is the distinction between lav/ and love that plays so
large a part in Lutheran theology.
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acknowledgment without any signs of grace in conduct - and "fides
formata" - the faith that is actively directed towards the beloved
SaviouP? and in Luther's time everyone who was seriously interested
in religious questions pursued this latter faith. Luther speaks of it
as "the true fulfilment of the first commandment". Luther in short
distinguishes mere obedience to the Church from that true obedience
that comes from personal love of God, and is already on the way to
11m itbtion of the Church as the object of a man's inmost responsibility.
The knowledge of the good is a direct possibility and the obedience
demanded is a personal responsibility to God. But faith issues in
distinctive actions; it is the "best work" from which all truly good
works depend. And the good works which he has in mind may be summed
up in the phrase "good citizenship" such as a prince would want to find
in his subjects.
The doctrine looks quite innocuous from a prince's point of view,
and yet Duke George had exclaimed against Luther's admission of some
Tightness in Wiclif and Hus, "God help us, the plague". On the
assumption that the Christian congregation would remain content with
the authority of the ruling prince, the doctrine was indeed innocuous;
all the more so as the prince was of the same mind as Luther and the
1
people, that the papal "officiales" were knaves. But one never knew
where the question of ethical authority would lead. With an ecclesiastical
institution one could enter into a concordat and rest assured that
the Church would honour the contract as honestly as any other
institution might. And thus one could ihdirectly buy an assured
obedience /
I
W.A. , VI, 228.
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obedience of the people through the priest. But if "good" works were
to be illustrated from a Book which it would be left to every man to
read for himself, there was no saying when someone would begin, on the
authority of that Book, to criticise the doings of the prince himself.
This became a prime issue in the Reformation, involving not only the
practical question of dissociation from Anabaptist anarchism, but as a
consequence, a radical re interpretation of the whole doctrine of Christian
.conduct. Luther's contribution was of a more modest scope than Calvin's
despite the fact that he seems to have described human nature in just
1
as realistic blackness. The difference is that Luther never emanci¬
pated himself from the belief that his so well known surroundings
could be restored to the romantic happiness of the "good old days",
while Calvin, himself an exile living amongst exiles in the political
upheaval of Geneva, was more detached in his judgment even of kings and
princes. For all the diplomatic defence of sovereignty which Calvin
and Calvinists maintained, Queen Elizabeth was quite right in suspect-
2
ing her Puritan subjects of desiring a change of policy in her government.
But the feudal system was part of the Kingdom of God for Luther. The
"inner" ethics of personal love, therefore, became increasingly distinct
from the working of the "outer" authority of government; and by this
detachment from affairs of state, Luther is open to the criticism that
he ignored the central problem of all Christian ethics, that of "justice".
The consideration of the commandments themselves falls within this
limitation. The first three are all taken as illustrations of the
necessity /
^ See above, p. 81, note 2.
®CcQtt Pearson, op. cit., pp. 62-3.
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necessity of faith in proper Christian obedience. The honour of God,
for example, can be performed by any "poor man, in whom no one can
see many great works, in the privacy of his home".1 Indeed, "temporal
honour and praise" are even a danger to faith since a man is always
tempted to take flattery too seriously. The attainment of honour is
not in itself an evil but virtue must be loved for itself, just as child¬
ren may be bribed to attend church at an age when they cannot be
expected to understand the implications of worship, but should be taught
2
at last to go for the worship itself. Of course even the virtuous may
fall, but the Church is wrong in emphasizing too much the threatenings of
God, for there is always the opportunity of reinstatement; so that
another "work" of the commandment is to preserve the constancy of humble
3
faith in God's redemption. Within its limits, Luther's doctrine of
obedience is realistic enough. His "faith" is not a hothouse plant.
It belongs to the real world of moral challenge in work, marriage, busi-
4
ness and so on; and it culminates in the chief "good work" of bearing
a witness for righteousness even against the rich and powerful. Silence
befbre injustice is a sin not to be atoned by much pilgrimaging. But the
witness is the sort of thing that one finds in novels, where the poor
man defies the local rich man, the implication being that, behind the
rich man there lies an accepted principle of law which he as an indi¬
vidual is transgressing and which in the last resort is upheld by the
5
powers that be. There is no criticism of the powers that be.
The above paragraphs are based upon the first section of the
treatise /
1 W. A. , VI~ 218.
2
Ibid.
s Ibid. , 222
4 Ibid- 3 224
5 .It)id. , 228-9. See HOte 7 at end.
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treatise and contain the principle of the whole."1" The remaining considera¬
tions of the Decalogue certainly afford an outline of a Christian pattern
of conduct, "but compared with Calvin's bold principles, the lines are
2
faint. Of the Sabbath, for example, he says that attendance at Mass is
a necessary part of Christian virtue and an excellent scope for the
exercise of immediate faith in God. But faith includes assent in "what
Christ has said (about the bread and the wine)", that is, "hoc est
»
Corpus Meurn". It is thus not the Mass itself that is at fault but the
lack of faith in the worshippers, both lay and cleric. The Mass is
beyond dispute and beyond the possibility of dispute. This conservatism
is typical of the man, but it is not perhaps so divergent from Calvin as
one might think. Luther did. criticise the Mass for its "oblationary"
tendencies. Moreover, the "morning service" of the Reformers was based
3
upon the Mass, and a modern Congregational scholar has endorsed their
acceptance of the Canon. Dealing with other aspects of worship, -
prayer, sermon, Lord's day observance, fasting - Luthei lays what one
would now call an "evangelical" emphasis, that is, with the constant con¬
cern of personal responsibility and obedience. Sermons, for example,
should be based upon "the Gospel and His testament" and not upon any,
4
perhaps non-Scriptural, theme that the preacher thinks fit. The holi¬
ness of the day, again, should be re-emphasised. "Would to God," he
5
says,1 "that in Christendom there were no holiday except the Sunday . . .
then would many evil vices be done away with the labour of workdays."
Luther thought over much holidaying led to industrial restlessness.
The /
See Note 8 attend.
8 W.A. VI., 229.
3 Bernard Manning "Hymns of Wesley and Watts" (1942).




The greatest stress of the second table1 of the Lav; is the duty to
do "honour". Under this head falls the faithful performance of duties
by children to parents and in general by subordinates to superiors in
2
church and state. This discussion is out of all proportion to that of
the remaining heads, and although it attacks the abuses of the Church,
3
it still leaves to "spiritual authority" to "look to it that adultery,
uhchastity, usury, gluttony, worldly show, excessive adornment and such
like open sin and shame might be most severely punished and corrected";
end to manage properly "the endowments, monastic houses, parishes and
schools". The connection between these duties of the Church and the
commandment under consideration is that the Church is the spiritual
parent of the believers, and the implication is that the present order
of the Church is not doing its duty. Reformers of all parties agreed
on this view. What they were not agreed upon was the authority which
should correct the existing church order. Luther makes one suggestion
4
of resistance.. Against the misuses of ecclesiastical revenues "we" -
that is, presumably, the faithful believers - "are in duty bound to
resist" as children must resist parents who are insane. The nature of
the resistance is first "humbly to call upon God for help" then "to send
the courtesans {of Rome) about their business. " Significantly, the
leaders against these "true Turks" are to be "the kings, princes and
5
nobility". "Thus", he concludes, "we are to honour Roman authority as
our highest father; and yet, since they have gone mad and lost their
senses, /
1 This is another separate section of the treatise under the title
"Rolget die andere Tapfel. Das erst Gebot der ander Tapfel Mosi".-
2 Ibid- , 250-265.
2
Ibid. , 255. "Es solt aber geistlich gewalt, etc. ..."
^ dbdd- 5257. "sein wir furwar schuldig, im ''..szd vij. Wlr nmgen, zuehich
^dd^g^ustehen, und mussen hie thun, gleich, wie die fruiaen kinder . .
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senses, not allow them to do what they attempt, lest Christendom he
destroyed thereby". Luther however does not find the solution in
1
another council. Councils have the weakness of being part of the
Church. The reforming force must come from outside, must be temporal
force. Thus obedience to temporal authority, whether just or unjust,
becomes a tenet of his faith. Unless it force us "to do wrong against
God or man" its injustice is a matter of the body and cannot harm -
indeed may even improve - the soul. Even the unjust power of the
state is thus a less evil than the unjust power of the Church, which
"has to do with preaching".
There is much that is both true and right in these remarks, much
that other Reformers also said. perhaps their main value is the re¬
minder that the Church is always the Church, and is never the constitu¬
tion merely of human desire - even human desire to make improvement.
The main criticism of the treatment is that it is itself uncritical.
This treatment of the Decalogue is certainly "catechetical", because one
feels that Luther simply applies to the Decalogue for confirmation and
examples of that which he already believes on other - perhaps admirable but
not religious - grounds. Calvin is much more realistic in his treatment.
The Decalogue is for him itself the source of his principles. One feels
that Luther - like Hegel in the nineteenth century - never reached a
point /
T ~ — ~ "
In the address 'an den Christlichen Ldel deutschen Nation' (1520)
Luther did summon the German nobility to call a Council, but not
as a legislative body. It would, Luther thought, enforce the
commands of Scripture. W.A., VI, 413.
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point outside his own social circle, and would never have questioned the
established feudal relationships as eternal ordinances of God. Calvin
was a cautious social philosopher but he had hit upon a doctrine of inspira¬
tion - by the H oly Ghost through the courts of believers - which gave
possibilities of great development in social criticism by the free
Christian conscience of the community. Luther's interest constantly
turns away from the main theme of the Commandments to long discourses upon
the duties of princes. They are not, he admits, absolute in the exer¬
cise of their will, being themselves under the obligation to offer God
a sacrifice of faith. But the remedy for the evil of the times - the
lack of "real government in the world . . . (for) no one wants to work"^ -
is in their hands. The summary of all is the duty .to show "obedience
and considerateness" - obedience by the subjects, considerateness by the
princes. Only in the last resort is there a final reminder that if our
obedience to God is compromised by the demanded obedience of men, then
2
we ought to obey God rather than men.
3
The space which Luther devotes to his remaining six commandments is
suitably indicated by the brief notice that will here be given. Faith
which does not doubt that God is gracious will find no difficulty in
being /
1 * ~~ ~
Ibid., 262. "... kein regiment in der belt ist. Niemant
wil erbeuten."
2
Ibid., 265. This view was expounded also in the 'von weltlicher
Obei'keit' (1523). It differs from Calvin's view in being largely
negative. Calvin distrusted individual action, but he sought to
control the ruler through the magistrates,and as the magistrates were
elected by the church members acting as citizens, there remained a
real democratic sanction of magisterial and even of monarchical
action.
3
T-i .Ibid., 265 - 276.
103
being gracious towards one's neighbour. The existence of enemies is
important not so much objectively, that is, of themselves, as subject¬
ively, that is as an occasion for developing the grace of meekness in
the Christian. Nevertheless, it is not fitting that the magistrate
should idly allow sin to have sway."1" By faith too shall we escape un¬
chaste thoughts, but the struggle against unchastity is bound up with
the practice of other good works, such as early rising, continual occupa¬
tion, and above all prayer and meditation upon the Scripture. It is
a monkish prescription for a monkish evil. So, too, when the heart
trusts in the divine favour, it cannot seek after the temporal goods
of others, nor cleave to money, but will use money with cheerful liberal¬
ity for the benefit of others. It is a commandment which leads to
p
many good works and can be summarised in the idee of "Mildigkeit" -
benevolence. But, Luther adds, "the magistrates and cities ought to
see to it that the vagabonds, pilgrims and mendicants from foreign lands
be debarred, or at least allowed only under restrictions and rules."
Faith too promotes courage which will always defend the truth in worldly
and spiritual matters. Of the latter he remarks that if it "were
attacked by peasants, herdsmen, stable-boys and men of no standing, who
would not be willing ... to confess it and bear witness to it? But
when the pope and the bishops, together with princes and kings attack it,
3









God is less than their love of goods, honour, favour and life. The last
two commandments forbid evil desires of the body for pleasure and for
temporal goods and "are clear in themselves"; and yet, "no one has ever
been so holy that he felt in himself no evil inclination . . . for
original sin is born in us by nature" and may only, this side of death,
be checked, not conquered.""
Even this brief review of a single work of Luther shows how close
he was in one sense to Calvin and in another how far away. There are
many reflections of the one in the other; and even the single para¬
graph above has phrases which recall similar views expressed by Calvin -
such as the necessity for prayer and meditation, and the doctrine of
original sin in human nature. But there is a wide cleavage between
the practical conclusions which each man draws. Luthei^'s desire for a
closed society, for example, reflects the medieval inability to cope
with commercial competition. Trade was not a natural part of the social
2
system that rested upon the basis of land-owning and the duties of land
owners and land tillers. Tradesmen had a constant struggle to get
Reasonable terms for the conduct of their business whether at home or
through the customs for overseas; and legally their only defence was
an increasing: development of their "persona" - their communal rights
and duties in relation to the other "personae" of Church and state.




^ Luther's sermon (1519) and tract (1524) on usury (W.A. VI, 56 ff) quite
frankly say that if business were conducted in a Christian manner
there would be no traders. His idea of trade is as a public service
rather than as a system of competition in a free market' of buyer and
seller. There is to be neither surety, lending or credit. Trade
is a direct exchange between individuals. Whatever demerits this
system may have by its oversimplicity, Luther at least emphasises
that it referred to all Christian life: it was not simply a counsel
of perfection.
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society of the period, "but it was doomed to a change in the society that
was Toeing "born in the 16th century. Calvin happened to be situated in
the heart of the new birth; Luther was not,and in this accident
perhaps lies the real distinction between the two.
There is, however, another sense in which Luther differed from Calvin.
The problem of authority is ultimately the problem of Scripture, and all
that Luther has been saying against the claims of people like Tetzel
inevitably raised the question, by what authority did he so speak? In
his earlier phases Luther believed that his reference to Scripture was not
contrary to the papal authority^- that, in short, the Pope himself rested
upon the authority of Scripture. When this view was disproved, Luther
was forced to decide whether the authority he derived was to be found in
p
Scripture in itself or in the "Gemeinde", that is, the fellowship of
believers. For all he said about Scripture he did not achieve a satis¬
factory interpretation of what is commonly regarded as such, namely, the
canonical books. Fundamentally he rejected the "Law" in favour of the
rz
"Gospel" on the ground that Law inevitably leads to damnation, and may
therefore be a useful means of coming to Christ, but that Law is swallowed
up in the Gospel. Hence his scornful rejection of JAMES as being mfcre
4
legalism; hence also his high opinion of ROMANS and his search in the
Old Testament for types of Christ. The weakness of the view is apparent.
Christian authority rested ultimately upon the experience of the visible
Christian /
See Davies, op. cit., 29ff.
2 W.A. XI, 408-16.




Christian church, the lay morality of the Prone worship. It was thus
open to the sentimentalism and disappointment of the peasants' instability;
it was also open to abuse should the "Landesherren" cease to be what
Luther assumed they were - Christian believers. It is interesting
to note that the Norwegian Church,-*- in the late occupation, faced precisely
this problem. Calvin saw through this difficulty and sought in the
concept of law a positive value. Law is the order of God from eternity,
and thus Christ is in the Law. Thus the obedience of Christ is a
possibility co-extensive with divine Creation.
(ii)
Melanchthon's theological thought is sufficiently like that of Luther
to be regarded as part of the Lutheran tradition. He was, indeed, a
friend and fellow citizen of Luther, but, unlike him, was not called to
pastoral charge. Nor was he, like Zwingli, Parel and Calvin, called to
the political responsibility of a social revolution. His contribution
was scholarly, analytical. A student of Reuchlin and Oec^Lampadius, he
set alongside the fervour of Luther the critical insight of Renaissance
learning. What he attempted to do for Protestantism was "what Averroes
did for Islam and Moses Maimonides did for Judaism and what Thomas did for
Catholicism in the middle age: to resolve the problem of how a thinking
2
person can harmonise philosophy and science with the beliefs of faith.
He /
1 See below pp. 307 tt.
2
C. L. Hill, "The Loci Communes of Philip Melanchthon" (194U), p. 39.
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He was thus the philosopher, as Luther was the prophet and Calvin the
statesman, of the fieformation.
The doctrine most significant for the ethics of Melanchthon was the
notion of "natural light". Underneath the first principles of every
science, he says, are certain ideas, innate in all men, implanted "by
God.1 This is no doubt a doctrine necessary for the Christian emphasis .upon
2
universal responsibility. Christian faith is not a mystery confined to
a particular hind, of person. On the contrary, Christian theology can
become committed to the most extreme expression of predestination for no
other reason than that it strives to cover the case of the "reprobate"
who refuse to acknowledge belief and membership of the Church; It is clear
that Christian dogma must assume something about unsaved human nature,
something in the creative purpose of the Almighty, which causes us to be
incapable of ignorance of, and therefore responsible towards, His divine
Will. Predestination however is not characteristic of Melanchthon or
Zwingli as it is of Calvin. To them the universal implication of the
divine Will is sufficiently guaranteed by the assumption of human ration¬
ality corresponding to the knowledge of, or at least the acceptance of
revelation about, God, accompanied by the irrational assumption of
Christian inclination to obedience. Calvin questioned, both assumptions,
replacing the former largely, though not wholly, with his doctrine of
predestination - thus referring the universal problem of man to the
hidden/
^ E.G. Liber de Anima, C. R. XIII, 7. * Veras noticias divinitus nobis
ins it as." The phrase is frequent in his other works, e.g., Peel, de
Legum Fontibus et Causis, C.R. XI, 921-2 - "radii sapientiae divinae
in nos transfusi".
2 Zwingli refers to the "inner man" in his argumamt 'von der Kladieit und
Gewissheit des Wortes Gottes\ 1522. Cr.K.L.XXXVIIX, 338-84;
Calvin refers to God's Law as written up©®. the heart of men. Inst. 2: 8: 1.
3 Ibid.. 124. In discussing the Decalogue Melanchthon says of the second
table that the precepts merely exemplify Christ'.s Word, "Love thy
neighbour as thyself" and "may be left to the diligent reader himselx
(diligens lector) to interpret from his reading of the Gospel.
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hidden counsel of God - and the latter "by a discipline imposed even upon
professed believers.
These doctrines however are in a sense secondary, in development if
not in importance, to the fundamental challenge which the Protestant move¬
ment gave to Rome. Melanehthon rejected the claims of the "Sophists",
1
the "Parisians", to enforce what he called their "opinions" upon the
conscience of the believer. Zwingli also repudiated the Sorbonne theo¬
logy, and Calvin, in the first edition of the "Institutes", expressly
2
distinguishes the two Scriptural, from the five false, sacraments.
The ground of the rejection was the primacy of faith, and faith directed
the human soul to the liberty of Christ. The first development in all
these theological arguments had to be a distinction between Law and Gospel.
Some laws, Melanbhthon says, are natural, others divine, still others
human. Qf natural laws he concluded that the very term "natural" ought
to mean that they can be collected and analysed by a method of human
3
reasoning through a natural syllogism; but, he adds significantly, "that
is precisely what I have not as yet seen done by anyone, and I by no
means know whether it can be done at all, since our human reason is so
4
enslaved and blinded." This natural law had two strands; there was that
which /




C.R. XXI, 116 "... nam cum naturales dicantur, oportebat a rationis
humanae methode earum formulas colligi per naturalem syllogismum".
One is reminded of the Cartesian method of the 17th century.
4
Ibid., 123. Impleri non potest dum in carne vivimus hoc praeceptum
at non ideo, non exigitur, sed omnes rei sumus dum non persolvimus
quo debemus."
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which, might be ascribed particularly to Adam and the descendants of Adam,1
such as knowledge of good and evil; and there was that which might be
called strictly natural, imprinted upon human minds as such by God the
2
Creator, namely, that God ought to be revered, that, because we are born
into a definite society of life no man ought to be injured, and that human
society demands a certain community of interest and sympathy. One can
only comment upon such a definition that it no doubt does permit the
3
conclusion that the Decalogue and natural law are identical but that it
begs the vital question of human sin. The whole issue between Calvinism
and the other forms of Protestant theology is that Calvin tries to make
the relationship between human sin and human responsibility something more
than mere words.
4
Divine law comprises "laws ordained by God in the Canonical Scriptures"-!
"There are three orders of divine laws: some are moral, some judicial,
others ceremonial." Moral laws are those prescribed in the Decalogue
which is the compendium of all moral law in Scripture and which is of
eternal significance. Human laws are those which may be made for conveni¬
ence by magistrates or even by the Church for the purpose of attaining
6
specific minor ends. Monastic celibacy, for example, was a matter of
convenience /
1




Ibid., 417. "Una est lex et natura nota omnibus gentibus atque aetatibus".
4 Ibid., 120.
^ IUid., 391. "Ideo omnia moralia praecepta in decalogum indudimus . . .
hac sententiae, cum sint notitiae in natura scripts, non possunt
abrogari, sed durant cum ipsa hominis natura."
Ibid., 130. "Civiles (leges) quas in re publica sanctiunt magistratus,
principes, reges, civitates." "Dei enim minister magistratus, ultor- ad
iram ei qui deliquerit. Forro non licet magistratui statuere adversus
ius divinum, nec obtemperari adversus ius divinium debet."
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convenience when the monastery was a school, "but the pontifical demand for
a celibate clergy, as if celibacy were a virtue in itself, is mere pre¬
sumption. Like all laws, the law of the Church is to be judged by the
divine law.1
What is the divine Law? The Scriptures clearly indicate a judicial,
a ceremonial, and a moral law. The first and second are equally clearly,
somehow or another "abrogated" in the Gospel. Of the former, Melanchthon
says that Christian believers no longer require forensic judgment since
2
they are under the law of love: for example, they do not have to consider
self assertion nor the problems of private property since poverty - that
3
is, concern for all - is laid upon all. The latter are, of course,
mysteries of the Gospel and, consequently, fulfilled in the Person and Work
b
of Christ. It should be added that Melanchthon, like Calvin, perceived
the necessity of avoiding a rigid separation of the Old and New Testaments
into Law and Gospel, as if they were opposites. Each Testament contains
both Law and Gospel. Their difference is not one of time but of condition.
The issue therefore is between Christian obedience to the divine Will
and the universal responsibility to show that obedience^between liii and
With the papacy dismissed and civil law exalted to the ministry of
God, Melanchthon was faced with the question, who was to guide the
magistrate. /
1".Ibid., 151.
• ■L D l g- f 129 *
3 Ibid.. 127. That is to say "poverty" does not mean "owning nothing"
but "holding in stewardship" for the mitigation of another's want.
Thus Melanchthon seems to preach a sort of communism, but a communism





magistrate. Clearly such guidance would depend upon the Word of God.
Scripture however could not "be regarded as in itself a compendium of know¬
ledge "because the teaching of Scripture itself involved abrogation of some
of its own strata. The object of Scripture, in other words, was the
creation and nurture of faith in men, and only through men, in states.
To say this is not of course to say that individual speculation should
1
pass for God's truth. There was a plain and simple sense of Scripture
and Melanchthon assumed that it could and would be reached, by the natural
intelligence of men. The problem rather was how Christian men would use
2
the knowledge gained. Melanchthon's answer is that while "those who do
not have the Spirit of Christ can by no means do the law", and thus remain
in the guilt of which the law condemns us all, yet "they who have been
renewed by the Spirit of Christ, going of their own accord even without
the law dictating, are led to do those things which the law has ordered."
Logically the argument is unassailable. It accounts for human
responsibility - that is, for "Nature" - and it accounts for the paedagogics
of the divine revelation. It also accounts for the final revelation of
God in Christ and the "motion" of the Holy Spirit in faith. What it does
not adequately account for is human "concupiscence". From a different
motive emerges the same pietism that can be found in Luther, the same
idyllic eulogy of the ordinary man and the same danger of reaction into
harshness /
1 "





harshness. Calvin was less romantic. He had a favourite proverb about
Geneva - "a rude ane rude aiuxLer".1 Geneva was a theocratic society - a
society of professing Christians, but it still needed discipline. To
Calvin the Christian life needs a Christian Decalogue. In short, agreeing
with Melanchthon that the law is beyond the possibility of obedience, and
agreeing also that the Christian is open to the motion of the Spirit,
he does not agree that the believer is, without constant vigilancey able
to receive the truth of the Spirit. The Church is not perfect, as the
State is not perfect, and as the believer is not perfect. The urgency
2
of faith and the opposition of the flesh is a continual warfare.
It is worth noting that in the second and third periods of develop¬
ment, the "Loci" pays an increasing attention to the Decalogue. In the
period 1535-41, for example, consideration of the Decalogue had extended
3
to a short account of the two tables and also to each commandment.
The division was between "the exterior and the interior worship (cultum)
of God", "interior and exterior service of neighbours (opera erga
proximos)". The first table emphasised the opposite principles of
4
perfect obedience and corrupt nature, and the only solvent, "Christus
est consummatio Legis." The remainder of the First Table, therefore,
concerns the proper attitude of worship - "de propriis effectibus fidei"
5 6
and the proper ministry of the word. The conclusion is "Wherefore it is
not /
Doumergue, "Jean Calvin" (1917) V, 206.
^ INST., 2: 7: 12.
3
C.H. XXI 392 ff.
4






not a slight error to say that this whole precept refers to the Jews, so
that meanwhile the ordinary man ( vulgus) may neglect Evangelical ceremonial
and the ministry of the Gospel."
1535 dates the first edition of the "Institutes" and one cannot hut
conclude that Melanchthon was not uninfluenced by the emphasis Calvin had
laid upon the Decalogue. 1541 is yet outside the beginning of Calvin's
domination of Geneva, and is thus not yet confronted with the serious
problem of Christian social construction. It is therefore not surprising
to find Melanchthon - like Calvin himself in the first editions - emphasising
the personal rather than the social implications of God's Law. Of the
1
second tables he says, "To this Law belong the highest virtues, namely, to
serve in one's calling without presumption (modestia), that is, not to
/
disturb the common peace or interest by -tfoV.oTrfd.y/A'Ocri/(officiousness)
or ambition." It is true that these precepts contain "virtues and
offices necessary to human society" but the emphasis is upon private virtue.
Revenge, for example, is for the magistrate to administer impersonally
2
while the ordinary man must develop self control and generosity. So in
marriage one is to develop faithfulness and sobriety; in property diligence,
in communication truth. All of these virtues, Melanchthon says in con¬
sidering the ninth and tenth commandments, point to the difference between
what is demanded of God and what can be paid by men, and. thus threatenings
and promises are added to keep us faithful by fear of punishment (poenas)
if by nothing else. This is a development, be it noted, from the







The editions "between 1542 - 59 contain a much longer consideration
of' the Decalogue. In fact, the discussion "de Lege" has changed from
the outline of the first "Loci" - de divinis legibus, de consiliis, de
monachorum votis, de iudicalibus et caeremonialibus legibus, de hurnanis
legibus - to a specific analysis of the Decalogue as the body of divine
laws. "Meditation upon the Decalogue is most useful and most wholesome,
for it contains such full and heavenly teaching that it can never be
(completely) probed (perspici), never exhausted."^"
God here has shown the condition of human nature both in its origins
and in its actuality. Moreover, He impresses us with His wrath at the
situation and therefore urges us to repent, and then points to the redeem-
2
ing work of Christ. The first table thus emphasises that "obedience
3
and honour should be shown to God", that is to say, the interior and
exterior aspects of the right relationship to God, and the origin and
purpose of the ceremonial worship in Scripture. With Calvin, Melanchthon
finds that the ceremonies had a moral significance which is of eternal
significance, but he concludes, "This first principle ("principalis
sententia") belongs to all men and all times, because it is the Law of
Nature" (quia est Lex Naturae).
Of the second Table he says, "Even if a political way of life were
here being set out, it would still remain for human reason to recognise that
4the best form of polity is (in fact) set forth here." It is not merely
an externally efficient state that is sought but the faith which alone
malfes /
politica vita hie institueretur, tamen











makes an individual or a state "right". In the first place, however,
it is laid down that God does command the existence of a State.
We are not intended to live solitary, but under the discipline of a thre
2
fold honour - to parents, to "common offices" and to the state. In
short, the Decalogue may be taken as "forma gubernation is"; "forma
regiminis" comprising "omnes virtutes et omnia officia boni patris et
5
boni gubernatoris", and the consideration which Melanchthon gives to
the various precepts is along this line.
The development of the doctrine of the Decalogue in Melanchthon
is, however, radically different from its development in Calvin.
The difference might be expressed in terms of Natural Law. Calvin's
view of Nature is essentially negative: it is admitted only so far as
to impress the universality of responsibility; Melanchthon seems,
even in the latest editions, to think that, even without the special
4
revelation of the Decalogue, men might be credited with a considerable
knowledge of the divine nature and the divine will. It is significant,
however, that such knowledge does not appear to have led Melanchthon to
the vigorous democratic Church of Calvin. The State and the magistrate
owe their origins to sources independent of Christian action: and he
U/v<.w
can even make a plea Wh&hb fctutfa the institution and
the person must be distinguished. Calvin's method was to control the




2 "Triplex honos", Ibid., 704.
3
Ibid.. 705-6.
Section de Lege Naturae, C.R. XXI, 711 ff.
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that is5 the Church courts - and to do so he had to narrow his generalities.
He might agree with the bare skeleton of a law of Nature - the necessity
of the State, for example - but the actual condition of the state could
be determined not from a theory of nature so much as the practical teach¬
ing of revelation through Scripture and through the motion of the Spirit.
Instead of a law of Nature then,Calvin has to introduce a doctrine of
predestination - which is, of course, an acknowledgment of ignorance
without an admission that any moral situation is meaningless. Calvin
in short uses the Decalogue in a stricter and more practical manner
than Melanchthon, because the situation he was dealing with was narrower
and more practical.
Melanchthon was not without a political influence but in religious
circles it tended to be, like the Lutheran influence, pietistic, that
is, concerned with personal rather than political criticism. But'it
also affected the non-religious doctrines of Grotius and Hobbes, and was,
indeed, a step in their emancipation from the religious trammels of
Medieval thought."1" Is that development to be considered advantageous?
2
The doctrine of nature, as Brunner says, has become increasingly secular
throughout the centuries, but, on the other hand, according to Lang,
the advance of the Protestant movement politically required the develop¬
ment of the secular "monarchoraachist" movement. The answer there seems to
rest upon the opinion whether Calvin's close social and religious relation¬
ships in Geneva could have been maintained as the "right" Protestant state,
or /
Hill, op. cit.
^"Justice and the Social Order."
g
In a paper "The Reformation and Natural Law", published in a symposium,
"Calvin and the Reformation" (1909).
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or whether they were as unreal and sentimental as ultimately the Calvinist
must regard Luther and Melanchthon.
(iii)
Farel and Zwingli belong to a movement in the Reformation Y/hich must
have seemed strange to Luther. The Swiss cantons had long been accustomed
to the responsibility and turbulence of self government. Reform therefore
was only to be achieved in their midst by a democratic appeal to the general
public, and it could be achieved by the personality of an individual unsup¬
ported by any physical support of the powers that be. Farel and Zwingli
were such individuals.
Farel's work may be taken first since it was written earlier, by a
small margin, than Zwingli's, but also because it is offensivel rather than
reconstructive in its emphasis. Farel was constantly on missionary service.
The "Summaire", for example, although planned under the exhortation of
Oecolampadius,2 while Farel was in Basel, seems to have been published after
he had left the town.^ The second edition appeared while he was at
Neueh&tel. ^ He was, says his editor, "neither a teacher like Calvin nor a
writer like Viret, nor a poet like Beza. ", but "more than any of them, an
orator"5 who could persuade men like Zwingli snd Calvin to achieve greater
YrorkSo
Luther's treatise grew out of his sermons, Melanchthon's "Loci" was
expedited by the appearance of a printed text of his lectures on Romans.
Zwingli /
1 Kidd, op. cit., 62+9, quotes Calvin's deathbed speech as evidence that
Farel s work was mainly destructive.
2 Realencyclopadie fur Prot. Theol., article, "Farel".
^ Heyer^ 2l+, quoting Baum's 1867 edition, prefa.ce, i-vi. Baum's edition
'is based upon the 153h edition, which he claims to be merely a reprint
of the 15 22-i- work. There was another edition in 1552.
14 I^icL , 37.
5 Baum, introduction to 1867 edition of Farel's "Summaire".
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Zwingli and Calvin also were impelled to write in order to meet a specific
challenge to their faith. Farel's motive was the opportunity of the
public disputation in Basel on February 27th, 1-524, at which he offered
"thirteen Reformation headings."1 No doubt these theses influenced him
in his more deliberate address to "all who love our Lord and wish to know
,2
the truth which he presented later in the year. The title of this work
is, "A brief summary and declaration of some places very necessary to a
Christian to put his trust in God and to help his neighbour." "Places"
(lieux) has here the specialised meaning that is found in Melanchthon's
"Loci", and like Melanchthon, Farel sought his authority primarily in
the written Word of God. In his original theses, which were denuncia-
3
tions of ecclesiastical abuse and ceremonial Farel appealed to the
authority of Scripture, and the argument of the ".Summaire" refers to
the sense of knowledge of spiritual things; that is "the law of God . . .
the judgment of Scripture", and not "our understanding, wisdom, reason or
4
prudence." The chapters themselves progress from the subjects of God,
man, Jesus Christ, Law, Gospel, sin, justice, the flesh, the Spirit,
unbelief, faith, merit, and grace to the climax of resurrection and the
Day of Judgment. The emphasis is thus a preacher's, namely the response
of faith to the revelation of God in Scripture and in Jesus Christ.
The work, however, is more deliberately a system of dogmatic argument
than Luther's or even Melanchthon's treatises at least in their early
forms. It is much more like the deliberate argument of Calvin's 1535
"Institutio" /
^ See Heyer, bp. cit., pp. 19 ff.
p
Summaire - sub title.
Heyer, op, cit., p. 30.
Summaire, Introduction.
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"Institutio" which, though "based upon the lay doctrines of the Deca¬
logue, Creed, and Lord's Prayer, nevertheless touched the fundamental
theology of justification by faith.
In emphasising the necessity of a right conduct based upon personal
faith in God, and not upon work-holiness, that is to say, in
attacking the Mass as mere idolatry diverting, responsibility away from
God to the priest and his action at the altar, Farel involved himself
in the inevitable problem of authority. His answer was simple. "Holy
Scripture, both in Old and New Testament, contains what we ought to do,
that is, what we ought to feel and believe about God our Father . . .
for the sacred writers are inspired by the spirit of God . . . nor is
it necessary to add to or to take away from (the Scriptural ."In
matters of salvation all that is not clearly and plainly based in
2
Scripture is to be rejected." Ethically, the implication of this view
is that we act according to the revealed Law of God, and not according
to any vague Law of Nature, but in distinguishing Old and New Testament,
he draws the line between the "fear" of the ancient people of God and
the "love" which is the motive of Christian obedience. As for the law
of Moses, he thinks that "all this mix-up of ceremonies, mortification
g
of the flesh, the multitude of offerings and sacrifices" signifies
nothing any more, since we are not of the particular people whom God has
placed under these laws. He recognises of course that the Mosaic









apostles give us clearly. Thus in the Old Testament he seeks the light
1
of the New. Virtually, therefore, although Fare! would probably not
have admitted the suggestion. Christians can do without the Old Testament
except as illustration.
The Law, therefore, is the Law as summarised by Christ. Farel does
not say as much. He says it is "the true rule of good living contain¬
ing and showing all justice and all perfection that ought to be in man,
teaching him what he ought to do and avoid in order to be the true image
2
of God clear and shining in all charity and right." That is to say,
3
it is, as Calvin describes it,, the "mirror" that shows man what true
righteousness is, and by implication, what man in his sin is. Sin
thus, as in ROMANS, is concupiscence awakened to a knowledge of itself.
Heyer has drawn an interesting comparison between Farel's action
and thought before and after his meeting with Calvin in 1536. The
appeal of the Reformers to Scripture as the absolute source of saving
knowledge and to freedom of interpretation of that Scripture alarmed
civil governments and forced a reconsideration of the nature of Christian
4
liberty. Farel s interpretation of Scripture illustrated this deeper
analysis of the faith. In three works on the subject - "Be Glaire de
la Parolle Ve'ritable" (1550), the 1552 edition of the "Summaire", and
"Du Vray Usage de la Croix" (1560) he still reaffirms that "the Holy
Scriptures contain sufficiently all that is needed for men to know and
do (what is necessary) to their salvation" and "(the Bible) has been
5 6





3 INST., 2: 7: 7 .
4 °P- cit. , 113 ff.
3'Bu Vray Usage de la Croix", XXIV.
® ''Le Glaire de la Parolle veritable", 27.
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is the note of judgment in his assertion of our knowledge of God. No
doubt God speaks in Scripture: but can we understand since we are sinners?"*"
This is the very question which led Calvin away from the doctrine of assur¬
ance into the cautious enforcement of discipline even upon Christians.
There can be little doubt that Calvin's influence is to be traced in
this modification of Farel's original theme. It may be a fair enough
comment upon him, therefore, to conclude that, while he set about the task
of building a Christian dogmatics without any of the subtleties which
Melanchthon tended to borrow from the philosophical doctrine of Nature,
but simply from the open Bible, yet the logic of the faith led him, as it
o
increasingly led Calvin, to seek in the Decalogue the ethical norm that
was not to be identified with, but was rather to replace in Christian
thinking, the traditional acceptance of "natural law". A final example
of this conclusion is to be found in the Confession of Faith which he drew
3
up with Calvin in 1537, where he specifically jdentif ies the law with the
4
Decalogue. Paragraph 3 reads, "Since He is the only Lord and Master,
who has the domination of all our consciences, and since also His Will
is the only rule of all justice, we confess that all our life ought to be
conformed to the commandments of His holy Law, in which is contained all
perfection /
Summaire (1552) pp. 30 - 40.
2
See his letter to Haller - Hernin j ard, III, 409. The emphasis is upon
the spiritual significance of the Decalogue.
3 Kj-3<3> on. cit., 568 ff.
^
Lex Dei Unica. "Quandoquidem solus ille est Dominus, penes quern potestas
et imperium in conscientias nostras esse debet: quando eius voluntas
unica est universalis institiae regula, vitam nostram ad canonem
sanctae legis ipsius exigendam esse confitemur: in qua omnis institiae
perfectio comprehensa est. Nec 'aliam bene recteque vivendi regulam
quaerimus: nec admittimus quaerenda esse alia bona opera, illi grati-
ficeraur quarn quae illic nobis cornmendavit, ut habetur." EXOD., XX,
2 seq.
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perfection and justice and that we ought not to have any other rule of
right living and judgment, nor to invent other good works in order to
please Him, except those which are contained therein as follows," namely
the Decalogue.
(iv)
Apparently Farel himself was one of the many men in Italy and . . .
France who urged Zwingli "to write out . . . his religious views for them."^
Presumably what is meant "by this statement is that Farel - himself a
Frenchman - hearing of the invitation to Zwingli'to write, added his own
characteristic invitation to fill out the statement he himself was making
at the time, and thus to spread the reasoning of Reform beyond the borders
of Switzerland. Zwingli complied, dedicating his work, as Calvin was
2
later to do, to Francis I, the "most Christian King" of France. In
1525 Francis was newly come to the throne and there was expectation that
he would carry France into the Protestant interest. But Zwingli's book
was placed straightway upon the Index by the Sorbonne theologians, and
Francis followed the politically safer path of Romanism. Thus in 1535
Calvin addressed him not as a possible convert but as a sworn opponent.
The importance of Zwingli's manner of address, however, is significant of
his /
C.R. XC, 637: "multis trans alpes doctis piisque hominibus.": he goes on
to say that he had determined to write down his own views as a commen¬
tary, in order to communicate them to, and receive the criticism of,
"doctissimis Galliarum."
g
Ibid., 628. The title of the dedication is "Christianissimo Galliarum
regi Francesco", etc: later, he adds, "Christianissimi titulo, qui
Galiis imperatis, non immerito gloriamini", 629.
Melanchthon also addressed his "Loci" to the "most Potent and
Illustrious Monarch, Francis, the most Christian king of the Franks."
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his political interpretation of the faith. Reformation did mean criticism
of, and interest in, political matters even if it did not preach destruction
of present establishments.
The "Commentary" belongs to a period which has been described as his
"period of struggle". Zwingli had already established his position in
Zurich by his preaching and disputation, but had not yet consolidated it
2
with an explicit and comprehensive statement of his faith. The statement
was finally brought to birth bjr his conflict simultaneously with the
Anabaptists, the Romanists, and Luther himself; it was therefore a
systematic statement of his faith "earn religionem, quam de Deo et ad
3
Deum domi habet". Although more controversial and therefore less
balanced than Calvin's statement in the "Institutes", this work is
0&&V
important not only for its systematic treatment but for its challenge
to Luther. Through its influence upon the Strasburg theologians it was
to modify Calvin's Protestant thought.
Zwingli applies the explicit distinction between 'false" and "true"
4
religion to Romanism and Reform. Here then was an end to the attempt
to reform the Church from within its medieval institution. The means of
true piety was in Reform. Quite half of the treatise is a repetition of
an earlier work, the "Reply to Eraser", which had been published in 1524
at the climax of a virulent controversy on the subject of the Mass, but
Zwingli /
RealencyclopHdie art. Zwingli.
^ Before his conversion to Reform, Zwingli had already made a name for
himself with his preaching as "People's Priest" at Einsiedeln (1516-
17) and in Zurich, 1519. His sermons were strictly Scriptural -
see C.R. LXXXIX, 145.
* C.R. XC, 638.
4
Ibid., 639. Dum autem additione 'veri' et 'falsi' religionem a
superstitione distinguimus, in cum usum fit, ut, cum religionem ex
veris verbi dei fontibus propinaterimus, altero veluti poculo
superstitionem quoque probeamus, non ut quisquam de ipso bibat, sed
ut effundat et confrugat."
12k
Zwingli does also try to set out the positive statement of Reformed
doctrine. What, he asks, in the first section, is religion; and his
answer is in terms of Cicero's definition,"1" that religion concerns the
things that pertain to worship, that is to say, faith, life, laws, worship
2
and sacraments. The means of distinguishing between true and false
3
religion is from the relationship of these practices to the Word of God.
The argument thus shifts to a consideration of our knowledge of God in
nature and in revelation. Zwingli says that by nature men may know "that"
4
God is but not "what" He is. The difference rests upon the difference
between a general and a special revelation of God to men. Like all the
Reformers Zwingli does not clearly distinguish between the knowledge one
might expect from a non-Christian and the knowledge one has in Christ;
the pagan was not a common object of concern in 16th century Christendom
5
as he has to.be in modern Western civilisation. Rather Zwingli is
concerned with two sorts of Christian faith, the true and the false,
distinguishable by their respective authority in Scripture.
Zwingli's classicism raises a point which is constantly occurring in
criticism of the Reformers. He did not perceive that the pessimism of
Cicero /
_ —
Ibid. The reference is to "de natura deorurn, Lib. 2".
2
Ibid. fiderrt, vitam, leges, Vitus, sacramenta.
3
Ibid. Facillimum igitur nobis est de vera falsaque Christianorum
religiose scribere, ac veluti rationem fidei nostrae reddere, quam
non ex humanae sapientiae lacunis, sed ex divini spiritus imbre
qui verbum dei est, hausimus.
4
Ibid., 640, "quid sit Deus, f'ortasse supra humanum captum, verura, quod
sit, haud supra cum est."
5
Calvin speaks of Christian duty to the pagans in terms of the relation¬
ship of the Israelites to the Egyptians, [[Opera 576] . But the
Turk or the Irish Gael was too much a source of physical terror to
be regarded as anything except vermin. Even Cromwell, says John
Buchan, v»as only echoing his age when he said so [see John Buchan' s
"°liver Cromwell"].
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Cicero was the pessimism of decadence - the pessimism to which Stoicism
leads when the flush of hope in human nature is dashed hy the fact of
human sin and folly - while the energy of Reform derived from a confidence
inspired "by newly found knowledge. Erasmus was much more consistent
when in his "De Lihero Arbitrio" of 1524 he indulged optimistic hopes
for mankind through mankind. The Reformers taught the sinfulness of human
nature for reasons of doctrine rather than for reason of personal despair,
and their classical allusion therefore is somewhat artificial. Zwingli's
real thesis of sin is hased upon the Pauline doctrine that sin was not
imputed before the Law came, that, in other words, "sin" is a Christian
term for human concupiscence brought to saving despair by knowledge of the
1
revealed Law. The distinction between true and false religion is that
the former turns the believer to Christ alone for salvation, while the latter
p
stifles the consciousness of sin by offering the mediation of priestly offices?
The importance of Zwingli in Reform is that he brings the issue
finally to the bar of" Scripture. The Law shows us God's demands and
3
the Gospel shows us Christ's satisfaction of God's just wrath. There
is no need to go outside the Scriptures for our complete knowledge of
our God and His ways to men.4 There is thus no question about "what we
ought to do", for that is set down in black and white. Our share is
continuous /
\
1 C.R. XC, 708: "Morbus ignorat se ipsum, quod morbus sit, opiryaturque
lie ere, quicquid libet." But 'per legem cognitio -Deccati' NrOM.,V'IJ.7 .
2 \
De Vera et Falsa Rel., Sections 11 and 12 - concerning the sin agVinst the
Holy Ghost and the Keys. Also C.R., XC, 720 ff. Zwingli thought that
even the Lutherans laid too much stress upon the mere utterance of the
Word. "Sed verbo docemur, quidem homine administro, quamvis verbo non
reddamur certi, nisi domini s'piritus corda nostra liquefaciat, quo
verbum inseri ac in deum spes plantari queat." (740).
^ See the section on "the Gospel, ibid., 691 ff.
Ihid., 643. Fucus ergo est et falsa religio, quicquid a theologis ex
philosophia 'quid sit deus' allatum est. Quod si quidam de hoc quaedam
vere dixerunt, ex ore dei fuit, qui cognitione suae semina quaedam etiara in
Gentes sparsit, quamvis parcius et obscurius; alioqui verum non esset."
_ "Nobis autem ... ex divinis oraculis petenda sunt."
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continuous repentance and acknowledgment of dependence upon His grace.
The supreme sin is denial of that dependence upon Him alone.
Zwingli knew that somehow this revealed Law must he equated with the
universal conscience of mankind. He does not devote much space to the
discussion, hut he does advance on Melanchthon's vague "natural light".
Whatever conscience may he, he says, it is clear that the precepts of the
Law are eternally binding upon the "inner man".1 It is therefore God's
responsibility to see that all men have been presented with His Will.
2
Conscience is of God, for "none writes in the heart save God alone".
Calvin also reached the conclusion that conscience is the tablet of the
Law written by the finger of God upon the heart of man. The emphasis
upon revelation, it will be observed, has not been lost in the accommoda¬
tion of the universal.
3
Moreover, Zwingli emphasises the ethical relationship of man to God.
If the supreme sin of false religion is to stifle the repentance of the
believer, the supreme duty of the believer is the principle that "every
action, every design . . . and whatever regards one's neighbour must be
4
comprehended under this law". These are the eternal precepts; the
civil laws may vary and the ceremonial be abrogated in Christ. Having
reached /
1
Ibid., 707 "de interiore (homine)"
2
Ibid. "at in cord^ nemo scribit nisi solus deus." The section upon
man is very short. Zwingli dismisses "civil" and "ceremonial" laws
as being "ad exteriorem hominem", and as "per Christum in universum
sublatae."
12
In the "von der Klarheit und Gewissheit" he says "the Word of God, as
soon as it shines upon the understanding of man, illuminates it in
such a way that it understands it, confesses it, and becomes certain
of it", C.R. LXXXVIII, 361. He also gives twelve criteria by which
the listener to a sermon can be sure of its divine authority I ibid. ,
367); one at least is a direct relationship, a "personal experience"
of God. Zwingli spoke of his own conversion in these terms.. [ibid.,
379: also in the Apologeticus Archeteles (1522: ibid., 260J.
^ C.R. XC, 707 "omnem igitur actionem, omne consilium, et quicquid ad
proximium spectat, sub hac lege contineri necesse est."
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reached this conclusion, however, Zwingli turns from its pursuit to
particular controversy, for Home was guilty of maintaining the ceremonial
laws in order to justify her existence "by performing them. The Keys,
he says, were not given to Peter as a mystical individual but to all the
1
disciples as individual believers in Him, and thus the true apostolic
succession is in the succession of "believing persons in each succeeding
generation.
The advance which this work marks upon those that have been mentioned
is that it had correlated the two problems of Christian faith and action,
namely, the universal implication of the divine Will and the particular
revelation of the divine grace in Christ. The medieval assumption that
an institution could save was finally laid, so far as .Reformed thought was
concerned at least. The first mark of the true Church for them was no
longer a right sacrament, but the right confession of one's faith in
2
God's Word. What was that Word? and what was the faith that it
produced? These two questions stand out from Zwingli's theology. And
2
the answers he seems to give are, that the Word is simply the written Word,
the Bible, while faith is the direct assurance of the Holy Spirit which
one must assume accompanies the proper meditation upon the Word. A third
and closely allied conclusion is that the conceptions of the Church as a
visible /
1
Ibid., 723 ff, section "de Clavibus".
2
Ibid., 747. "Videmus hie luce clarius Christi ecclesiam sponsam suam . .
hie habere fundamenturn et robur, quod sit eius, cum confitetur Christum
dei vivi esse filium." This confession of faith rests, of course,
upon the right preaching of the Word - ibid., 749, "ecclesia, quae
errare nequeat, ea nimirum sola, quae solo verbo dei nititur."
"... Zwingli identified the Word of God with the Scripture . . . and . .
obliterated the useful and time honoured distinctions between the
value and purpose of the Law and the Gospel, and between the Old
Testament and the New Testament." Davies, op. cit., p. 73.
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visible body of Christ's faithful ones and as the sacramental institution
of His eternal hill have to be distinguished. Clearly all do not
possess faith, even amongst those to whom the Word is rightly preached.
It is, of course, inconceivable that the Word should not be absolute
in its Truth, and as it is equally inconceivable that God's decree
should be defeated by human disobedience, it follows that for some reason
in God's own Providence, some should be deliberately excluded by Him.
Equally, however, it follows that the faithful, acting as citizens,
should not flHHHP reprobation, even if reprobation should be, theoret¬
ically, God's Will for certain individuals.
Zwingli, however, does not actually say so much, and in this respect
may be said to stand midway between the Lutheran and the Calvinist polity,
lelanchthon, like Luther, seemed content to accept the state and live the
Christian life under it as might best be done. Zwingli goes further and
asserts not only that it would be desirable to have a Christian magis¬
tracy, but that magistrates in a Christian state must be professing
2
Christians. In fact too he was prepared to deal forcibly with
2
recusants; but he does not give any real reason for doing so apart
4
from his own interpretation of Scripture. Thus he not only suppressed
Anabaptism /
1
That is to say, the Church as the visible body of all who live, have
lived, or will live, the life of confessed Christian obedience.
C.R. XC, 750 ff, but, of course, this Church is "hominibus ignotam":









Anabaptism "but went back upon his own assumption that the "Gemeinden"
would, by the exercise of their Christian freedom, reach a common pattern
of church government. Some actually wished to retain the Mass and had
to be restrained by Act of Council (12th April, 1525). Calvin avoided
such inconsistency by the thoroughness of his discipline upon the Church1
as well as upon the outsider.
Zwingli's weakness lies in the attempt to maintain Christian freedom
2
as an individual attribute. But the "faith" that was preached by
Lutherans and by Zwingli himself could hardly avoid the inference that
the Church was to be simply a body of professing persons; and all that
the Anabaptists were doing was to assume that this Church should govern
itself by its own understanding of God's Word. Zwingli's dilemma was that
no pattern revealed itself absolutely and mechanically. Therefore his
theocratic state was a dictatorship of the established church against
dissentients. So, of course, was Calvin's; but Calvin did not present
his Church as a body of perfect persons. Perhaps he lost something of
the primeval brightness that can be assumed from the doctrine of the
inner light, by which men turn gladly from a darkness they cannot help,
from a disease that has descended upon them, to the relief of divine
salvation /
e.g. the "Consilia" C.R. XXXVTIl(-a),. In certain cases of disagreement
the magistracy would exert authority. For example in theological
disagreement (ibid., 18, and even in the composition of domestic dis¬
agreement (ibid., Ill ). In the INST., 4: 12: 1, he says that
discipline is the nervel of religion.
2
In church decisions he assumes direct illumination by the „4ord of God
which is 'seated in the ininds of the faithful', C.R.LXXXVIII, 752.
Ibid., 867 ff. Of magistrates; he says their office is or¬
dained of God. This view might imply that even in the wider, less
personal, issues of the state there should be a pattern of divine
reference. It is obvious that Zwingli inferred that there is such
a reference; but the basis of his inference is simply that he had
proved a reference of faith in individual faith.
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salvation in Christ. Calvin, of all the Reformers, was most consistent
in his doctrine of sin as something for which men were responsible. Of
course, all the others said so, but Calvin acted upon his doctrine. The
result was a less bright picture of salvation. The most that can be
said is that we are upon a pace that leads to heaven. Even the Christian,
then, requires discipline, and thus the Christian is not so ready to
pass judgments based upon his own Christian intuition. Personality is
at a discount with Calvin. The Word of God is the norm; the Holy Spirit
is the power, but the channel is not the individual but the congregation
acting as a court.
The Christian conscience, then, for Calvin,is neither that of the
obscure .Anabaptist fanatic nor that of the acclaimed Christian magistrate's
voice, but the combined voice of the citizens speaking as churchmen. This
o 1
is the "middle principle" of natural law to which Bohatfec refers when he
speaks of Calvin as balancing the actual laws of a Christian state against
the divine Will. The question that remains to be asked is whether this
middle principle is adequately represented - or could be adequately
represented - by Zwingli's dismissing of God's Law in the New Testament
summary. Is it not precisely in the easy assumption of direct intellectual
illumination that WB "enthusiasm" begins? Calvin not only spoke of the
Law as an eternal principle, but worked out the implications of that
principle - the principle of equity - in terms of' a Moral Law which
historically had embodied the precepts given to God's people. In order
to /
r~
'Bohatec. "Calvins Lehre von Staat und Kirche ( 1937 )> PP- 17 ff •
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to make a place for this serious treatment of the Decalogue Calvin was
content to lose the idea of the Church as a body of more or less recog¬
nised believers. The continuity of the Church for him does not rest
upon an inner light in human nature so much as upon a fiat of the divine
Will. All that can really be said about human nature is that it is sin-
-r *
ful. All else depends entirely upon God's grace. Not inner light, but
divine predestination, is the basis of the Church's existence and there¬
fore the real force of the Church's judgments.
(v)
Calvin belonged to the second generation of Reformers. In 1525,
when the works which have been considered were new publications, he was a
youthful student in Paris and a Roman Catholic. The nature of his con-
1
version is somewhat obscure, so that one may assume that it was not of a
dramatic nature. It took place between 1529 and 1533, however, for by
1535 Calvin was a religious exile in Basel.
In putting pen to paper in the "Christianae Religionis Institutio"
2
Calvin claimed to be doing no more than provide an elementary treatise"
for the use of his countrymen in exile. The origin of the work is vague.
If he were working up notes originally made in his retreat at
Angouleme in 1534 - the "Breves Admonitiones Christianas" referred to by
Be;ta - /
He speaks of a sudden conversion "subita conversione" (Kidd, op. cit. 523» quo"t>
ing Preface to Psalms), but it does not seem to have been dramatic.
Williston Walker, op. cit., discusses the matter at some length.
o
"Rudimenta quaedam": C.&.XXIX,9(3). In the Preface to Psalms he
describes it as an Encheiridion.
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Beza - they may "be said to derive from his first efforts at preaching,
that is to say, elucidating, the faith that was in him. Troeltsch thinks
2
that Calvin can be described as at this time a "Lutheran"" and such was the
general term given to Keformers. There were no doubt other French
"Lutherans" in Basel, exiles from the Sorbonne heresy hunt. The "Insti-
tutio" was an essay in the views to which they were in fact committed,
particularly relevant since they were in danger of being confused with the
3
Anabaptist movement both there and in France. The first edition of
Calvin's polity was thus scarcely a public manifesto. It was published
anonymously and was not yet the plea of the exiles to the sovereign of
4
their native land. Like the other works that have been considered, the
main object in view was particular and local and the general principles
outlined were drawn against a specific background of controversy such as
the opposition of Some or the turbulence of the Anabaptists.
The literary history of the "Institutes" brings its later editions
into a group of works which Calvin either wrote or revised towards the end
of his life. Amongst these works have already been mentioned his sermons
on the Decalogue and his Harmony of the Pentateuch, and it has been
suggested /
C.E. XLIX, 123. Beza's "Life".
2
"Social Teaching", II, 579.
3
Preface to Psalms. "Ecce autem quum incognitus Basillae laterem,
quia multis piis hominibus in Gallia•exustis, grave passim apud
Germano odium ignes illi excitaverant, sparsi sunt, eius, restinguendi
causa, improbi ac mendaces libelli, non alios tarn crudeliter tractavi
quam Anabaptistas ac turbulentos homines, qui perversis deliriis non
Seligionem modo sed totum ordinem Politicum convellerent." In his
letter to Francis, Calvin makes the same distinction between the good
citizenship of the group he represented and the anarchic tendencies
of the Anabaptists.
4
That is, if Beveridge's view of the later addition of the "Epistola
Nuncupatoria" be accepted.
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suggested that Calvin's political experience in Geneva brought the focus
of his Christian experience even more narrowly upon the central problem
of Christian obedience in the sense of Christian citizenship in the world
as distinct from the isolated personal piety which condemns the world as
evil. The purpose of this section upon the 1556 "Institutio"^ is to
emphasise that even before political responsibility was thrust upon his
youthful shoulders, he grasped the social implications of Reformed - that
is to say, of "true" - Christian faith in a most remarkable manner. As
Beveridge points out in his excellent summary, the main opinions scarcely
changed throughout the additions and recasting of form which the work
underwent in the twenty years of its handling. Sometimes even the word-
2
ing of the first edition is little changed in the process.
3
The actual form of the treatise is not remarkable. Its six chapters,
dealing with the Law, Faith, prayer, the Sacraments to be retained (baptism
and the Lord's Supper), the sacraments to be rejected (the remaining five
of the medieval church) and of Christian liberty, are, like the emphasis
of the other Reformers whose works have been considered, primarily, an
explication of the faith that the prone existed in medieval practice to
develop /
1
For purposes of distinction the 1536 edition is referred to as the
"Institutio", the 1559 edition as the "Institutes" - shortened in
reference to INST.
2
Examules are given in a table in Beveridge's edition of the "Instituted'.
3
The first three deal with the common material of the Prone, viz.,
(1) the Decalogue - the chapter heading is "De Lege"
(2) the Creed - " " " " "De Fidei"
(3) the Lord's Prayer - " " " " "De Oratione".
(4) De Sacramentis .
(5) De Falsis Sacramentis.
(6) De Libertate Christiana, potestate ecclesiastics, et
politics administrations.
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develop in the laity. This was the right faith in their view because
it was faith in touch with the reality of daily circumstance as distinct
from the parade of external trappings of clerical celibacy, priestly
pretension and monastic social irresponsibility. Ana since the expres¬
sion of the elementary faith of the laity was in terms of the Decalogue,
the Greed and the Lord's Prayer, it is not surprising that these subjects
should form the matter of the first three chapters. Nor is it surprising
that upon the basis of this faith an attack should be made upon the
ecclesiastical pretensions in the very stronghold of their position, namely
the sacraments. And finally there is the positive statement that must
follow the demolition of a system: how did the exponents propose to con¬
duct themselves in the practical relationships of personal and municipal
responsibility?
The problem of authority is not confined to Reformed doctrine. It
is a problem of all Christian thinking precisely because it concerns the
point of contact between the disparate planes of the divine Will and human
conduct. Prom New Testament times Christian believers had to grapple with
the claims of the divine command and the counter'claims of natural duty to
family, class and state."'" But in 16th century Europe the social background
y^as complicated by the integration of - at least pretended - "Christian"
authority. The Reformed problem was thus not only to deal with paganism
but also to refute this false doctrine - to prove, in short, that the
established spiritual order was a long standing heresy. In doing so,
as has been suggested in preceding sections, Luther took refuge against
the Church in the secular order which Christian influence had produced -
namely the Christian prince; Melanchthon sought a more doctrinal basis
of /
^
Hence perhans the divine Word, "He that loveth . . . more than me is not
worthy" fivIATT., X, 37'] and the Pauline phrase about crucifixion to
the world [GAL., VI, 4, etc.J.
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of Reformation and found it in the natural light of human nature. Neither
A'i
of these views is so erroneous as "bald summary suggests. Both
emphasise the necessity of finding the true faith in contact with ordinary
human situations, and while Luther expresses the practical necessity of
an ordered Christian society, Melanchthon expresses the essential doctrine
of rational consent which must underlie such a society. In practice
Zwingli advanced on these views by the experiment which he was able to
work out in Zurich. Here were the "Gemeinden" of the faithful endeavouring
to work out the pattern of their salvation according, to the pattern of
God's revelation; but as was noted, the patterns of the various groups
failed to agree without the enforcing power of the secular aim.
Without desiring to over-emphasise the object of one's own research,
one cannot escape the suggestion that Zwingli's democratic experiment
failed in the degree to which he left the inspiration of the divine command
to a simplified summary of the Decalogue. Whether Calvin perceived in
the 153^ edition the relationship of the Decalogue to Christian conduct
in the same degree that he did in the Harmony of 1563 would be of only
academic interest if it can be shown that in 1536 he already had taken this
step beyond his predecessors of establishing Christian conduct upon the
1
eternal principle of revelation as exemplified in the Old Testament.
This seems to be precisely what Calvin did intend when he began his treatise
2
with a consideration of Law which he identified with the Decalogue.
Into /
^
That is to say, a Scriptural as distinct from Melanchthon's natural
principle of human nature and an absolute as distinct from Zwingli's
casual interpretation of the revealed Word.
2
The full title of the first chapter is, "De Lege, quod Decalogi
explicationem continet."
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Into this discussion is poured much of the material which in later editions
was expanded into chapters and finally, in the 1559 edition, into more
than a whole hook. The Synopsis set out in the Corpus fieformatorum
illustrates this point. In the original folio the paging of the intro¬
ductory material, leading up to the discussion of the individual commandments,
is from 42 to 52 These ten pages correspond to Book I and the first
seven and a half chapters of Book II in the 1559 edition. The whole of
Book I, indeed, might he taken as an expansion of pages 42 and 43 in the
1536 folio. The two sentences - "the whole of sacred doctrine may he
said (fere) to consist of these two parts:- knowledge of God and knowledge
of ourselves"^ and. "... the forebear of us all, Adam, was created after
the image and likeness of God, that is, endowed with wisdom, justice,
holiness, and that so long as he thus clung to God by the gifts of His
grace, he should have been continually victorious in Him, if he had
continued in that integrity of nature which he had received from God."
are the principles out of which the long discussion on our knowledge of
God is developed in 1559. The sentence on page 45, "Although we are thus
horn in such a way that it is not in us to do anything that could be
accepted by God, nor that there is found in our virtue anything that could
be /
1 ~~
In the 1536 edition as it stands pp. 1-42 cover the "Epistola
lluncupatoria" or introduction.
2
"Summa fere sacrae doctrinae duabus his partibus constat: Cognitione
Dei ac nostri." C.fi.XXlX 27(42). The figure in brackets refers
to the paging of the original folio.
3
The whole sentence is, "Quo in certain nostri notitiam veniamus, hoc
prius habendum est: parentem omnium nostrum Adam esse creatum ad
imaginem et similitudinem Dei [_GEN., lj, hoc est, sapientia, institia,
sanctitate praeditum, atque his gratiae donis Deo ita haerentem, ut
perpetuo in eo victurus fuerit, si .in hac integritate naturae, quam
a Deo acceperat, stetisset." C.R.XXIX,27-8 (43).
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"be desired by Him, nevertheless we do not cease to owe Him that very thing
which we cannot fulfil, etc." provides the theme of Book II as the third
point in the Christian analysis of human nature.
It is because Calvin perceived the relevance to Christian faith of
the irrational absoluteness of the relationship of these three incompatible
doctrines that he turned so resolutely to the Decalogue as the key to
Christian conduct. It is true that he does refer to the situation as
2 3
"natural" and to the Law as "natural"' but it is clear that he could not
mean by natural the same thing as a rationalist would mean. The nature
referred to is clearly the nature of God's creation, the nature of God's
purpose in Adam, the nature of God's permission of sin in Adam, the nature
of God's continued demand of the impossible in Adam's children in order that
the Divine order'of Nature might be re-created by the free acceptance by man
of the restoring work on Calvary. To expound this doctrine of duty Calvin
had to introduce a doctrine of Providence which to many has appeared monstrous,:
but behind it there lies a consistent reference to faith in revelation which is
just what Luther, Melanchthon and Zwingli in the last resort failed to maintain.
The /
1
'^uamquam etiam sic nati sumus, ut non sit in nobis situm qui dquam agere
quod Deo acceptum esse possit, nec sit in nostra virtute positum
illi gratificari, non tamen desinimus id ipsum debere quod nraestare
non possumus, quando enim Dei creaturae sumus, eius honori et
gloriae servire debebarnus, ac eius mandatis morem genere."
C.R.XHX,28. Cf. INST., 2: 8: 2.
2
E.g., above "integritate naturae". Even if this phrase be restricted
to "human" nature, it still refers which exists to the extent at
least that man - you or I - is condemned here and now because of
what we here and now are.
2
E.g., G.R.-XXIX, 30 (47). "• Proprieque haec ipsa scripta lex, testimonium
est duntaxat legis naturalis, quod memoriam nostram saepius
excitet, et inculcet ea quae, docente intus lege naturali, non
satis didiceramus."
5-38
The Christian prince, natural light, even the Zwinglian appeal to
Scripture, are all^in the context in which they were made, strictly appeals
to forces outside the material of revelation. To say so is not to deny that
princes could he Christian nor that all men owe obedience to God, nor that
Scripture is the norm of Christian conduct; hut it is to assert that the
arguments by which Luther, Melanchthon and Zwingli reached these judgments
were at best emergency measures and perhaps were no more than rationalisation
of their own personal authority; that in other words, to make their theories
natural they made essentially material appeals to principles which are in¬
consistent with their spiritual premises.
The "uses" of the law which Calvin maintained seem to support this
judgment. For Luther there were only two uses, the "civil" and the
"spiritual", the former of .which was "to maintain civil order and obedience"
-mo'r
in a non Christian social order so that it would degenerate into sub¬
human standards. This was the medieval view of society as at once the
sign and the cure of human sin. The latter - "spiritual" - order applied
to predestined believers, leading them to a faith which strictly speaking
implied the freedom of grace and thus out of the obedience of law. Calvin
2
added a third use, namely the guidance of the Church. That is to say,
Calvin /
1 The reference here is to a thesis by Dr Keith L. Bridston, (1948)
"Law and Gospel and. their relationship in the theology of ^uther."
p
The three uses to which Calvin refers are - "Frimum, ut dum justitiarn Lei
ostendit, hoc eat, quam a nobis Deus exigit, suae unumquemque in justi-
tiae admoneat, ac peccati convincat." C.K.XX1X^9 (88). "Deinde,
quatenus Deum fore ultorern declarat, poenam transgressonibus constituit,
mortem ac judicium minatus; hue prodest, ut qui nulla justi rectique
cura, nisi codeti, tanguntur, coerceantur saltern poenarum for-midine
Ibid. , 50 (89). "Postremo et f'idelibus, quorum in cordibus jam
viget" ac regnat Dei Spiritus, non mediorcrem usum adfert, dum lo rnagis ae
magis asaidue admonet", quid rectum sit, et placitum coram Domino."
Ibid., (90) that is to say, the law:
(1) Asserts the sovereignty of God.
(2) By /
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Calvin asserted that the freedom of Christian believers was not a freedom
from the law, but a free acceptance of the law seen as the divinely ordained
structure of the world order. The distinction is not by any means as
subtle as it appears. If one accepts the law as sit^ply the expression of
God's requirements and therefore God's condemnation of the world, one will,
from the point of view of salvation, regard this continuing evil of the
world as a remote cloud upon one's personal horizon. There will appear
to be, in short, two world orders, that of law, or sin, and that of love or
salvation. But are these tseparate orders? Is the evil of the world
merely a Cross to be borne penitentially by the faithful?'1" Are not Chris¬
tians rather sent out into the world of sinful men to exhibit God's true
purpose for the world, namely, obedience to His justice?
Calvin's treatment of the various commandments in 1536 are no doubt
somewhat hasty. Like Luther too he tends to draw out of them his pet
doctrine - in Calvin it was the iniquity of images. Perhaps, too, he
scarcely contemplated a situation in which he would be the virtual founder
and ruler of a new social pattern. But even in these strictly personal
conditions his treatment of large issues is statesmanlike. Hoy/ever strongly
he might defend the views of the exiles against the imputation of lawlessness,
he /
(2) By implication condemns human claims to absolute worth.
(3) Asserts that even grace is mediated according to the eternal prin¬
ciples of the Divine Will. Hence Calvin would be restricted to a
penal and substitutionary view of the Atonement and would restrict
the actions of force to ordered channels of Christian discipline.
He proceeds to say so in a subsequent paragraph. Ibid. (90-1) The
term he uses is "charity" but obviously the charity of members of a
separated order of grace to a world eternally lost will be dif- •
ferent from.the stern charity of saved members of an erring world to
their as yet unenlightened fellow citizens.
1
Bohatec, op. cit. suggests that this was the Lutheran view.
1U0
he does not imply that they would accept permission to return home un¬
conditionally. There is even the implication that the King is not above criti-
"|
cism.-1- Kings are in the hand of God, called no doubt to high authority,
but never placed beyond the same laws of conduct under which all believers
lay. The doctrines of kingship formulated in that same generation by Bodin^
were to lead France, and to some extent England and Scotland, far away from
this democratic view and were to force Calvinists into a republicanism they
'Z
did not relish. But it seems reasonable to trace the modern doctrine of
government by consent, which became in England and Scotland so closely part
of the religious tradition and in France returned in a romantic and much
4
less stable form in 1789 to the insight of Calvin into Christian freedom
and Christian duty.
The implication of this view of the Decalogue is that Calvin regarded
it not only as a desirable exercise of piety and not even, as Brunner sug-
5
gests9 an ideal model of conduct. It is true that he regarded as danger-
ous the proposal to replace existing social codes by the Mosaic code, but
the object of his abhorrence was not the proposal to use the Mosaic code so
much /
^
Referring to the pains of exile, he says they must call upon God "cuius
in manu sunt regum corda, et regnorum inclinationes." Op.cit.( 246-7 (510)
That is to say, Calvin hopes that the king will rescind the conditions
which make exile the only alternative to martyrdom, but he does not sug¬
gest that the king's mercy would be from his own good will. In fact, fran
one point of view one might even take from this remark the interpretation
that the king was positively in error in his presentation of the truth.
^ Bodin's "De Republics" was published in 1577. His "monarch" owed no
"legal" duties to his subjects, but only "moral" duties under the law of
nature - So Pollock, op. cit., p. 50.
3
In Scotland, for example, during the Bishops' wars. Later, Scotland accep¬
ted Charles II in defiance of Cromwell.
4
Via the American States.
5 •
"Justice and the Social Order", 242.
Bohatec, op. cit., p. 15.
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much as the implication that the Mosaic Code was merely a code, like that of
Solffl© or Lycurgus. On the contrary the Decalogue is both a social pattern
and at the same time an indication of the continuing efficacy of the Holy
Spirit. To the unbelieving therefore the Decalogue was only a form of words
capable of no development into saving precepts. Before the Decalogue could
be used effectively it was necessary to invoke the Holy Spirit."'" In prac¬
tice therefore the State as such could not appeal to the Decalogue. Appeal
could only be made to the faith of the Church by which the precept of the
Divine Will could be expounded.
In this doctrine lie many subjects for discussion, for example, the
identity of the State qua, citizens with the Church qua believing members.
More specifically there is an identity of the appeal to "equity" not with
natural law, at least as natural law is understood by rationalist thought -
that is, as the wisdom of man as he is - but with the living faith of man as
a believer - that is, the wisdom of the man who sees the eternal purpose of
God. And if this equity is in the last issue mere Christian dictatorship
Calvin would appeal to the fact that Christian faith is truth and that the
unbeliever if he is indeed reprobate, must be made to conform to that truth.
It may not be altogether irrelevant to add a few remarks about the
opportunities that were opening out for Calvin almost on the morrow of his
publication of the "Institutio". He had set about the preparation of a
second edition almost immediately but was interrupted by, amongst other
business, a visit to Ferrara, to the Duchess, who was a noted patron of
Reform. Making a detour on his return, in order to avoid "the wars", he
passed through Geneva, and, being discovered to Farel, was forcibly
detained. /
^ Jean Cadier echoes this view of Calvin ip his paper "La notion de
l'Ecriture Sainte chez Calvin". The Presbyterian horld, Sept., 1949.
"La comprehension de l'Ecriture, tout comme la foi, est l'oeuvre de
1'Esprit •" The paper is full of similar references and, remarks. For
example, "un rdforrae? est un homme qui accepte d Stre a la Parole
de Dieu et de ne pas rechercher de preuve plus haute a ses aiiirma-
tions que le donne de I'Ecriture sainte."
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detained.1 Between this date and the exile to Strasburg in March 1538
Calvin concerned himself with the practical matter of reconstituting the
Church in Geneva rather than with the academic work of his "Institutio". The
second edition, published in Strasburg in 1539, where Calvin was engaged in
theological teaching, was, however, still academic in its purpose. Six new
chapters were added, two, as an expansion of the introductory material, deal¬
ing with the knowledge of God, human nature and free will, and four interposed
into the discussion on faith, dealing with penance, justification, the rela¬
tionship between Old and New Testaments, and Providence. At the same time,
the chapter on the true sacraments was expanded into chapters on the two main
Administrations, baptism and communion. Separate chapters were also made of
the various headings of the final chapter of 1536, on Christian liberty. But
behind this expansion of thought one cannot help tracing the administrative
problems that had brought into being the first of his "Ordonnances".
The "Articles concernant 1'organisation de l'/glise et du culte a
Geneve, proposes au Conseil par les Ministres" of 16th January, 1537, deal,
as would be only right, primarily with the Church order.
His first words are,2 "it is certain that a church cannot be said to be
ordered and governed aright unless in it the Holy Communion of our Saviour
is often celebrated and attended. In the act of communion,^ "the members
of /
1
See "Annales", C.R. XLIX, 203. The date is August 1536.
2
C.R. XXXVIII, a. 5-6. H est certain que une esglise ne peut estre
dicte bien ordonnee et reiglee synon en la quelle la saincte Cene de
nostre Seigneur est souvente foys celebree et frequentee.
^ Ibid.,8. "... pour conjoindre les membres de nostre Seigneur Jesus-
Christ avecq leur chefz et entre eux mesmes en ung corps et ung
esprit . ." The passage goes on "Mays le principal order que est
regnis et du quel je convient avoyr la plus grande sollicitude cest
que ceste saincte Cene ordonnee et institutee pour conjoindre les
membres de nostre Seigneur Jesus-Christ avecq leur chefz et entre eux
mesmes en ung corps ne soyt souillee et contaninee, si ceux nappartenir
millement a Jesus, viennent a y Communiquer." The word "chefz" is
talcen as "heads of families" as more appropriate than "heads of the
church".
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of our Lord Jesus Christ with their heads and among themselves are joined
together in ody and spirit". Constantly faced with the necessity of
grace and its means through the right sacraments, they would learn by
implication the horrors of excommunication, which was the only ultimate
sanction that Calvin would admit. Calvin urged in this document the
1
desirability of a weekly communion, but in the revised editions had to be
content with a quarterly. The real sanction was to be an informed public
opinion, and Calvin therefore urges the definition of a doctrine of faith
so that the faithful might be united in one church. Preaching held a large
place in this instruction and also the singing of congregational psalms, led
2
in the first instance by "aulcungs enfans". Educational facilities were to
be extended to these children, finally precept was to be enforced in
3
practice: the conditions of marriage, for example, were to be defined
strictly.
In later projects Calvin emphasised one or other of these four funda¬
mentals. In 1541 when he was reinstated in Geneva he tackled the
4
ecclesiastical problem further, dealing with the organisation and discipline
of a right ministry. Its order was to be four-fold - ministers, teachers,
elders and deacons - of which the spearhead was the pastoral ministry.
Particular arrangements were laid down both for their continual mutual
contact and for the extension of their work into outlying parts of the
countryside. Their work was religious instruction and not politics, but
in /
1









in the last resort the magistrate could he summoned "pour mettre ordre"
in the event of "obstination" even in ecclesiastical matters. In short,
the ministry was to represent the doctrinal side of the truth of which the
state represented the social and political sides. In order to fulfil
this function the ministry had to be strictly disciplined. The crimes
"intollerable en un ministre" range from a first degree such as heresy
and schism to a second degree which includes personal misdemeanour such
as uncontrollable anger. In the first order, along with crimes of
violence, civil offence, drunkenness and dancing are included, and also
usury. This inclusion is interesting in view of the sanction which
Calvin gave to usury on a limited scale in business. His motive was no
doubt the prevention of misuse of pastoral authority for personal ends.
The minister was not to handle money even in poor relief; that was the
function of the deacon.
In this first project Calvin deals also with the administration of
church "social" services such as baptism, marriage and burial. In all
these acts the minister must combat the superstition that the act of
the Church can supersede the personal faith of the believer in the Word
of God. Burial is very little more than a committal of the body. In
1 2the marriage and baptismal question the Reformer seems to have been
faced with nothing less than licence, and he has separate consideration
upon each. The principle of marriage was to be the banns, which were
to ensure that the persons concerned were not only right and proper
parties /
1
Pr-ojet d'Ordonnance sur les mariages, 10th November, 1545. C.R. XXXVIII 33 ff
2
Projet d'Ordonnance sur les noms de bapteme, 22nd November, 1546. Ibid.., U-9
Ik5
parties but were also capable of undertaking the responsibilities of the
married state. No person previously unmarried could be married without
paternal consent unless the man were over twenty four and the woman over
twenty. If such a marriage did take place, it could be rescinded and the
parties punished by imprisonment on bread and water - the main parties for
three days, the witnesses for one. The ceremony was to be conducted in
church "without drums or minstrelsy""'" and not on a day of communion. Once
married, the parties could not easily be released from their vows. The
authority of the Council itself might be invoked to persuade them to remain
together. Unlike Bucer, Calvin did not allow divorce on grounds of
incompatibility. Nullity could be decreed on grounds of physical maladjust¬
ment and divorce on grounds of adultery or desertion by either party.
The important point is that Calvin expressly made men and women equal in
their rights and duties of marriage.
In 1546 Calvin dealt with baptismal names. The fact that he did so
at all is significant of the common usage. Again the main concern was
the suppression of superstition. Names of local "idols" take precedence
in the ban, a fact that suggests that the medieval principle of baptising
local deities had not altogether removed paganism from Christendom.
Other names banned were such as superstitious persons might take from the
Christian religion itself. The Names of God such as Jesus, Saviour,
Emanuel, the names of Christian festivals such as Easter, Noel, and even
the name Christian, are all banned, together with other less likely names
such /
1 ~
Ibid. , 40. "Sans tambourins ne menestriey".
li+6
such as Suaire (shroud), Claude (fool) and Mama. Calvin even suggests
that other, non-religious names such as Allemande and Mermet, corrup¬
tions of names such as Tevenot instead of Estienne, and double names,
should also be disallowed, presumably because of their levity.
In several ordonnances during the year 1551 Calvin deals with oaths
and blasphemy, and by this time we see how far he had departed from the
merely spiritual attitude of the Church to sin. Prison on a bread and
water diet is recommended for the various degrees of dishonour to God.
Frivolous oaths could be punished in the fourth offence by as much as three
months' banishment."'" Finally the work was revised and completed in the
Ordonnances of 1561.
The reason for tracing these events is to indicate the integration
of political practice with spiritual precept that was forced upon the
author of the "Institution. The "Genevan"editions of 1543 - 1554
reflect something of that development. There is a good deal more said
about both Church and state. For example, a chapter is inserted between
the consideration of the Law and Faith, concerning oaths, particularly
oaths of religious devotion such as men or women might take to the
monastic life. A good deal is also added in explication of faith,
Christian liberty and human tradition and. finally, on the political
significance of Christian faith.
What relationship has this political thought to the Decalogue?
That, of course, is precisely the question to be asked and answered in





standard of piety or a standard of criticism. It is not so easy to be
clear in enunciating a pattern of Christian conduct on the basis of that
Law, without, at least, losing the essential freedom of Christian faith.
1
Lobstein describes the Decalogue in Calvin s ethical system as "the
norm- of the new life" objectively based upon election, that is, the
divine will in eternity, and "subjectively" accepted by faith, but
"conditioned and presupposed" by Christian freedom. That is to say,
the Calvinist view assumes the truth of the beginning and developing of
this new life in God's Will, the human response being in terms of peni¬
tence, the continual test being self denial, and the manifestation to the
world being in the right conduct of family, state and Church. In 1536
Calvin was already saying that Christian liberty consists in fulfilling
the demands of the Law without being forced thereto by the Law, ' so that
he could finally, in the "Institutes" of 1559 and the Harmony of 1563,
without contradiction seek a pattern of right conduct in the Decalogue
without being bound to the Spirit of legalism. As for the necessity of
imposing that discipline upon the unwilling Calvin is faced with a





• . . ut conscientiae non quasi legis necessitate coactae, legi
obsequantur, sed legis ipsius iugo liberae, voluntati Dei ultro
obedient." C.R.XXIX, 197 (403).
CHAPTER IV
The Theological Basis of Christian Conduct.
(i) The theological problems of Calvin's conception of "faith",
(ii) Calvin's Biblicism.
(iii) The problem of abrogation.




(i) The Theological Problems of Calvin's conceptions of "faith".
This chapter and the next two are "based upon the three major
works of Calvin that have already "been described as "being con¬
sciously written or reviewed "by him towards the end of his life,
and left, as it were, as the deposit of his Christian philosophy.
The "Sermons" will not "be referred to in any detail since they
represent a popular exposition of those views which he has
1
elsewhere expressed in more considered language. But the
"Harmony" of the Pentateuch and especially the 1559 "Insti¬
tutes" may be regarded as the theological mine out of which any
definitive exposition of his views on the Decalogue must be hewn.
If the preceding three chapters have fulfilled the purpose
intended for them, some idea of the main issues involved in
general for any Christian theologian and in particular for Calvin
in the circumstances in which he had to find a solution, will
have been already formed. They may be briefly summarised as
follows. Primarily7the Christian believes he has to consider
the importance and the nature of the revelation upon which his
confessed faith rests. This is a very large, and indeed may be
said to be the whole, issue of Christian theology. Whatever
might be said in favour of the 18th century search for a religion
2
that should be independent of revelation, from the Calvinist
point /
His sermons were delivered extempore. They were not reduced to
writing till 15k5, when Jean Cousin was appointed as the first
of his secretaries - T. H. L. Parker. Op. cit., pp. 36 ff.
2 e.g. Kant's "Religion within the limits of mere Reason" 1791. But
this work was only the climax of a long history of argument, par¬
ticularly in England and Scotland. Graham, op. cit., 351 ff,
gives an account of the change of emphasis that happened in Scot¬land under the influence of Professor Hutchison of Glasgow, 11726
onwards]. Calvin, says Dr Hunter (op. cit., p. 107) "allows™
himself no licence in a priori reasoning."
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point of view it would simply not "be the Christian religion.
The question rather was the balance of three strains of divine
revelation, in the fact of creation, the Written Word represent¬
ing the historical events leading up to and culminating in the
life and death of Jesus Christ, and finally the evidence of the
Holy Spirit's leading in the Christian experience of each genera¬
tion. In determining the "balance, the Reformers were not simply
selecting amongst theoretical possibilities. They did not,
apparently, know much about St. Thomas Aquinas,"1" but the teach¬
ing of St. Thomas was in accord with the deep stream of Roman
practice with which they had to deaL, namely, accommodation with,
in order to keep control of, secular affairs, whether philoso¬
phical or political. The medieval synthesis did not, of course,
ignore the revealed nature of Christian faith; but it was a
static exposition in the sense that the Church as an institution
(as distinct from the activity of personal response) claimed to
be the only channel of inspiration or grace. The objection of
the Reformers to this view was that the mere guarantee of the
Church was to them an insufficient, indeed a presumptious,
2
solution to the basic problem of Creation, which is sin. Only
Jesus Christ can forgive sins, and He must do So to the
consciousness /
According to Barth, see "Natural Theology" pp. 100 ff. Calvin's
criticism of the Roman usages in 3N.8TJ, k- 20: 1-19 illustrates
the point of Barth's remark. Many of the abuses which he
mentions were rectified, largely as a result of Loyola's in¬
fluence; but, as Barth says, the claims of Rome to absolute
spiritual rule remain incompatible with Protestant ideas of
Christian freedom. His references to the Papacy in oermons 15
2 and 16 of the 1562 collection on DEUX. V (0yR. LIV,Zj.07 ff.)
INST, k, cap. 20. are nruch more fundamental.
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consciousness of each "believer.
In asserting this interpretation of faith, the Reformers
were accused of the aiarchy of Anabaptist "inspiration" which
was opposed to, or at least apparently incapable of maintaining,
stable social grouping.1 It was necessary, therefore, for the
Reformers to prove themselves defenders of Christian society,
based upon personal conviction about a historic revelation and
membership of the fellowship - the Church - which embodied that
eternal revelation. Their bulwark of revelation was thus
2
Scripture, rather than either "nature" or "inspiration", but
they interpreted the particular event of Jesus Christ in terms
of the eternity and time which led up to and lead away from that
point. The Church was no mere chance collection of believers.
Calvin can speak of the "fathers" of the Old Testament, and,
3
as Niesel emphasises, the fundamental doctrine of Calvin's
k 5
ethics is that God's Law is a Covenant and a social law.
Perhaps /
1
Calvin's prefatory letter to Francis. Doumergue in the article
"Calvin - epigone or creator" quoted above (Calvin and the
Reformation, pp. 19 ff) discusses the relationship of the two
movements as they presented themselves to theologians of the
19th century. A. C. Underwood "A History of the English Bap¬
tists" (19U7) points out that Penry and other Separatists who
fell under the ban in loth century England, but always protested
that they were not Anabaptists. The reason was not doctrinal
so much as social. Believers' baptism stood for the political
anarchy of Munster - pp. 21 ff, 37 etc.
^ Warfield, article "Calvin's doctrine of the Knowledge of God" in
the above symposium, p. 135.
3 Op. cit. , 86 ff.
^ Bundesgesetz.
5 As distinct from an isolated personal obedience. On the question
of freedom, he says, ibid., 95 "the basis of the precepts, which
were given to the nation of Israel for their political life, is
imperishable ("unverganglich") cf. Tawney, op. cit., 103.
'(Calvinism) was a creed which sought, not merely to purify the
individual, but to reconstruct Church and State. See also
Vischer, op. cit. , pp. 202+ ff.
I
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Perhaps this view involves, as Seeberg remarksthe restriction of
individual freedom both in action and in opinion, and it is obvious
that Oalvin had to rely increasingly upon the doctrine of predestina-
2
tion to preserve the balance between the fact of revelation and the
event of faith, but it does account for both consent and order in
the impact of God's revealed -fill upon the streams of human decisions.
Various subsidiary problems, or aspects of the main problem,
immediately present themselves. There is, for example, the suggest¬
ion of a "mechanical" inspiration of Scripture. 33r ¥. P. Patterson
asserts"* that 17th century scholastic Calvinism was based upon such a
view, but Calvin clearly did not feel constrained to hold it. Brun-
ner's examples in "Justice and the Social Order"+ can be multiplied.
Taking the discussion of the seventh commandment in the "Harmony
5
of the Pentateuch", for example, - and this is a random choice -
Calvin is found in the toils of exposition. Quoting EXODUS XXI,. vv.
7 ff - "if a man sell his daughter to be a maid-servant" -
he concludes that "many vices were tolerated in this
people", and thus the Christian must rest rather in the
protection /
Dogmengeschichte IV, pp. oll-2.
2
This tendency is brought out clearly in the above article by Dr
Warfield - op. cit. 166 ff, particularly. Even in 1536 Calvin
had been saying, of the sacraments, "they can by themselves offer
us no hope of salvation" (CR.XXpC.p38). That is to say, salva¬
tion'is a hidden gift of God which even the pious cannot extort.
By 1559 he had four chapters on predestination (INST. 3: 21-21+),
which he was developing from his discussions on faith and
justification. Compare his agnostic remarks in CR.LIV 263.
^ "The Rule of Faith", pp. 6i+ ff of Calvin he adds "that Calvin
looked upon Scripture as a statute book of doctrine and morality,
and that he held the mechanical and plenary theory of inspira¬
tion, is antecedently probable from his intellectual constitu¬
tion and legal training, and this is strongly supported by the
terras in which he usually touches on the subject." Of this
judgment Calvin might, as Tawney says, justifiably remark, "I am
U p n§2+ 2a Galvinist-
5 CR. LII* 65O ff.
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protection which, the law afforded to the unfortunate children ■ involved.
Again there is the reference to divorce in Deuteronomy, 21+.
1
Divorce, Oalvin says, was allowed 'in indulgence' to the Jews,
yet Ohrist pronounced that it never was in accordance with God's
Will. In other words, Oalvin sets over against the ethics of the
Old Testament the teaching of Jesus and the assent which the be¬
liever gives to that teaching. But, of course, he implies that
really even the Old Testament "Fathers" also assented to the prin-
2
ciple although they were permitted the "indulgence" of breaking it.
The freedom of assent which could pass judgment even upon Holy
Writ -would not, however, while remaining Christian, lead to the dis¬
solution of the social conventions. As the Spirit, for Paul, could
3
not-say "Jesus is accursed" so, for Calvin, He could not say - as the
Anabaptists were accused of making Him say - that marriage, property
or human personality are of no account in God's sight. The phrase
5
which Calvin used for this common sense balance was "equity" , and
this equity seems to remain a factor in his theology, even although
he can speak with much greater reality of meaning than Luther, of





So that the unity of Scripture is maintained, as the Westminster
Confession requires (I, 9).
^
I CBS*, xii, 3-
h
A. C. Underwood, op. cit. , pp. 23 ff. Calvin defines the order of
civil polity as ^securing to every individual the exclusive enjoy¬
ment of his property" - INST, b: 1: 3«
^ "Naturalis equitas" INST., b: 20: 16; equite naturelle CR.-XXXVIII a,
pp. 21+8: 261+. In the' former instance Calvin was discussing the
basis of natural law as law: in the second, the more restricted
problem of economic usury.
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rejection of momkish asceticism precisely because they refused to
believe in the devaluation of human personality as a result of sin.1
That there was a dilemma of human nature Calvin has already been
2
quoted as maintaining. Responsibility and sin were both, and sim¬
ultaneously, present in each individual, and his system rests upon
that basic assertion. Thus, if he were no ascetic, hating existence,
he was no sentimentalist, forgetful of the temptations that assail even
the Christian in the act of receiving the symbols of divine grace and
the Presence of a Risen Saviour.3
The subject matter of this chapter may be conveniently divided
into the following heads; the probLearns of Scripture, abrogation, guilt,
and finally law. Apart from the problems of Scripture and of "judicial"
Law, the argument follows that of the first chapter that Calvin devotes
to the subject of "Moral Law" in the Institutes.^" The norm of
Scripture he had already discussed at length, particularly in the
first book, which, as has been already shown, grew out of the original
assumptions of the 153& Institutio, about our knowledge of God.
The problem of judicial law he reserved for the discussion not of
doctrine /
1 '
Doumergue, op. cit., takes up this accusation of asceticism which
was first made by Ritschl. He distinguishes asceticism as an
end from self denial as a means of the good life.
^ See above, pp. 84 ft-
3 RUST. I: cap. 9 contains the substance of his polemic against the
Anabaptists. The point he stresses is that while the Spirit
may seal the divine testimony of grace, the la?/ of Christian
living is found in the Word. "We are not favoured with daily
oracles from heaven" (LUST. 1: 7: l). Obedience too is a daily
exercise of human responsibility, a discipline requiring constant
vigilance while we are in this flesh (INST. 3- 3: lU).
^ INST- 2: 7.
155
doctrine itself, tut the application of doctrine to practical conduct
in Church and State.'1"
(ii) Calvin's Bitlicism.
2
Professor Tawney describes the Calvinist Church as "an army
marching back, to Canaan, under orders delivered once for all from
Sinai." Its system, he says, was "more Roman than Christian, and
more Jewish than either." The description has the point and the inaccu¬
racy of a half-truth. It is certainly not true that Calvinist polity
was in any sense "marching back". Geneva was, in its economy and its
social order, a modern city compared with, for example, iittenberg.
Moreover, its vision was the future, not the past. Calvin, however,
remained conservative in his ideas of, for example, monarchy and aris-
3
tocracy. He was no "monarchomachist". But, as will be seen, his ob¬
jection to monarchomachism was not a mere negation, the fear to take a
necessary step. Calvin was not a monarchomachist because he objected
to the subjective implications of the natural law which monarchomachism
invoked. When he looked to Sinai he was not looking to the past, but look-
4
ing to eternity, which is neither past nor future. The working of the




2 OP- cit., pp. 117: 127: 128.
3 " v
■Otieneviere, op. cit., pp. 11 ff, etc. Scott Pearson, op. cit.,
pp. 76 ff.
4
Thus he regarded the polity of the Old Testament as the clearest
example of a Decalogue - politics, but not necessarily on example
to be slavishly followed in 16th century Geneva.
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imagination" can be exaggerated. In so far as they represented the
working of the eternal Spirit of God in history they were relevant
to Calvin's thoughts but they were in themselves mere "organs" of
God. Tawney is more accurate in his comparison between this
Biblical inspiration and the inspiration of Brutus and Cassius to
"the men of 1793"- Every social code needs a slogan. That of 1793
was the power of Reason: that of 1535 was the power of Scripture.
To some extent Professor Ta.wney declares his own attitude when
he dismisses the core of Calvin's theology as beyond the judgment of
1
an amateur. The dilemma of that primary statement has already been
discussed. It is, of course, deliberate, not because Calvin
repudiated logical tidiness but because he accepted as one of the
factors of the human situation the mystery of divine intervention.
The attempt to describe God in terms of impersonal absolutes and His
Law in terms of abstract nature has little place in Calvin's thought.
Primarily he is content to know of God that which He has seen fit to
reveal in His Scriptures, and to deduce from this body of knowledge
3 k
alone the proper life of faith. What Milton ascribed to Virtue,
then, might be transferred to Calvin's view of Scripture.
"[scripturej could see to do what [scripturej would
By her own radiant light, though sun and moon
Were in the flat sea sunk. "
To /
^ 0p» eit. , 108: the reference is to Calvin's summary of predestina¬
tion. INST, 3" 21: 7 and 23: 7-
2 E.g., INST. , 1: 5: 9.
^ Warfield makes this point in the article quoted, op. cit. , 138 ff.
k
Comhs, 11. 373 ff-
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To him Scripture carried its 07m conviction. It was not a collec¬
tion of fragmentary texts to be co-ordinated by "natural" wisdom or
ecclesiastical authority but a record of the authentic utterance of
God. This interpretation of Scripture may not be self-evident wisdom,
but it is the characteristic interpretation of all the Reformers by
which they refashioned the conduct and the thought-forms of European
society. A Protestant believed that he was "ever in the great Task¬
master's eye" as an individual, and that his every action was weighed
in a balance, the measure of which he himself possessed in Scripture.
Mystery there might be about God's Providence, but there was no
mystery about what God actually willed all men to do here and now;
and the events of Scripture were illustrations of the working of His
eternal Will. Men had Moses and the prophets, whose teaching was
enough to bring them to saving knowledge of Jesus Christ.
Reference has already been made to a criticism of Calvin that
-mm:
even he was committed "to a completely verbal and mechanical theory
of inspiration".^ The same critic added that he, Calvin, had also
fallen into "the medieval error that the source of authority is neces¬
sarily to be found in some place wholly outside the individual."
That judgment is true in only a limited sense. It is true, for
example, that Calvin repudiated, or perhaps never even considered,
the modern conception of human salvation by human means. For many
reasons the medieval thinker distrusted the individual as sn individual,
and sought refuge in social groupings. The physical life of the
individual /
Davies, op. cit. p. 153.
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individualwas too insecure to permit of our modern confidence.
Sickness within and the horrors of nature without surrounded the
brief candle of humanity with darkness and encouraged the invoca¬
tion of the eternal powers.
Moreover, society was itself insecure. The utter disaster
which overtook Rome at the hands of the Gothic hordes still
vibrated in Christendom. There was neither understanding nor
hope of controlling the powers of etbnic movement. Chaos was
1
round about Christendom, and sometimes even within its borders.
The arm of law was comparatively short and therefore the scope for
outlawry was considerably greater than it is supposed to be to-day.
Christendom, therefore, was not likely to elect for the dissolu¬
tion of that external civilisation which had come to it through
Rome by the Gospel-teachers, and to embark on the hazardous task
of beating out a new philosophy of the individual. That experi-
2
ment was not begun before the 18th century; and to-day, with
civilisation itself a broken tool, it is perhaps natural that one
should still look to the individual as the means of restoring to
society its equilibrium. It is upon this point of view that
condemnation of Calvin for destroying Servetus rests, the argument
being that Servetus had rights as an individual, whatever his
theological /
In Luther's Germany, the fear of Turkish invasion was a constant
factor. The frequency of the plague was another factor of in¬
security. Economic change with its inevitable associate, social
insecurity, was a third. Lindsay I, p. 129*
2 Particularly in Prance. The consequent questioning of the family
as the smallest unit in the social structure was first expressed
in England by Godwin and Shelley.
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theological views. It -would have been a meaningless argument
to both men.
Another form of this criticism is the horror at Calvin's
description of the prophets as the mere mouthpieces of God. It
may be no defence of Christian doctrine to remark that Plato held
a similar view."3" In his state the greatest good of the individ¬
ual might be rejected in favour of the greatest good of the com¬
munity. This judgment was passed upon the highest classes of the
group, but it was egually true of all classes, and included by im¬
plication the slave status of the bottom strata. One passes over
the similar restrictions of the modern welfare staxe. The fact
is that absolute freedom for the individual is incompatible with
2
society and therefore with his own individuality. But in the
Christian community the question is not limited to the choice of
freedom and slavery. The over-riding service of Almighty God
transforms all human relationships. Because the individual is the
creature and the servant of God he can neither be a tyrant nor a
slave. Individual liberty that cannot suffer employment even for
the secular sta"&e is an elixir too delicate for the workaday world,
and service which cannot be joyfully offered to Him Who loved us
and gave Himself for us is too mean for a Christian state. Perhaps
even the character of the individual may most truly find itself by
being /
1 ' " ' '
Republic IV, eb.init.
So Buber in "I and Thou", (E.T. 1937) •
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loeing lost in the divine service."1*
The problem of Scripture, however, is perhaps more correctly
associated with the problem of knowledge, particularly ethical
knowledge. The question at issue for the Reformers was constantly,
"What am I to do?"*'" whether to obey the mandate of the Church (of
Z
Some) or on what grounds to disobey it. The alternative was
apparently to do simply what Scripture should say^*: but Scripture
was found to contain a regulative principle by which certain teach¬
ings contained within its own covers were criticised and even re¬
jected by others. And yet Scripture could not simply be rejected
by Christians. Even Rome did not reject Scripture but merely
claimed the absolute right of its interpretation. Nor yet could
one take refuge in the individual although clearly Scripture de¬
manded the consent of the individual to the divine Word. The
issue of Scripture lay between "revelation" and "inspiration".
5
According to Dr Cadier, inspiration is for Calvin "the act by
which the Holy Spirit has given to apostles and prophets (the
power) to write the holy books without ranking them the authentic
records in which Cod has placed His truth. The principle that
distinguishes our religion from all others is that we know that
Cod has spoken and are certainly assured that the prophets have
not spoken in their own understanding but that "as organs and
instruments /
1 S T.- MARK VIII, 35.
2 Warfield, op. cit.
3 Warfield, op. cit., p. 167.
c Heyer points out how strongly Farel appealed to Scripture as the
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instruments of the Holy Spirit they have announced what they re¬
ceived from on high . . • that it was the mouth of God which had
spoken.""*" Revelation, on the other hand, is "a miracle, for a
particular person in a particular situation" - the interior proof
2
corresponding to a natural knowledge of God. This knowledge is,
of course, corrupted; but Scripture breaks through the obscurity
of sin.
Calvin's answer to the question, "What to do?" would thus be
in two parts. Let a man study Scripture, for in and through Scrip¬
ture God will speak to that man as He has spoken before. But the
revelation itself can be tested by its coherence with other acts
of revelation, so that the man who simply claims knowledge of God's
leading without being able to dispute about it and place it in its
relationship to a recognisable pattern, is not really in possession
of a revelation at all. Hence his repudiation of the alleged
Ij.
"daily oracles" of the Anabaiotists. It is not altogether true
that the mere ability to dispute about Scripture indicates a
, 5
possession of its trutti. Scripture demands a humble and lowly
spirit in its study. ^ The knowledge it contains is the secret of
7
God, and the Christian knowledge of the Christian man is comparable
only /
Referring to Commentary on II TlMOtHY III, 16. See also "farfield's
article, op. cjt., p. 159 for other phrases drawn from Calvin's
writings.
2 Referring to INST. 1: 3*. 1.
3 Referring to INST. 1: 6: 1.
4- See above, p.154 rote
3 Inst. 1: 7: 4- Compare 'Westminster Confession I, 5- Other refer¬
ences appear in fflST. 1: 7: 5; 1: 8: 1; 1: 8: 13-
6
E.g. INST. I: 7: 5-
7
i.e. in Scripture it is God, not man, who speaks - Comm. 2 PET. 1,20
also Inst, l: 7r k; 1: 7: 5> 1: 7: 13-
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only to a new sense.1 Pop step by step with Scripture reading
there moves - for the elect at least - the testimony of the Holy
2
Spirit. But the knowledge imparted by Scripture is in a sense
no secret at all. The Christian perceives that it is essentially
the whole truth: that is to say, it is the truth for the unsaved
as well as the saved, the truth which is patent to the unbeliever, -
or would be if the unbeliever were not blinded by sin.
It is upon this ethical basis that Oalvin rests his doctrine
of nature. Nature is the means by which all stand condemned,
whether pleading guilt or innocence.^ God's Will is known to us
all, even if we have not been subject to the discipline of the Old
Testament polity. The Decalogue made the Old Testament polity,
but it also made our conscience. The problem of conduct for the
Christian is never ignorance but always sin.
(iii) The Problem of Abrogation
Scripture itself patently implies the necessity of selection
amongst its doctrines, a purpose and development of its history.
The study of history in Oalvin's time was not, as it now is, a search
for that elusive "Ding an Sich" - what "actually" happened. To us,
therefore, his historical statements may appear naive, but in fact
they are merely succinct expressions of the principle that is
fundamental /
_ . . .
"Sensus" - INST. 1: 7: 5- He compares it with ordinary sensory
perception - INST, 1: 7: 2.
2
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fundamental to all Christian thought - that the Old Testament is
fulfilled in Jesus Christ. Calvin's opening sentence of the
chapter on "Moral Law" illustrates this principle. "The Law was
not superadded about four hundred years after the death of Abraham
in order that it might lead the chosen people away from Christ,
but on the contrary, to keep them in suspense until His advent;
to inflame their desire, and confirm their expectation, and that
they might not become dispirited by the long delay.""1" as history
it is fcHHUKSfc according to scientific standards of accuracy.
Too much, however, can be made of this historical inaccuracy, even
when he proceeds to the assertion, "it is to be observed that the
Kingdom, which was at length erected in the family of David, is part
p
of the Law, and is comprehended under the dispensation of Moses".
Calvin's literalism was neither that of Rome which proceeded to
express every detail in terms of ecclesiastical symbolism nor yet
the literalism of the evangelical who will refuse rabbit and shell¬
fish because of the Levitical commandments.3 He may be accused of
straining his texts on occasion but he stands in the company of
Paul,^" and with Paul he emphasises the basic principle of annexing
the Old Testament for the glory of Christ.
That is to say, as an Evangelical Christian Calvin brought
Scripture to the bar of his faith. If all is fulfilled in "this
Jesus" /
1
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Jesus" It is clear that certain parts can no longer retain their
apparent implication. They must be abrogated. Yet since Scrip¬
ture is as a whole the Word of God, abrogation of any of its parts
cannot mean mere dismissal. Christian logic requires the dogma
that every Old Testament institution should be given a New Testa¬
ment significance. The key word of Old Testament criticism is thus
"pattern" - a word which was being used already in the Old Testa-
ment^ to emphasise the divine significance of earthly institutions,
and which in HEBREWS2 was made the clue to the embodiment in Christ
of the offices of King and Priest. This view is not altogether at
variance with scientific common sense. In the question which
Calvin asks, for example, - "what could be more frivolous than for
men to reconcile themselves to God, by offering Him the foul odour
produced by burning the fat of beasts, or to wipe away their own
impurities by besprinkling themselves with water or blood?"3 -
the answer of the anthropologist is similar to that of the Christian
dogmatist. Both may assume that the men concerned did really be¬
lieve in the efficacy of the practice and both have to answer two
questions; is the belief the expression of a genuine human need, and
if so, is the practice adequate to produce satisfaction of the need?
Too often the anthropologist is a mere spectator, criticising the prac¬
tice without seeing the spiritual motive. Criticism without reference
to
1 NUM. VIII, 4: EX, XXV., 9.
2 HEB. VIII, 5.
3 INST. 2: 7: 1.
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to an alternative philosophy is as foolish as the superstition
itself. Christian logic offers an interpretation on the "basis
of a possible faith. These practices were ordained as a "school-
"i
master sxlesson to bring the "Fathers" to a Christ they would not
see in the flesh. Elsewhere2 Calvin says that the very inadequacy
of the rites became a lesson to the Fathers of their hopes of im¬
mortality. The anthropologist may offer his interpretation in
terms of the primacy of scientific thought, the Christian answers
in terms of theprimacy of Christ.
Calvin applies his principle of interpretation with logical
thoroughness to the consideration of the Law. Christ is the Climax
of the Old Testament and is, therefore, assumed to be also the inner
meaning of it. He is the End of the Law.® But for the same reason
He is also its Beginning. He fulfils the Law and therefore somehow
the Law foreshadows Him. He is Alpha as well as Omega. The Law
is "not only the Ten Commandments . . . but the whole system of
religion delivered by the hand of Moses",4 and therefore, although
the Ten Commandments may carry eternal value, the "ceremonial" is also
significant, and may indeed t)f- said to have eternal value also.
"Abrogation", in short, cannot be permitted to imply the mere setting
aside of ceremony, for if it did, the Christian would be in danger
of a spiritual legalism as the only alternative to a Christian
libertinism. Moreover, abrogation must apply also
to /
1 GAL, III, 24. Quoted INST., 2: 7: 2.
2
INST- 2: 7: 17.
3 ROM. X, 4. Calvin used this text in his introduction to the
Genevan Bible.
4 INST. 2: 7: 1.
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to the "moral" Law. Both "ceremonial" and "moral" are thus epithets
of the one term, "Law", and must, in a Christian sense, he both
interpreted in terms of the revealed "fill of God in Christ. In
other words, the Christian refers both aspects of the Law beyond the
mere appearance of the Law as ceremony or as precept to a more
ultimate revelation of the divine Will. Whether that revelation is
to be identified with the Decalogue or with some other conception
of Law remains for later consideration. The point to be stressed
here is that "abrogation" as a Christian concept does not turn upon
human acceptance or rejection of either "ceremonial" or "moral" Law;
but of the subsumption of both in Christ. It was precisely because
the Roman Church, like the Pharisees, wilfully maintained the former
against the revelation of Christ, and the spiritual libertines
maintained the latter against the revelation of Scripture that the
Reformers appealed to Paul as the apostle of the Truth.
Calvin can say, therefore, that"*" "it would be impossible to
understand for what purpose they - the Old Testament sacrifices - were
instituted" apart from Christ's sacrifice. He means that they Y/ere
part of the Covenant which God made with Abraham and fulfilled in
2
Christ. Thus he says of the actual practice of the sacrifices
quoting Augustine - that they were "more confession than expiation
of sins" and thus brought the worshipper by acknowledgment of guilt
to "the same grace as ourselves". "Ceremonial" Law in practice was
thus /
_ - * '
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thus in a measure "moral" Law. Then men strove to put themselves
right with God Toy means of blood-shedding and by such personal acts
of sacrifice as keeping feasts and fasts, tithing property and obed¬
ience in general to the various precepts, they were conscious of
directing their conduct along a path of "moral" duty. In Christ,
believers are relieved from the incessant burden of the duties, but
not from the moral obligation which underlay them. To say this is
not, of course, to say that a Christian has no duties. It is to
say, first, that the doing of duties is not a means that leads to
Christian salvation; and secondly, that Christian conduct springs
from love, not fear. Calvin enlarges on this theme in the last
chapter of the work. (INST. 4: 2o) So this doctrine of the "cere¬
monial" Law implies the abrogation in Christ of the "moral" Law too.
Obedience to the moral Law is not the same thing for a Christian as
it is for a n on-Christian, whether he be a "Father" of the Old Testa¬
ment or an unbeliever in the New. For the non-Christian, the "moral"
Law is an intolerable burden since he is beyond assurance of salva¬
tion but not beyond knowledge of God, and since his knowledge of
God is, whether he likes or not, moral knowledge. In other words,
he cannot escape the condemnation of God; in fact, he condemns
himself.-*- But the majesty of the Law is for the Christian only a
means to the end of salvation, a burden laid upon him to bring him
into the humility of repentance. The non-Christian, making the
means /
1 ' ' '
Compare ST. JOHN,III, w. 18-21.
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means itself an end, and therefore presuming to attempt in his own
strength what God alone can fulfil, inevitably falls either into
despair or, worse, into self conceit about a romanticised and there¬
fore a restricted legal obedience, which ultimately denies the neces¬
sity of the Holy Spirit's energies.
Towards the end of the chapter under review"*" Galvin attacks the
Anabaptists' view that the word "ordinance" in 00L0S3IANS ii, 13-lU,
should be taken to include not only "rites of absolution and sacri¬
fice, by which the Jews were consecrated to the Lord", but also the
"injunctions of the Law." It is this difference between "rite" and
"injunction" that makes the difference between "ceremonial" and "moral"
Law. It might be said that the former is abrogated in its use but
not in its effect, the latter abrogated in the opposite sense, namely
in its effect but not in its use. This is the fundamental distinction
in Calvin's ethical thought. On the one hand, the sacrificial work
of Christ is adequately accounted for; the believer, as he takes
bread and wine into his mouth, learns by faith that he receives the
benefits that the patriarchs laboured to attain. No sacrifice need
be made now. It has been made in its fulfilment once for all, and
may be now enjoyed by faith in that fulness. The effect remains:
the use is discarded. On the other hand, the effect of the "moral"
Lav/ is abrogated in the sense that the illusion of possible obedience
is once for all dispelled by the sight of Christ's absolute obed¬
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obedience. Even the Christian, coming from the Table of the Lord,
having enjoyed the full benefits of the sacrifice done once for all
on Calvary, is still involved in a warfare of the spirit, for, so long
as men are in this body of flesh they are capable of sin and incapable
of fulfilling what God demands. The Anabaptist doctrine of "assur¬
ance" was an error if by assurance it meant that the Christian is set
free from obedience, for even if he were saved from the effect of the
curse that all who are under the Covenant know is the reward of sin,
he would still need a discipline of the soul."1"
Whether this view is consistent with the spirit of Christian
faith will no doubt remain in dispute until the end of time: and in
such disputation Calvin's view will be, certainly by some, advanced
as strictly speaking an expression of his personal distrust of his
con temporary Anabaptist opponents. This criticism is less than just,
though not, as will be said later, altogether unjust. Christian
obedience to the Law does not necessarily mean a return to bondage.
The highest doctrine of Communion is consistent with such obedience;
at least, if one means to say that when the communicant by faith enters
into heavenly places, the universe that he sees from the divine stand¬
point is an ordered universe. From such a flight of faith he will
return to daily life a disciplined man, no longer a recalcitrant slave.
That is to say, having seen the Will of God, and having seen God
Himself obey that Will> he delivers himself over to the same obedience,
willingly and in love. And in so far as he is yet subordinate - and
therefore fallible -, and human - and therefore open to temptation -,
he /
1 Mitchell Hunter, op. cit., pp. 110 ff.
The Twelfth Sermon - CR. LlV, 37I4-5.
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he will give himself assiduously to training of body and spirit.
It is, of course, true that the .Anabaptist might exclaim against the
permission by God of sin in the faithful. Oalvin is content to
state as mere fact that we are, in this life, upon a pilgrimage."*"
Does this view invalidate the function of the Holy Spirit? Is
this mere legalism, as Brunnen suggests? It is at least not in¬
consistent with the dynamic character of Reformed faith as distinct
from the repetitive and static reference of the Mass. The activity
of Reformed faith allows for the directness and even the unpredicta¬
bility of God's working in history, and is thus constantly moving in
adjustment to the ever changing combination of human environment on
the one side and the activity of God throuvh the Holy Spirit in men's
hearts on the other. In other words, if the Christian does not
enjoy "daily oracles" he still has to offer daily obedience, which
demands constant vigilance. Knowledge of,and co-operation with, this
action and reaction is true Christian freedom or - which is the same
thing - true Christian discipline. And it is discipline in the
highest sense, because it implies knowledge as well as obedience.
God's action is never outside the pattern which He has laid down for
our guidance once for all in His Covenant and in His Christ. The
Spirit may say strange and hard things to us, but they can always,
on reflection, be fitted into a known pattern.
Again, /
_
X.N.SJE* 3: 3: 20. The reference "in carcere corporis nostri"
"implies eventual release. As Doumergue points out, op. cit. ,
pp. 39 ff, this fact does not mean that earth has no pleasures.
The fact of sin is itself aggravated by the continual revelation
of God's bounty in Nature. Hence Christian conduct is not
without its material reward.
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Again, Christian liberty does not mean doing what we like in
absolute independence; it means being so transformed that we see
1
and desire what God likes. Thus for the Christian it is true both
that Moses is more than a Solon or a Lycurgus - great but human law¬
givers - and also that the "ceremonial" part of the Mosaic Law is
fulfilled in the Christian sacraments, and is therefore no longer to
be striven after but to be enjoyed by faith. "By the death of
Christ the veil of the Temple was rent in twain, the living and ex¬
press image of heavenly things, which had begun to be dimly shadowed
forth, being now brought fully into view. In the very act of
bringing the need for sacrifice to an end Christ illuminated its
eternal purpose.
Oalvin suras up his position with an exposition of ROMANS X, U:
"It is vain to teach righteousness by precept until Christ bestow it
by free imputation and the regeneration of the Spirit . . . Christ
(is) the end or fulfilling of the Law, because it would avail us
nothing to know what God demands, did not Christ come to the succour
of those who are labouring, and oppressed under an intolerable yoke
and burden." The assumptions of this are clear. Grotian lawyers
err in the assumption of the possible immorality of God. Judaisers
equally err in the assumption of human aspirations to obedience
without grace. God for Calvin is a Being Himself moral, although
why He should be moral there is no saying. So far as we are con¬
cerned, all depends upon His mere will, His gratuitous Word,3 but in
fact /
1
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fact we can depend upon that Word as having a moral - though to us
still an unknown - end. And God has made us in His image. That
is to say, we know this much of the Divine Nature, - that we owe a
right obedience to Him, and that disobedience must, in the nature of
things, bring punishment. Such knowledge is natural in the sense
that it is part of human mentality. What the Christian by faith
knows is that out of inevitable condemnation there is an escape in
Christ which violates neither God's justice nor human freedom.
The place of the Decalogue in this exposition may be stated
briefly. All law is revealed since it is part of God's creation
of man. The Decalogue is revelation par excellence since it is
delivered in Scripture. It is not a code since it is the spirit
of the codes just as conscience is the spirit of every natural
attempt to reach adjustment with the universe. In Christ, of course,
it is abrogated in its effect of condemnation, but not in its use,
since men remain men in body and in environment. It is only their
affections which faith transforms. Therefore the Decalogue, since
it is the epitome of the Divine will, remains into Christian
obedience.
(iv) The Problem of Guilt.
The keyword in Calvin's interpretation of Law is "guilt".
Guilt implies two factors - the moral error and the possibility of
avoiding the error; in other words, responsibility. The fact that
the accused pleads "not guilty" is still a tacit admission on his
part of the Court's jurisdiction. "Not guilty" is a personal plea.
If /
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If he denies the jurisdiction of the Court altogether, he might be
further charged with contempt or else detained as mentally unfit
to understand the charge. In short, the ascription of guilt is
not made simply on an arbitrary standard, like Humpty Dumpty's in
"s&lice". It implies the mutual acceptance by Court and accused
of one another's validity. The only exception arises where the
Court declares the accused not, strictly speaking, a person.
In discussing the "moral" Law Calvin brings out all these
points.^ It "renders us inexcusable" by setting before us "a
perfect righteousness", a standard whose "complete observance is
perfect righteousness in the sight of God, ... a righteousness
by which a man may be deemed and pronounced righteeus at the
divine tribunal". That is to say, the standard of human justice
is Divine, and moreover, it is this standard that human beings
imply when they speak of "justice". .'/hat we know about right and
wrong, therefore,, is knowledge of the absolute. The only just
Person may be God Himself, but we recognise His absolute justice
and His absolute demand upon our relative pov/ers of obedience.
Like Paul, Calvin was not a respecter of persons. He was
strongly inclined to the text, "Thou art inexcusable, 0 man, who¬
soever thou art that judgest." On this theme, indeed, he sets the
2
first chapters of the "Institutes." Religion, he says, is always
3
finally knowledge of the one True God. Even the heathen is
l± 5
worshipping that God,* even the atheist. and the reprobate.
The /
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The worship of God is the only thing which renders men superior to
brutes.^" If on the one hand no legitimate religion is unconnected
O
with truth, on the other no human mind is to be permitted an igno-
*
ranee of the Deity. Nevertheless, no genuine piety remains in the
world.4 None. It is easy to work out the argument with reference
to deliberate unbelievers and unevangelised heathen: it is under¬
standable even to describe the Jews as those to whom "Christ was not yet
familiarly known", "like children, whose weakness cannot bear a full
knowledge of heavenly things".5 But are we, as Christians newly
come from the communion of the Lord's Supper, to regard ourselves
as sinners of the same dye of ignorance or rebellion? This is
obviously a delicate question, for if the believer is to be left in
his natural sins there is left open a doubt whether the sacrifice
of Jesus Christ is really effective. Calvin says6 that "when we
have learned that the promises would be fruitless and unavailing
did not God accept us of His free goodness, without any view to our
works . . . and by faith embrace the goodness thus offered in the
gospel, the promises, with all their annexed conditions, are fully
accomplished." He goes further and remarks that7"God, while
bestowing all things upon us freely, crowns his goodness by
not disdaining our imperfect obedience;, forgiving all
its /
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its deficiencies, accepting it as if it were complete, and so
bestowing upon us the full amount of what the Law has promised".
Having let this Pelagian remark escape, however, he hastens to
withdraw it.1 Setting aside the circumlocutions of the Fathers, -
"what Jerome thought, I care not; let us enquire into the truth" -
he dismisses any suggestion of perfectionism. "I will not enter
into a loprg discussion on the various kinds of possibility. By
impossible, I mean, that which never was, and being prevented by
the ordination and decree of God, never will be. I say, that if
we go back to the remotest period, we shall not find a single
saint, who, clothed with a mortal body, ever attained to such per¬
fection as to love the Lord with all his heart, and soul, and mind,
and strength; and on the other hand, not one who has not felt the
power of concupiscence." "It is incontrovertible, that, in
consequence of the feebleness of our nature, it is impossible to
O
us,, so long as we are in the flesh, to fulfil the lav/. "
It has already been observed that Calvin was content to stand
upon this position. He was prepared, that is, to admit many
transient blessings to the righteous man, but at all times to deny
any relief to the tension of faith. We receive heavenly things,
not, as the Jews, under a type, but in the reality of a Holy
Spirit's energies. We are called to our obedience which is
motivated by love and understanding. Nevertheless, he returns to
this /
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this assertion of guilt. Dr. Niebuhr, comparing Augustine, Luther
and Calvin^offersthe profoundest analysis and Christian interpreta¬
tion of human nature, "but points out the failure of all to deal
as straightforwardly as their common master, Paul, does, with the
mystical side of the question. All are afraid of the Schw&rmerei
which might lead to Antinomianism. The mystical element of faith
was thus, "by Augustine, canalised into churchman ship, by Luther,
vapourised into a sort of halo about the fulfilment of mere civil
obedience, and by Calvin, transferred from individual experience
to the corporate experience of the assembly. The result has been,
for Romanism, a two-fold standard of lay moralism and clerical
pietism, and for Protestantism an extreme alternation between
shallow Deism and uncontrolled "evangelism". Calvin's dismissal
of the saints - "I am indeed aware of a kind of saint whom a
foolish superstition imagines and whose purity the angels of
O
heaven scarcely equal" - is almost cynical. This is indeed Calvin
"aecusativus" .3 It is not even a fair estimate. No saint ever
calls himself such. That title is bestowed, and is usually denied
by all that the recipient ever says about himself. He knows that,
"they who fain would serve Thee best
"Are conscious most of wrong within."
There was no insincerity in Paul's reference to the "enmity"4 to
Christ /
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Christ, which made him chief of sinners, and at the same time the
miracle of the Damascus road which bore in him the Christian experi¬
ence of patience, hope, joy. These are terras of emotion, or, to use
a term of Calvin's, affection. Yet it seems precisely this affection
that he is curbing. Perhaps it is too much to say that salvation
for him was simply a matter of intellect. But, as Diesel"*"points out,
there is a significant "until" in Calvin's eschatology. We do not,
reach perfection in time by some gradual development. Very defin¬
itely we are members of the Body of which Christ is the Head, - and
unworthy, one might almost say wayward, members, needing a constant
discipline, that is to say, a constant vigilance and a constant sup¬
port by the external structures of church, state, and family.
In fairness to Calvin, however, one has to take note of a
domestic as well as a public expression of his faith. Niesel quotes
2
a letter in which he breathes a more assured enjoyment of the promises
of God. It is true that the present enjoyment is still of a promise
not of the fulfilment, but the expectation itself is a characteristic
privilege of believers, binding them together into a brotherhood.
This personal assurance appears in other expressions of Calvin's
faith, in his fortitude under sorrow,^ for example, in his utter
courage under personal danger, perhaps even in the certainty of
5
his own utter rightness. Perhaps one might interpret in these terms
the /
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2
^ Letters quoted by Reybum, Op. cit. , pp. 1/46 ff.
^
Ibid. , p. 16i|.
q
This absolute certainty was characteristic also of Cromwell -
pohn Buchan, "Oliver Cromwell"). In his case it was often
preceded by periods of doublings and uncertainties: but these
were matters'" for the closet, not the field or the council
chamber.
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the remark which has been derived by Professor SQucek from Barth's
"Dogroatik" - namely that sin is, strictly speaking, a human phenomenon.
God cannot hold sin as a real opposition to His Almighty plan; and
the believer, looking upon human nature from the point of view of
grace, realises that, while sin is the most real factor of the
human situation, yet in a sense it is already done away in Ghrist.
That is to say, as a so;cial phenomenon sin is all important: as a
phenomenon of faith it is, ex hypothe si, an appearance. The
corollary is that whatever one may dimly perceive in the adt of faith
the keynote of public life, whether applying to one's own daily
conduct or to public business is discipline, because of sin.
It was the error of Servetus, he said, that by faith in the Gospel
"we receive the completion of all the promises
The universality of guilt - the totality of depravity - is a
doctrine not without its own implications. If it sets the tone of
2
Galvinist society very definitely in terms of discipline it does
not escape inevitable distinction between those who obey and those
who do not obey, the Law of God. Calvin has already been detected
3
in this Pelagian sentiment. Nor was it possible to escape.
Granted that all is of God, that man has had his chance in Adam
and by Adam's sin is a mass of corruption; granted that this fact,
together with the self-revelation of the Almighty, is deposited
unalterably in Scripture as fulfilled in Ghrist, the fact still
remains that knowledge of this state is in the possession of
particular individuals, the believers, who in turn actualise the
will /
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3
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will of God as far as it can be actualised, amongst men. Geneva
itself is an example of a state dominated by a ruling class, which
in Calvin's later years centred upon Calvin himself. Perhaps he
might say that his salvation was by the imputed justification of
Christ, that it rested upon no certainty but upon the gratuitous
promises of God. tie might even not be numbered with the elect.
But of the Law which he strove to administer he had no doubts
whatever. Such knowledge might, of course, be urged as the un¬
welcome heritage even of the reprobate, but it was, in Calvin's own
case, knowledge which was received as of God and obedience that
was striven after. Calvin may not have been a democrat in the sense
in which we use the term to-day."1" He did not believe that every
individual merely as such, should have the right to an opinion.
No one of that generation held the view as we hold it. Even the
Anabaptists were, at this stage of their history, unwilling to
keep their private opinions to themselves. Opinion was a dynamic
urge. One held an opinion of absolute truth and therefore
inevitably urged it upon the society in which one lived. Even
2
Servetus, while in prison, urged the magistrates not to release
him but to vindicate him. Thus he desired by implication the
imprisonment of Calvin. Calvin's view of society, therefore, was
of a system in which opportunity was open to talent and particularly
3
to character; and as the test of character he urged the acceptance
by every citizen of an agreed creed. Indeed, for the ultimate good
of /
^
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of Geneva he vras prepared to press for the acceptance into citizen
rights of foreign persons whose religious views were sound. In
short, Calvin's political aim for Geneva was the creation of a class
of "believers" who would vote and generally act according to the
Jord of God. The same principle underlay the Calvinist view of
monarchy. Thefci policy -was to influence the king through his member'
ship of the Church. His prime advisers were thus the ministers and
in general the consistorial body."*" These Christians might seek no
personal glory, but they were conscious of being the mouthpiece
of the most High.
Alongside the obedience of the few lay the responsibility of
all. Something has already been said about this responsibility.
Neither the heathen in his darkness nor the reprobaue in his denial
were excused. The basic principle of Christian law was that all
rational beings were aware of their duty. Barth's dictum that
Calvin rested upon the deduction, "all correct knowledge of God
originates in obedience", is only partly accurate. It is true in
the sense that theology rests upon active faith in Christ: it is
not true in the sense that one condemns the sinner not for his
incorrect knowledge but for his disobedience to the Light. If
this seems a hard principle, the only Christian alternative is
harder. Christian faith cannot compromise with the world; if it
does not actively set about ordering the disorder it must abandon
2
the disorder to its inevitable fate. Such, according to Troeltsch,
wa s /
Scott Pearson, op. cit., pp. 6l ff, etc.
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was the prevailing tendency of the early church. Theoretically it
was also the ultimate refuge of Calvin. He frequently spoke of
leaving Geneva, and it is said that the Calvinist method of claiming
political power in a state - failing success in controlling the
monarch or the magistracy - was "to suffer or to abandon the public
church"; that is, to become a sect. But Calvinism was inherently
not sectarian: its ultimate aim was always the domination of public
opinion. The reason for this desire is quite clear. The
obedience of the believer and the responsibility of the unbeliever
was towards a Law whose knowledge is inescapable. It is the "one
perpetual and inflexible rule of life," obedience upon which.is
relevant not only to "a single age . . . (but) ... to all ages,
even to the end of the world."2 If then a man undertakes the
obedience of God he undertakes obedience not only for himself, but,
as far as lies within his power of influence, obedience for all.
The assertion of total depravity, interpreted in ethical
terms, thus leads to views about human nature and a political phil¬
osophy which at first sight seem at variance with the original
statement. Since depravity concerns will rather than being - men
3
remain men - it follows that the divine Will can still be known
and, to a degree, obeyed. Perfection might be denied but a good
life, as distinct from a bad life, could be maintained, a right
state as distinct from chaos or from an anti-christian system. And
the operators of such a state were to be confessed believers in
Jesus Christ. Thus Calvin is led to deductions about individual
personality /
Nobbs, "Theocracy and Toleration" (1938) pp. 26-7.
2 INST. , 2: 7: 13.
3 INST., 2: 1: 11, 2: 3' 12-16, etc. See Torrance, op. cit.. pp.88 ff.
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personality and about the efficacy of political laws. Neither
are to be dismissed as of no consequence. The fact of condemn¬
ing the recalcitrant asserts his responsibility towards, and there¬
fore his knowledge of, God. The claim to dominate society in the
Name of God implies the relevance to human conduct of such rules
and regulations as may be deducible from the revelation of God's
Will. In other words, one has to discuss "natural" law and
"judicial" law.
(v) Judicial Law
Judicial law may be taken first since it follows the main
theme of the believer's duty to rule. Calvin's discussion is
separate from his main discussion on "moral" Law, but it is not
independent of it. Whether in church or in state the operating
factors are God's revelation and man's obedience or at least his
responsibility. It does not by any means follov/ that we are to
apply the Mosaic judicial law to our own times. Mosaic law
represents a right obedience to God - the only right interpreta¬
tion in pre-Christian ages in fact. But it is not the best inter¬
pretation of God's Will since Christ was known to these Fathers
only under a type- Christians are in a position to adjust their
conduct more closely to the will of God; indeed they are bound to
do so. Calvin is thus not open to the accusation of legalism if
by legalism one means mere slavery to a received body of precept.
There is a strong dynamic element in his ethics. Right conduct
for /
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for him does not depend simply upon the Bible as written: it depends
also upon faith. Thus Calvin can and does criticise Old Testament
standards - concerning divorce, for example. At the same time
Calvinism is legalistic if by the term one means that faith is
bound to consider the relevance of such external factors of human
existence as state, family, business, war, and so on. To him there
is a right Christian state as there had been a right state of Israel.
Calvin did not wish, then, to impose a Mosaic system upon
Christian society. He felt that Christian faith had its own impli¬
cations to work out. But Christian faith, like Jewish faith, was
not without guidance in the matter of interpretation. Both are
attempts to express a revelation which essentially has never changed.
And this revelation is assumed for every state. That is to say,
there is but one right state, as there is but one right Church.
Although, therefore, he did not propose to overthrow other systems,
he was prepared to criticise them, just as he would criticise the
personal philosophy of an individual. He was not an anarchist.
He believed in the institutions of church, state and family. He
believed also in the relevance of the individual, and therefore in
his liberty to create state systems according to his lights. But
these systems, like the conduct of individual men, were of necessity
to be measured by the yardstick of the divine will. The inevitable
V(AA
conclusion is that, as Servetus was from Geneva, nations of




The subject is dealt with in the fourth book of the "Institutes".
The problem of the right Ghurch occupies most of the argument since,
of course, all depends upon the fostering of right faith,1 which
O
reckons by individual freedom, and not by force. And in the first
place, Calvin is concerned to lay down the limits of self-determina¬
tion. Of the three headings under which he discusses the matter,
the first two emphasise the necessary attachment of the Church to
the plain fact of revelation. The power of the Church does not
3
alloy/ of any addition to the doctrine contained in the ford, nor
does it allow any interpretation other than what may be found in
the Scriptures.^" That is to say, Calvin is maintaining the suffic¬
iency of Scripture, as read under the invocation of the Holy Spirit,
over against the decisions and councils of Rome. He is not
condemning either bishops or councils as such. He is concerned
merely to emphasise the principle that the ultimate authority in
such matters belongs to the Holy Spirit, that it is mediated to us
through Scripture, that its end is edification and not destruction,
and that, strictly, the interpreters are interpreters, and not
creators. The personal element in the ministry is strictly sub-
5
ordinate to the office. The important end is to clarify the rule
which /
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which God has prescribed.1
The power of the Ohurch to legislate consists of the same
limitations. The distinction which Oalvin emphasises is between
human traditions and "holy and useful constitutions of the Church,
p
which contribute to . . . discipline, or integrity, or peace.
Calvin returns in this discussion to the tv/o principles which
he has already laid down in the chapters on "moral" Law. "Every¬
thing," he says, "pertaining to the perfect rule of a holy life,
the Lord has comprehended in His law, so that there remains nothing
for men to add to that summary." The Word of God is again the
x
handbook of faith. Over against this body of the divine Will is
set the human sounding board of conscience. "Our consciences have
todo, not with men, but with God alone. By definition,
conscience is that "apprehension of the judgment of God", that
"witness which suffers them not to conceal their sins, but forces
them as criminals before the tribunal of the Judge.As works
refer to our relationship with man, so conscience, the inward body
of our motives, is the point where we meet with our God. 6 There is
an obvious reference here to the Decalogue; and Calvin proceeds to
criticise Rome precisely on her alleged emphasis upon the ceremonies
which have been abrogated in Christ. Romanism is at best a
"species of Judaism",7 and as such not only returns to a state of
pupillage /
1
INST, b: 10: 1.
2 Lb-id-
3 INST. U: 10: 7, b: 10: 15-16.
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pupillage but brings in again the Pharisaic pride of human obedience."*"
The true obedience, he argues, begins with the free consent of our
O
conscience to God as the "sole legislator of His own worship." So
long as we retain this direct relationship of active personal faith
we shall be able to judge correctly of particular and local laws. Laws
are to be judged of by the end for which they have been made,^ and all
right laws lead either to the glory of God or to charity towards our
k
fellowmeh. These are alone the inviolate principles. Variety of
discipline may indeed be found amongst local churches without at all
violating their claim to be expressions of the true Church, but such
variations are subject to the over-ruling principles of the divine YiTill.
The whole jurisdiction of the Church relates, therefore, to the
■ r
discipline of manners. Virtually this principle restricts the
power of the Church to an administrative scope. The Word legislates,
the Spirit executes, the Church administers. And in this sense,
the Church is the local church, the pastor and those associated
with him in spiritual government."'7 Their power is without civil
implication; they merely decide that, on the premisses of faith,
such an one cannot be allowed to associate in the sacraments and
other benefits of the church. The social status of the person
concerned is, of course, irrelevant to his being faithfully dealt
O
with, and further there is a progress of discipline from private
admonition onwards. ^ Further distinctions in discipline also
emerge. /
1 INST, k: 10: 15.
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emerge. It is not, for example, merely a matter of punishment.
Public fasting is an act of corporate discipline, a spiritual
exercise. Moreover, the public ministry lies under a discipline of
conduct which is peculiar to its calling."*" "It is reasonable that
the people should be ruled with a milder and less rigid discipline;
and that the clergy should suffer heavier censure and exercise far
less indulgence to themselves than to other persons. ^ Clergy,
WULAtKj
however, not m be celibate, for pastors are not priests.
That is to say, the pastor does not stand, as the Levite might be
3
said to have stood, as a type of Christ. Essentially the pastor
belongs to the "not-yet" of the whole Church here on earth, for,
as Calvin says in his definition of the Church and sacraments,
they belong to "our confinement in the prison of our flesh,"*4 that
is to say,^of God, but, in so far as we are involved, a ladder
whose topmost rung we cannot presume to see.
The judicial power of the Church resides in the "assembly of
5
the elders". Calvin discusses at some length the history of
lay assent, concluding that it is essential to matters of principle,
though not to matters of routine. He stresses once again the
local impact of the Church. It has no legitimate claims to
empire. It is concerned with the life and manners of a limited
number of persons who locally assemble for worship. The analogy
of the Church Court is significant. In the Church it is what
a
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a senate is in a city. It deals with problems with which it is
familiar, not with problems that concern alien circumstances. The
shadow of Geneva rises up behind this argument. Here is the scope
of the "Institutes", the possibility of knowing every individual
in the quarter under administration, and the possibility of arguing
out differences of opinion that might arise between church assemblies
or even different cities. The question inevitably arises whether
such a principle could be applied to larger social units. Could
there be a Calvinist system for an empire, as there had been a
Soman system? That question may be for the moment passed by.
Only in the last chapter of the whole work Calvin turns to
the civil problem of laws. One always feels that Calvin is
anxious to propitiate kings and magistrates. He had the strong
motive power of contemporary Anabaptist anarchy and the imputation
of that-anarchy to himself. At the outset, therefore, he lays
p
down the divine ordination of the state. He is concerned even to
dissociate himself from any particular kind of state. Personally
he preferred "either aristocracy, or a mixture of aristocracy and
democracy",^ but the Church can subsist under any form of government.
"The kingdom of Christ consists not in these things. The only
condition of a right magistracy is that it should be concerned for
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this world, to cherish and support the external worship of God,
to preserve the pure doctrine of religion, to defend the constitu¬
tion of the Church, to regulate our lives in a manner requisite
for the society of men, to form our manners to civil justice, to
promote our concord with each other, and to establish general
peace and tranquillity","*" and consequently, a right magistracy and
law will exist to perform these functions. It will be observed
that Calvin has maintained the same distinction as he did in his
description of the Church. It is a local matter, confined to
our sojourn here on eatth. Moreover, it concerns both religious
and civil obedience, both justice and love. Finally the senate,
like the Church assembly, represents the body politic in matters
concerning other bodies. Calvin makes a strong defence of war on
2
this ground. The power of the sword is withdra?m from individual
Christians; but "in this respect magistrates are not subject to
the common law." They are bound, therefore, to punish malefactors
and also to protect the Christian society "against hostile
3
aggression ".
If the magistrate is a "speaking law", the law is a "silent
magistrate".^ The equation means more for Calvin than simply the
mutual necessity of enforcement for law and principle for magisterial
validity. In an argument whose process is difficult to follow he
lays /
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lays down the principle that the "common laws of nations" may
represent a form of justice which the "polity of Moses" does not
1
equal. The Christian state does not require to replace its laws
by the Mosaic polity. This polity, it appears, is to be identified
with the judicial precepts of the Old Testament. In other words,
Calvin wished to avoid the extravagances that appeared, for
example, in the England of the Barebones rule. Geneva was not
Israel although the mantle of Israel may have fallen upon her.
However relevant the ceremonial and the law of Israel may have
been to Israel, its relevance to Geneva was strictly through its
subsumption in the moral Law. The "ceremonial" Law, therefore,
was the religious pupillage of the Jews, and the judicial, "given
to them as a political constitution, taught them certain rules of
2
equity and justice." The ceremonies, that is, corresponded to
to the first table of the moral Law, the judicial law to the second.
Therefore the abrogation of both these particular forms of piety
3
and justice do not alter the basic principles themselves. Finally,
the conclusion can be extended to all nations. "All nations are
left at liberty to enact such laws as they shall find to be
respectively expedient for them; provided they be framed according
to that perpetual rule of love, so that, though they vary in form,
they /
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they may have the same end. 1,1
The importance of this principle can he over-rated. It is
true that Calvin leaps forward to the identification of this
"moral" Law with "natural law" and "that conscience which has been
p
engraven by God on the minds of men." "Equity, therefore, must
alone be the scope, and male, and end, of all laws," equity being
3
natural and the same to all mankind. But the principle of equity
is still an "ought"; even Calvin has to consider the possibility
of^" "barbarous and savage laws which rewarded theft and permitted
promiscuous concubinage" and so on. His answer is simple.
These, he says, are not laws at all. In other words, the category
of equity is itself definable - as he proceeds to define it - in
terms of the Decalogue. And this order, first the Decalogue and
then the principle of equity, is fundamental to his thinking.
God is the Author of equity, and therefore we use the yardstick
of God's Word to measure the equity of the common laws of nations.
The fact that it was not necessary to revise the laws of l6th
century Europe is due merely to the fact that they were based upon
Christian equity, and to some extent cast their mantle of piety
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advocated the "polity of Moses" in its moral form, to such wild
nations as those visited by St. Francis Saviour. Perhaps he might
have repudiated their claim to humanity altogether: but certainly
he could not have subscribed to any suggestion that their merely
physical cohabitation or their totemistic associations could have
constituted a "natural" law comparable with the revelation of God
in Scripture. Calvin's was a narrower view of civilisation.
Without dispagagement it could be called even "medieval", for to
him the state was a good and useful ordinance of God just because
man himself is a sinner, incapable of initiating any good thing.
() Natural Law.
It will be sufficient at this point to mention only one point
about natural law as it may be found in Calvin's thinking.
Professor Lang points out that in the "Institutes" the conception
1 2
is mentioned only three times. In the first two it is said of
it that it affords only a very faint foretaste of what is really
well pleasing to God, that is to say, it serves as an assertion
of responsibility upon sinful man. In the third,^ which has
already been discussed in the immediately preceding paragraphs,
he is saying that whatever application of responsibility individuals
and nations may make, they are subject to the yardstick of the
revealed /
^
Article, "The Reformation and Natural Lav/" in the symposium
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revealed principle of equity.
The point which has to he stressed, however, is that this prin¬
ciple of equity is a Christian principle. If Calvin says, of Greek
or human legal thought, for example, that it exhibits the quality of
equity to some degree, he does so because, as a matter of criticism
based upon his revealed standards, it appears to be such. His im¬
mediate retort to the assumption by them of their equity would be the
condemnation which he passes upon the Old Testament - that it tended
to complacency. In other words, all mankind is guilty, and such as
are not believers in Christ are yet in the mass of sinful corruption.
Their plea of righteousness merely adds to their condemnation. The
question therefore whether, from a Christian standpoint,these people
have the capability of salvation, is sharply distinguished from the
question with which natural law is so commonly equated, whether, in
themselves, they may be said to become better by a process in¬
dependent of the divine intervention of Jesus Christ.
The process of reducing the Decalogue to the principle of equity
and then identifying equity with natural law does not, therefore, take
Calvin outside the bounds of strictly Christian terminology. He is
not at all unlike the early Fathers who refused the Old Testament as
a heritage of the Jews on the ground that only Christians could rightly
interpret it. He is concerned to formulate a Christian philosophy,
and may be said to use terms with a strictly Christian reference.
Even sin, for example, can be so used, since the unredeemed either
refuses this description of his nature altogether, or else, while
admitting /
19U
admitting that something is wrong, does not admit that the wrong-
ness is of the nature of evil in the Christian sense. Otherwise
he would no longer "be unredeemed.
It may he that at this point, when the unredeemed man is being
redeemed, a gap is left in the interpretation. There must, of
course, be something in the man that makes him a fit subject for
redemption, such as a donkey, for example, is not. In other words,
one: moves from the revelation of Christ to the revelation of
Creation. To do so, however, is to pass through a plane which is
beyond human knowledge. It is to return to the essential enigma
of Christian fact. It is true that Creation was and is good. It
is equally true that man is a sinner. The two facts are at variance
and must therefore be referred finally to the inscrutable Will of
God. What is not inscrutable is the third fact that God has a
Law which is of His own nature and by which He judges all things.
We know this Law because He has revealed it both in Creation and
in Scripture. And it is this Law, with the obedience that it
demands, which is the main concern of the human soul.
CHAPTER V
Christian Citizenship




"For most of us", says T. S. Eliot, "there is only the unattended.
Moment, the moment in and out of time,
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight,
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightening,
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply
That it is not heard at all but you are the music
While the music lasts. These are only hints and guesses
Hints followed by guesses; and the rest
Is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action.1,1
The subject matter of this chapter is the word "action". As
in the lines quoted, it is a climax to prayer, observance, discipline
and thought. The faith of the believer may be thought of as begin¬
ning with him as an individual; it is the confronting of God with
me, and as such drives me to adoration and trust - to prayer,
obeervance - but it requires also a reconstruction of my conduct and
my philosophy - my discipline and thought. I cannot live to myself,
and I cannot even live a life completely surrounded by those who
2
agree with me. The attempt has been made both in the medieval
monastery and in the early Puritan States of New England. But com¬
promise is inevitable. If the Church witness is to be more than a




Bohatec, op. clt., pp. points out that Calvin was aware
of this restriction upon the church as a spiritual body.
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Puritan Fathers were forced, therefore, to institute"1" what is
quaintly known as "the Half-way Covenant" of 1662 in order to "bring
into fellowship the children and grandchildren of those who had
originally gone out from home for conscience' sake. The measure
stirred up controversy on the grounds of compromise but it illus¬
trates the general principle which Brunner points out2 - that "the
individual human being does not enter into the sphere of social
and natural relations as a free master of himself but, as a psycho¬
physical being, ... is born into the life which is already present,
and - as always - already 'ordered', and . . . grows . . . within
this organism." Action - Christian ethics - is the impact of his
faith upon his environment. And his environment, be it noted,
includes not only the world of things but the world of human
creatures, both those who are dependent on him, such as his children,
and those who are less dependent on him, such as the stranger within
his gate. The main issue of Christian citizenship is thus justice.3
Calvin treats the subject under the heading, "the three uses
of the Lav/",^ and incidentally, the Law is now pre-eminently the
"moral" Law. The three uses are as follows, "First, by exhibiting
the righteousness of God - the righteousness which alone is accept¬
able to Him - it admonishes every one of his own unrighteousness,
certiorates /
Byington, op. cit. , pp. 306 ff.
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certiorates, convicts, and finally condemns him'1."*" Secondly, "the
Law ... "by means of its fearful denunciations and the consequent
dread of punishment, (curds) those who, unless forced, have no
regard for r ectitude and justice".2 The third, and principal,
use "has respect to "believers in whose hearts the Spirit of God
already flourishes and reigns','3 The form of the description is
theological. There can "be traced the rejection of work-
righteousness, the primacy of faith, the emphasis of the revealed
Will of God. But the terms "office' and "use"^ as a description of
the proposed manner of treating the subject indicate the practical
categories into which faith was now to "be fitted. Calvin here
speaks less as a theologian than as a statesman and particularly
as a pastor of the Church, and the persons whom he brings before
us are the sort that a pastor would have to deal with. There are the
active believers, and these who, though on the fringes of the
community were not yet embodied into it by their own confession
of faith, and finally those who, whether as rebels against the
domestic faith or "incomers" with the wrong theological training,
explicitly deny the faith and spiritual authority recognised in the
community /
1 INST. 2: 7: 6.
2 INST. 2: 7*. 10.
3 INST. 2: 7: 12.
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community.
"The Law""'" Calvin says in discussing the first use and office,
"is a kind of mirror" in which man is shown himself as he appears
in the sight of God. However conceited he may have been in contem¬
plation of his own virtue, he is now shown not only that t he right¬
eousness of God is infinite hut is forced to the conclusion that,
since there can he hut one standard of righteousness, the human hest
does not qualify a finite heing for salvation. Since, however, it
is ohvious also that unrighteousness must hring punishment, it
follows that "all that remains for the Law is to arm the wrath of
God for the destruction of the sinner";2 "hy itself it can do noth¬
ing hut accuse, condemn and destroy him" although, even in des¬
troying him, it shows the grace and mercy of God, Who "is never
weary in doing good, and in loading us with new gifts". In short,
this office of the Law is a sort of summary of the Christian enigma.
God is at the same time a loving Father and a Destroyer of unright¬
eousness.
But the intellectual description of God does not exhaust His
revelation. He is not passive, hut active in the work of salva¬
tion, and the Law, therefore, hy the very dispassionate majesty of
its terms, reduces to despair, and therefore prepares for grace,
those who seek God. The ohvious question is, of course, how the
assertion /
1 INST. 2: 7: 7. "instaF . . . speculi suiusdam". Cf. Sermons
(1562). C.R. LlV, 373. , La Loy nous doit estre^un miroir
"Dour contempler la povrete qui est en nous." 382 -v La Loy de
Lieu est eomme un miroir pour nous monstrer nos ordures etc."
2 Ihid. Compare. Sermon 15 (C.R. LIV, U07). "Il est vray que
par empire il nous doit hien assuietis a soy, et .11 peut faire:
mais il aime .heaucoup mieux nous traitter par douceur paternella"
Cf. "Harmony". C.R. LII, DEUT. 10, 12-13. "Et certe non
aliunde manat, quae Reo reverentia defertus, quam ex gliatti -
paterni eius erga nos amoris . . . etc. '
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assertion of God's search for man can he related to that of His
mere majesty. This is a question, however, which the believer
does not ask for he is where he is because of an actual experience
both of his own unrighteousness and of God's saving grace. There
is something in the logic of conversion which is never expressed
in argument, namely the certainty of the sinner's need for grace.
Even the materialist has to explain this fact out of his system,
and as Browning reminds us,-'- the moment of our clearest logical
certainty is often succeeded by a plunge once again into the mystery
of existence.
This first use and office of the Law, therefore, has the
strength and the limitations of dogmatic assertion. It expresses
the process of salvation, but for that very reason is sharply dis¬
tinguished from the views of those who are not saved. The person
who has not yet entered into the experience or who looks upon the
universe from a different point of view will not accept it; and so
it does not address such persons except by merely defining the
experience; it is dogmatic, not apologetic. Indeed, Calvin does
not enter into an apologetic for the faith in anything like the
detail which has become common since the Liberal movement in theo¬
logy. All that he has to say about sinful - that is unbelieving -
man is that they will not always remain "puffed up with infatuated
confidence in their own powers" but will sooner or later, beginning
to "compare them with the requirements of the Law" feel "that they
pant under the heavy load, then totter and stumble and finally fall
and give way.2 It is no refutation of this assertion to suggest
that /
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that there may "be other ways of entering the Kingdom, or that the
fact of disbelief can "be construed as an admission of God's defeat
by human freedom. The doctrine of election covers all mysteries
and safeg&'&Ms what is actually known of God's will. The believer
may be assured that, even if the unbeliever's repentance is not
obvious to human eyes, he still has the same standards of righteous'
ness to face here or hereafter.The fact of God's will is known
by revelation, the fact of disobedience is only apparent. What
God's answer to it in terms of salvation may be we cannot know;
what we do know is that God's Will demands obedience, and that the
end of the disobedient is punishment. "Assuredly", he says,2 "if
our whole will were formed and disposed to obedience, the mere
knowledge of the Law would be sufficient for salvation; but since
our carnal and corrupt nature is at enmity with the Divine Law,
and is in no degree amended by its discipline, the consequence is,
that the law which, if it had been properly attended to, would have
given life, becomes the occasion of sin and death". From such a
statement one can deduce both the doctrinal certainty of the
believer and his attitude to the non-believer.
One may also deduce the expected process of salvation. The
man who is^'forced to weigh his conduct in the balance of the Law"
and /
1 'So- Chenevi^re, on. cit. pp. 83 ff. points out Calvin's division
of mankind into a spiritual and a political creature. (INST.
2+: 10:Z|.. ) As spiritual, he is ruled by the Decalogue, as
political he is ruled by."offices of humanity and civility",
The difference, however, lies not in the Law as a revelation of
God, but in the difference of mankind into obedient and dis¬
obedient. For a further discussion on this distinction see
Note 10 st end.2 INST. 2: 7: 7.
3 INST. 2: 7: 6 " . . . ad legis trutinam examinare vitarn suam
cogittinr ..."
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and "sees that he teems with innumerable vices of which he formerly
seemed free" will soon reach the godly despair out of which Christ
works renewal of life. "Despair" is not perhaps the exact word
for the experience, for despair strictly applies only to the
reprobate. The children of God, although they may reach a point
where the "flesh is cast down""*" pass through the experience "to he
renewed in the inner man, and revived again" by the grace of hesus
Christ. The reprobate in their despair remain "obstinate".2
Calvin here is touching upon two doctrines which have been commonly
enough held and preached by sects which he himself would have
abhorred. Both doctrines of assurance, whether assurance of
salvation or ^assurance of damnation - the commission of the unfor¬
givable sin - implSr a a knowledge of the divine mystery which Calvin
denied to human intellect. Like George Borrow in his dealings with
Peter, the Welsh preacher,^ Calvin might have rejected the whole
idea of assured reprobation as being as sentimental as the idea of
assured salvation. At the same time it was necessary to give
value to the work of grace and to prevent the escape of the
reprobate into a false dualism of human standards. The reprobate
is not permitted to go his way in ignorance of the divine value or
even of the bliss which he would not enjoy. By the same Law which
leads /
1 INST. 2: 7: 9. "ut pont carnis deiectionem interiore homine
renoventuF ae reflorescant", i.e. children of God.
2 INST* 2: 7: 8 "In hune certe (i.e. despair) modurn illinc
examinantus reprobi, sed ob animi obstinationem".
^ "Lavengro".
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leads or lashes the redeemed upon their way of life the reprobate
is faced with the gloomy logic of his inevitable damnation. He
too is made sick with the knowledge of his human impotence, his
consequent iniquity, and the inevitable curse that is attached to
it.
The reasoning behind Calvin's argument is clear enough. One
of the functions of the Law is to "stop the mouths'1"1" of scoffers
who might argue the possibility of ignorance of God's Will or deny
God's justice. Calvin touches upon the possibilities in order to
demonstrate that the Law of God is an absolute, as indeed all law
must be^i admitting of no exceptions to its decrees, but his interest
clearly is that of a preacher rather than that of a lawyer. The
point of his remarks is reached when he has convinced the eongre-
2
gation that, for example, they v/ould be justified in disciplining
their children in order to bring them to a suitable state of docility
or that the clever scoffer is simply an irresponsible and unfeeling
person bent on mischief.^ Did we know the personality of men well
enough we should see clearly what we know in part, namely that self-
knowledge, sanity itself, presupposes the knowledge that God is
righteous. If the term "conscience" has to be used - and Calvin
uses it - then all men have a conscience, some faculty of their
humanity /
1 A quotation from ROMANS III, 19. INST. 2: ~J: 8.
2 The example is quoted by Carew Hunt, on. cit. . of a child who de¬
veloped leanings towards the banished religion of Rome. Calvin's
advice was summary. She should be whipped into obedience.
3 The character of the reformed and spiritually narrow Will EhaggS
in Walmsley's novel "Master Mariner" illustrates this atti-
tude~of Christian faith towards the "world".
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humanity which can be intelligibly addressed by the Word of God,
and which, if it does not make for salvation, at least makes
damnation all the more terrible because of the Word having been
inescapably heard."1" Morally, mankind is a unity. It must,
however, be said thai Calvin's doctrine is, as Barth says, negative.2
There is no attempt to build upon it a moral theory of "natural"
virtues or even of natural "tendencies" to virtue. How far from
the "noble savage" of the Rationalists is the casual dismissal by
Calvin of those without the Law'. Where the Word of gra.ce has not
been preached we can only suppose that sin "miserably destroys
before the fatal sting is discerned". 3 One illustration of the
negative but didactic interest in the unbeliever comes to mind. ^
A scoffer, lying sick of the plague, was seized by the devil, so
his mother and a servant affirmed, carried over their heads despite
their valiant efforts at a rescue, out of the door, across a broad
road, with a hedge and ditch on both sides, and finally disappeared
into a vineyard on the far side. The body was never found. Most
people in Geneva dismissed the story but Calvin insisted upon a
public /
This is the inevitable basis of Christian philosophy. E/g.
A. E. Taylor, "a completely intelligible universe must also
be a moral system" -''Christian hone of lramortality'1 p. 48.
So Dean Inge, "Confessio Fidei" in "Outspoken Essays" II (1922) ,
"Ultimately, there can be only one true philosophy".
2 "Natural theology" pp. 105 ff.
5 INST. 2: 7: 6. ". . nisi per 111am retegatur ex latebrls suis,
occultuls miseram hominem perdit quam id exitiale eius telum
sentiatur." In the Sermons, Calvin refers to the Pagans as "les
povre aveugles" (C.R. LIV 238). Of the Turks and Jews he saysTibld., 427) that though monotheistic and iconoclastic, they
both stand condemned: the Turks "ne veulent pas recevoir nostre
Seigneur Jesus Christ." The Jews "ont renonce la Loy de Dieu
quand lis ont reiette^ Jesus Christ qui est l'ame de la Loy."
4 Quoted by Dr. A. Mitchell Hunter, op. cit., pp. 288-9. Calvin was,
in an age of superstition, notably free of the trait. In thisinstance his interest was not in the episode as such, but in
its "catechetical" possibilities.
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public enquiry and made it a subject for some enei'getic preaching.
His interest clearly was to establish the fact of God's control of
the reprobate, and by implication one may assume the existence of
those whom He wished to impress. Would these persons perhaps be
the younger members of the congregation not yet convicted of sin,
those "sinners not yet regenerated1'"1" whom he had faithfully been
schooling in the Law in order to bring them to a knowledge of their
sin and to a godly despair?
The second office of the Law envisages a class of person who
require to be "curbed".^ Into this discussion the word "force"
significantly comes. Calvin the preacher is passing from
exhortation to what Calvin the lawyer and statesman sees to be
inevitable if the Christian community is to be preserved. It is
of course true that the word does occur in the discussion of the
first office. Calvin says of the man who 'feees that he teems with
innumerable vices" that he has reached this state of mind by having
been "forced to weigh his conduct in the balance of the Law", under
the preaching of John Calvin for example, or under the educative
methods which Calvin had advocated to parents and teachers, perhaps
even by the supernatural impact that one might expect upon the
motives of the elect. But all such forces are considered "moral"
as distinct from "physical". Whatever the outward conditions of
the prodigal the final movement takes place when the prodigal
himself /
^
INST. 2: 7: 10." . . . omnibus tamen nondum regeneratis ..."
2 INST. 2: 7: 10 "nisi coacti . . . coerceantur ..."
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himself "comes to himself", and as an act of his own personality -
one need not say his "unaided" personality - turns from the evil that
is not his true self. But Calvin in the second office is thinking
of those who remain rebellious. They, he says,1 are to "be "curbed,
not because their mind is inwardly moved and affected, but because,
as if a bridle were laid upon them, they refrain their hands from
external acts, and internally check the depravity which would otherwise
petulantly burst forth". These persons are Calibans to their
Prospero; their desires and intentions are in revolt; their essential
personality is being deliberately thwarted, not even with the intention
of moulding it to a better way but with an end in view which implies
their destruction. In a modern phrase, they are to be morally
"liquidated". The proposition is of course a statement of extreme
possibilities, as one might argue the moral necessity of retributive
punishment without ever actually giving up hope of its beneficial
effects upon the guilty person, but it shows Calvin in a light one
could scarcely call, in the modern sense, "democratic".
What is involved in his doctrine of "curbing"? Two points are
quite clear; namely that the obedience to be extorted does not work
for the subject's good - in other words, that the reprobate is to
be made a means to the end of social security - and secondly that
the obedience to be extorted is spiritual acquiescence and not merely
outward conformity. In short, Calvin's God was a tyrant with all
the /
1 INST. 2: 7: 10 - " Caercentur autem, non quod interior feorum animus
permoveatur, aut officiatur, sed quid, tanquam iniecto fraeno,
manus al exterione opere continent, et suam piu-vi-tatem jintus
eohibent, quam alioqui petulantur- effusuri erant. " In the
Sermons there are also many references to "la pride".
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the attributes of tyranny which have "become so familiar to modern
experience. Not, of course, that Calvin would have accepted modern
totalitarianism; on the contrary Calvinism has "been one of the forces
of democratic determination against political imposition. Nor is the
point of his difference from such imposition hard to discover; God
was his Tyrant and none other."1" All men, including Christians, were
hound together by a common bond of sinful finitude, and therefore
none, not even the king, was to be regarded as more than a mere mortal
called by God to high things under Him. God is a Tyrant Whom one can
trust to remain faithful to His declared policy. What this doctrine
of "curbing" does reveal is Calvin's own sternness and his own cer¬
tainty of God's Will. Farel's comparison of his colleague with
Moses has been already mentioned. It is significant that Moses was
the lawgiver of God's people. Like Moses too, in dealing with a
motley social group Calvin left whatever hesitations he might have in
his closet. Publicly he appeared certain of himself and incontro¬
vertible by others. Neither his logic nor his courage could be
attacked. In his dealings with Serve tus, for example,
he /
INST. 1 Chap. 18 is the strongest expression of this aspect of
God's Sovereignty. It occurs frequently in the Sermons, e.g.
"Il faut done, que Dieu marche devant; et puis apres que les
creatures suyvent, comme en ordre subalterne, ainsi, qu'on dit"
iC.R. LIV, 316J. Hence His Will is free (ibid., 383) declared
"par la bouche" of prophets (e.g. ibid.. 39U). Princes and other
magistrates derive their authority from Him (e.g. ibid., 318).
But HiS justice is dependent upon His goodness (ibid. ,21+2) so
that the sinfulness of man is ingratitude. This view of God s
justice as deriving from His Being was maintained by scholastic
Calvinists. ' See Heppe "Reformed Dogmatics" (E.T. 1950, p. 292]).
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lie admittedly^ pressed for the extreme force of the law both
logically on the ground that heresy is treason to a Christian society
and politically on the ground that Servetus had "been made the cover
of a subversive movement. But Calvin's opposition to Servetus did
not make him pitiless. Both on this and on other occasions^ he is
found pleading with the Council to mitigate the preliminaries of
execution.
The question one can 4NML ask of Calvin, therefore, is the same
that one must ask of every legislator, not whether external force will
convert the soul but whether force in any particular instance is the
only remedy. What Trevelyan says in connection with English history
Calvin knew in Geneva, namely that t he only stable government is
government by consent and that every act of dissent is a point of
weakness.^ L^e war on the international scale, mere force settles
nothing at all except the question whose will is to be dominant.
Even the most totalitarian regimes at least pretend to represent some
social group if by no other means than as the embodiment of the
group's soul in the person of the governor, and on the other hand,
even the most democratic regimes have to put a limit to the right
of /
1 Calvin, in his "Declaration" seems to deny that he wanted the death
of Servetus, but JamesGruethad been executed in 15U7 for blasphemy,
and Rilliet suggests that Calvin had a share, at least by impli¬
cation, in the matter. Probably Calvin's disclaimer was of any
personal interest in Servetus' death; for the case of Servetus
involved the personal standing of Calvin in Geneva. Rilliet
says (p. 201) Servetus "whs a tool which the leaders_^of the anti-
Calvin faction) wished to employ for their own ends."
2 Annales, March 9th, 15^5• ^.R. XLIX, 3U8.
3 History of England.
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of dissent, however sincere that dissent may he. This is not the
place to embark upon the problem of toleration, but at least it can
be said that Calvin faced the problem in a way that the Western world
has not been forced to face it till the most recent years. Living
in Geneva, he saw that every act of dissent was an act in favour of
the enemies and rivals who surrounded the city. There was no
solution in the export of the undesirable to some place of refuge
where the "poor heathen" lacked the political standing to object.1
As with the conscientious objector in a total war the answer had to
be found within the framevrork of his own social system.
If one cares therefore to press the comparison, Calvin can be
stood in the same pillory as the Spanish Inquisition, for he too was >
ready to use force as an educative measure and as a means of preserving
the purity of society. No doubt there have been in Calvinist history
many futile tragedies of revolt against tyranny, and no doubt the
educational methods which Calvin advocated had both the successes and
the failures which the famous heate enjoyed with Gladstone^ and per¬
petrated against Shelley^ at Eton. There is indeed only one just
basis for the use of force against another person, namely the
assumption that one is absolutely right and that one has the authority
to mould the personality concerned. Hence the most easily defended
use /
1 Thackeray mentions the practice in "The Virginians". The reaction
today is of course that nationality is regarded by native peoples®
an end worth purchasing by any renunciation of Y/estern science
and order.
2 Morley "Life of Gladstone" I, 25 ff.
3 Cf. Article on Shelley in "National Dictionary of Biography".
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use of force is educational. Calvin enlarges upon this justifi¬
cation in an interpretation of I TIM. i, 9-10 and GAL. iii, 2k.
Force is a form of tuition-1- "not without its use, even to the children
of God, who previous to their effectual calling, being destitute of
the Spirit of holiness, freely indulge in the lusts of the flesh.
When, by the fear of Divine vengeance, they are deterred from not
being subdued in mind, theg profit little at present, still they are
in some measure trained to bear t he yoke of righteousness, so that
when they are called, they are not mere novices studying a discipline
of which they have no knowledge." The assumptions behind this
statement are, firstly, concerning the nature of the child, that*1
"they have need of a bridle from giving full scope to their passions
and thereby losing all desire after righteousness" - the method of
bending the twig the way it is to grow rather than the modern idea of
developing what is in the child himself - and secondly, the statement
of one's authority;^ "those whom (God) has destined to the inheri¬
tance of His Kingdom, if he does not immediately regenerate, he
through the works of the law, preserves in fear, against the time of
his visitation, not indeed that chaste fear which his children ought
to have, but a fear useful to the extent of instructing them in true
piety according to their capacity."
The third, and as Calvin says, the "principal" use of the Law,
takes us safely back into the heart of the Christian community amongst
those /
1 INST. 2: 7: 10 -II.
^ INST. 2: 7: 11 " . . • opus habent fraeno quo retineantur ..."
3 IHid.
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those who do not question the authority of God's Law and God's
promises. Such persons can still "benefit from the Law in two ways.-1"
"^t is the "best instrument for enabling them daily to learn with
greater truth and certainty what that will of the Lord is which they
aspire to follow", and it serves, too, "to confirm them in this
knowledge". "Let none of us deem ourselves exempt from this
necessity", he adds, "for none of us have as yet attained to such
a degree of wisdom, as that they may not, "by the daily instruction of
the Law, advance to a purer knowledge of the Divine will". In this
passage Calvin is returning to a doctrine which he has already stated,
that perfectibility is an impossible attainment while we are in the
flesh. Human nature is such that it requires "a whip to the flesh,
urging it on as men do a lazy sluggish ass".2 "Lven in the case of
a spiritual man," he goes on, "inasmuch as he is still burdened with
the weight of the flesh, the Law is a constant stimulus, pricking
him forward when he would indulge in sloth." "The recesses in which
concupiscence lies hid are so deep and tortuous that they easily elude
our view" and thus even the man in Christ cannot assume from his share
in the ©acrament that he is assured of salvation. He walks by faith
in the promise of God. The Law is the dominating fact of Christian
life, not only as a means of fortifying the Christian against the
sneers of the unbeliever but as a means of keeping himself right.
The Law "binds their (the reprobate) consciences with a curse" but
in /
1 INST. 2: 7- 12.
2 carni lex flagrum est, quo instar inert is taudi que asini ad
opus urgeatur". (a misreading for : urgeantur")
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in regard to believers, it "has the force of exhortation". "Our
whole life is a race, and after we have finished our course, the Lord
will enable us to reach that goal to which, at present, we can only
aspire in wish".
(ii) Jus-tlce.
An obvious question must be postponed to the next chapter: what,
namely, is the content of this daily guidance that the Christian by
faith is to seek; what, for example, about marriage, business, war,
and so on. It will be submitted that Calvin derives through the
Decalogue a fair outline or pattern of social law, covering personal
and property rights and duties and also that interior goodwill without
which no social fabric can hold together. At the moment the issue
is more general. A state cannot be self-sufficient. However
absolute its origin, however close the mutual trust of its citizens,
there are points at which it must touch the external world. Indi¬
cations of this necessity have already appeared. Calvin has laid
down the principle of total depravity. ae has emphasised that total
depravity still implies responsibility and therefore significance of
action even in those outside Christian faith. But nowhere did he
touch the issiie so closely as in his discussion of the uses of the
Law /
1 INST. 2: 7: 1U - "Nunc ergo, quoniam vim exhortationls erga fideles
habet lex, non quae eorum conscientias maleduetfc4he liget ..."
2 INST. 2: 7: 13.
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Law where he committed himself to the view that the reprobate must
be used as means to the end of divine glory. This is a question of
justice.
Two kinds of criticism can be offered against Calvin's idea of
justice. The first is quite sentimental and demands no great effort
for its demolition. It centres upon the unfortunate Servetus who
is held up as a martyr to free opinion. Such criticism comes strange¬
ly from the pen*, of a Roman Catholic, but Dr. Piette1 denounces Calvin
and Far el's credal text in sweeping terms. "It was their purpose,"
he says, "to subject the state to the Church ... to refuse the Lard's
Supper, and exile and excommunicate from the city everyone who refused
to swear to the new confession of faith." "Under threat of banish¬
ment they were forced to give their individual acceptance of it in
the presence of the class-leader('.) of their quarter . . . Calvin gave
orders that those excommunicated by their pastors should be driven
from the city." There are more errors there than the solecism of the
class-leaders.^ Calvin, of course, never "gave orders" to the
Council. Very often he had to stomach orders from them.3 There is,
however /
1 OP. clt.. 59-
2 The "class leader" was probably one of the persons appointed under
the Articles of January 1537 (which had been called for by the
Council in May 1536, i.e. before Calvin's arrival). These
persons were to be "divided and distributed in all the quarters of.
the city", and to have an eye to the life and conduct of each one.
(See also "Annales" C.R. XLIV, 211) . Calvin, says Walker, op.
cit., "did not need to say what would be done with recusants."
¥The G-enevan authorities had already taken the position, in the
month of Calvin's arrival, and without influence from him, that
they must leave the city". Jean Bolard was thus banished,
July 24th, 1536.
3 Reyburn, op. cit., gives examples. See references elsewhere.
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however, enough truth in the assertion to merit investigation. Dr.
Piette quotes G-oyau"1" for the following facts. Between 1542 and 1546
there were 56 sentences of death, 37 of which were "between 17th
February and 15th May, 1545; and during these same years 76 persons
were banished the state. It is not altogether clear whether all of
these sentences were specifically for religious misdemeanour, but Dr.
Hunter^ mentions that between 1558 and 1559 414 trials took place
for such offences as laughing at Calvin while he was preaching. To
be more explicit, there is an entry in city annals that all strangers
were to be warned that attendance at church was a condition of their
-z
continued sojourn.-' But however harrowing these figures may be,
however pathetic the trial of Servetus may be painted, one must remember
some other facts in the case. Roman Catholic has the right to
complain of Calvin's persecution. What he did - granting that it be
persecution - is but a pale shadow of the Inquisition's aim and its
achievement. Moreover the very dates that Dr. Piette quotes illus¬
trates the methods of Roman Catholic France.^" In May, 1545 > a
punitive expedition was sent into Provence to destroy indiscriminately.
The details of the horror are such as even the Old Testament abhors.
Calvin never sought his ends by indiscriminate destruction. His
victims /
l"Une Vine Eglise, Geneve, 1535-1907" &919] 1.4-5-
2 0p» bit., p. 221 (note) - The "Annales" (QR. XViX, 220) refer to
persons se mocans des prescheurs" in taverns.
3 C.R. XLIX, 240.
4 C.R. XLIX, 352-3. Farel and Calvin were deputed to raise a fund
for the assistance of the refugees. They canvassed Bern, Basel,
Zurich, Schaffhausen and Strasburg, Walker, op. cit. . pp. 382 ff.
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victims were tried according to laws which were not only consistent
with a general policy in Church and State, "but which were, by
implication, known and accepted beforeh&nd by the victims themselves.
Even Servetus knew what to expect, not only in Geneva but elsewhere,
if. he set foot within its bounds."*" A "monument expiatoire" has
been erected in Geneva to Servetus, while Calvin is commemorated
only by inclusion in a group and by a meagre stone on a hypothetical
grave. There is little evidence in Roman Catholic circles of
memorials to those who have been martyred by the Church.
Another side of the Servetus affair is its wider implications in
Genevan politics. In general, the city lay under the continent-
wide fear of the Turk, the plague and the spiritual infection of false
religions. "The threat of a Turkish invasion were always before
2
their eyes". The defence of Vienna ha^.turned the direct threat
in 1529, but the Turk was not defeated, and in 154-1 captured Buda.
3Fear of the plague was equally strong, and led to strange pietism
and strange cruelty. In Geneva, in the period mentioned by Goyau,
some at least of the death sentences were "pour avoyer faict seyre-
4
ment de server la peste". The accused, though women, were sentenced
as follows: "elles auront les mains coupees au Molard, et le corps
brule a la potence de Plain palals." Calvin pleaded on this occasion
for at least a speedier despatch of the execution. About
the /
1 Other states concurred in his execution.
2 Lindsay, op. clt., I, 129.
3 Ibid., pp. 128 ff. Rilliet, op. olt., 38 ff. also gives some de¬
tails of the horror of the plague. He mentions the hysterical
lax?lessness which led to these deliberate attempts to spread the
disease.
4 C.R. XLIX, 349 - March 21st 1545- The Molard was a public square
in Geneva, the scene, incidentally, of Froment1 s earliest sermons
in the town, January 1st 1533* Walker, op. clt., 17°.
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the same time-*- he is found making a general reguest "pour les povres
gue sont condampnes a mort, mesures pour ces empoysonneurs, c'est
gue Ion advise de non fere languyr". Internally, Geneva had an
understandable fear of dissent. The so-called "Libertines" who had
embraced the cause of the Reformation with eagerness but with no love
Q
for the doctrines it asserted" were in Calvin's eyes at least, a
menace to the very liberty for which they had fought. Probably
he was right. The Italy to which they looked for inspiration did not
survive the fires of spiritual persecution. The Netherlands did.
Reform reguired utter belief in the divine significance of the move¬
ment. Further there were the crypto-Romanists and a mass of super-
stitious^ ignorance which could be moulded by any force in power.
Calvin was stern-faced against what we might dismiss as slight offence.
The reason is not simply a matter of his personality: nor is it his
legal mind insisting on the principle that "in enacting laws, the
first thing to be guarded against is, their being forthwith abrogated
by contempt".^ It is true that he sought a reconstruction of
society"on the basis of a morality enforced by all the sanctions of
a religion whose word was law and whose assertions were truth;^
it is equally true that he realised the danger of permitting a Roman¬
ism which might open the gates to French treachery or French power.
One /
1 Ibid., 31+8. March 9th 15k5»
^ Hunter, on. cit.. 218 ff.
3 E.g. on baptismal names, burial, etc. See "Ordonnances" C.R.XXXVIII a
US ff.
^ INST., 2: 8:. 13
^ Hunter, op. cit., 219-20.
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One has only to compare the Qrue„.t ,Berthelier or Servetus affairs in
Geneva with the trials and executions of alleged traitors in England^
under Elizabeth to perceive the uncertainties which lurked "behind
the newly won independence of the small states of Europe. In short,
Servetus represented to Calvin the whole opposition, that is to say,
the spiritual laxity, which threatened the state as he perceived it.2
As has been said, however, the Servetus affair turns very largely
upon the sentiment that "spreads amongst large minded men uninfluenced
by the responsibilities of leadership and either less apprehensive
of the contagion of heresy or more trustful of the deep rootedness of
the general faith.
Dr. Brunner raises a much more fundamental issue in his "Justice
and the Social Order." In earlier works^- he had already pointed out
the fact that the individual human being does not enter into- the
sphere of social and natural relations as a free master of himself,
but is born into a life which is already present, and - as always -
already "ordered". The early Fathers were influenced in their views
by the clearcut historical situation in which they professed their
faith. /
1 E.g. the Portuguese Lopez - see Lytton Strachey's "Elizabeth and
Essex".
2 This remark ignores the fact that Calvin was not in a position to
condemn, and did not have a share in the actual condemnation of
Servetus. It merely accepts the fact that Calvin pressed for
the extreme penalty.
3 Hunter, op. cit., pp. 22+8. ff.
^ "Divine Imperative". E. T. quoted above p. 1^0, The opening para¬
graph of "The Mediator" makes a similar point viz. it is the
believer, nxxt his environment,who is primarily changed in con¬
version.
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faith. The "world" as they knew it was obviously "fallen"; all
therefore that could he deduced from its "order" was the "regulative
principle" "that in the sinful world, so far as possible the absolute
Law of Nature must be carried out".*^* They accepted therefore the
fact that God intends His people to be a society, although not
necessarily the kind of society that actually comes into existence
by the hands and ideas of sinful and unregenerate men. The point
of Roman Catholic error, Brunner goes on, is that, on the authority
of the Church's unique calling, it claims to interpret the "trans¬
formation formula" into actual laws, which thus acquire the absolute
authority of God. What the Reformers rejected was not the idea of
a Law of Nature in the absolute sense, but the Roman claim to be the
guardian of the law in actuality.
Brunner denies, however, what seems to be the mainstay of the
Calvinistic position. Calvin set up as the Protestant transforma¬
tion formula the Decalogue: that is to say, the essence of Scrip¬
tural precept maintained as a living force in the Christian Church
by the Holy Spirit. This was not perhaps the Decalogue which
scholars say was the "real" Decalogue of Moses.^ Let it be admitted
even /
"Divine Imperative", 628 ff.
^ Cf. Gierke, on. cit., 38. "Lordship made its appearance as a conse¬
quence of the Fall of man." °ther "relative" standards were
accepted on the same assumption, notably the practice of slavery -
Troeltsch I, 133 ff. Barth brings out this point also in his
"Rechtfertigung und Recht". See also Brunner "children of light
and children of darkness" (19U5) pp. 66 ff. Hence, he points
out, the greater ease in accommodating the idea of private
property.
3 E.g. Buber, "Moses" refers to the number of the commandments as being
equal to the number of fingers on Moses' hands. Prom a com¬
pletely different viewpoint Calvin uses the same analogy - C.R.
LIV 385. The simplicity of the Ten Words is due to the Divine
care for'us: as the use of two tables is likewise to impress us
that God desires two directions of our obedience - to God and to
man - which are basically one. ( ioid...300).
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even that it is essentially a "Christianised" Decalogue; for the
same epithet could "be used of Scripture as a whole. But Brunner
objects to the use of the Decalogue on deeper grounds. The answer
to the moral question, "What does God command'?" cannot, he says, be
answered abstractly, apart, that is, from a concrete human situation.^
There is an "immediacy" of reaction between mnn acting under God and
his neighbour man. Only a "legalistic conception of the good"2
attempts to answer the question of God's Will outside the actual
contact of personalities; and by "legalistic" Brunner implies the
hateful superiority of considering one's fellow man as a "case".
Therefore, he concludes, while the Decalogue and. the Sermon on the
Mount may be used as "God-given paradigms of love",3 they must be
distinguished from the divine inspiration to action as mere grammar
is distinguished, from the living contact of speech.
In passing one remarks that grammar, if not itself speech, is derived
from speech. The Decalogue may thus still be the essence of the divine
speech to Israel. The question remains whether the divine speech in
l6th century Geneva or 20th century Zurich is saying anything essentially
different. Is it true that the Christian can in the Spirit, write
an endless series of Decalogues gs Paul in the Spirit wrote a number
of epistles?4 Or is it true that the infinity of applications of
Christian Charity as of Christian doctrine are simply variations upon
a theme uttered from the foundations of God's world? It is the
latter /
1 "God and Man" (E.T. 1936) 95 ff. Barth has a similar idea of the
Church as an "Ereignis" of the Christian era.
^ "Divine Imperative", 122.
3 Ibid., 135 ff.
4 So Luther, quoted by Brunner, op. c 11♦, p. 148.
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latter position which Brunner expresses in "Justice and the Social
Order". "Obviously", he says,"*" "there is a great deal written in the
Old Testament as divine law which no Christian can regard as binding
upon himself.1' And again, the commandments cannot be made "the bas$s
of a scientific doctrine of justice" since they cannot be used as a
satisfactory appeal for any teaching about, for example, income tax,
abortion,"or war. No doubt, he admits, the exegete may claim to
deduce such teaching, but he can produce a workable doctrine only by
surreptitiously introducing into the Decalogue other principles such
as that of the New Testament or that of natural law.
Calvin, of course, does deal with the equivalent of income tax,
.
tithe, with abortion, and with war.^ Does he introduce external
J
factors of nature, such as Luther and particularly Melancthon have
been criticised for doing?The suggestion that the introduction
of the New Testament principle is not relevant is itself irrelevant.
Since Christ was in the Lav; it follows that equity is a form of
charity. But Brunner claims further that not only Luther but Calvin
too in his doctrine of conscience, was appealing to a form of
natural law. The moral law, he concludes, is "nothing but a testimony
to natural law of G-od and the lav; which G-od has written in men's con¬
science. "4- Calvin, in short, was one of these exegetes who "regarded
I
the legal sysem of the Old Testament as a model" tut surreptitiously
nested upon the law of nature for his authority.
This criticism does less than justice to Calvin. There is no




2 See Chapter VI following
1 See Chapter II.
^JLgp. cli., 2A2 "f-
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revelation.1 Brunner seems to "be doing precisely what Calvin
refused to do, that is, making a gift of Christian categories to
unbelievers. The equation of the law of nature with the divine
act of creation and redemption is a Christian's view of nature, not
a rationalist's. The rationalist begins from his own thought and
may eventually equate his idea of law with that of God. The
Christian argues from precisely the opposite point. Moteoever, the
rationalist in a final issue appeals to his own authority; and it
was for this reason that even Zwingli, for all his Scripturalism,
p
has been criticised in these pages." But the whole trend of Calvin' s
thought is connected tothe revealed will of God for Church, individual
and state, by a thousand bonds. This may be a legalistic view but
it cannot be dismissed as sentimental inconsistency. Calvin's
'naturalis aequitas' was no hurried camouflage for mere force, but
the will of God as revealed in Scripture and as tested by Christian
faith in a variety of contacts with the circumstances of the world.
One may sympathise with Brunner' s main plea. There is
necessary in European thought a revival of "a sense of right and
wrong", 3 an acceptance of divine law with the emphasis upon "divine".
Moral values have sunk to a merely relative level.^ Law is above
private opinion and. above the expedience of the State. Law refers
to the eternal order of things. But the eternal order does not
compress itself into any one event of revelation, even, apparently,
that /
See Note 11 at end.
p
Chapter II above.
°P• &t., p. 14•
4 Ibid., pp. 233 ff.
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that of Scripture. Thus Christians, while they revere Scripture and
make catechetical use of Scriptural law, cannot march "under the
banner of truth to Scripture in the literal sense 'as it is written'".1
There must always be the mystical factor of Spiritual immediacy.
There can be no question that Brunner is here emphasising an aspect
of the Reformation which was perhaps toned down in the l6th century.
The idea of "immediacy" was too near that of Anabaptist enthusiasm,
O
and, as has been learned from Dr. Niebuhr, Calvin restricted the
action of the Spirit to the assembly rather than to the individual.
The result of this restriction has been, Brunner says, in practice,
an over-emphasis upon the mere written Word. It was the barrenness
of this literalism that prevented Christian faith from controlling
18th century "Reason", which thus became divorced from Christian
faith. Now the action of Reason upon the traditional doctrine of
Christian justice - a blend, Brunner says,-' of the Aristotelian
(potffct dLK.do.ov and prophetic justice, producing a peculiar doctrine
of divine justice as eternal, supernatural and absolutely valid -
was to reduce the divine law of nature to a subjective law of human
reason. This view was reduced to a merely self consistent body of
law lacking any internal reference to eternal authority, and has been
finally swallowed up by the totalitarian state which arrogantly appro¬
priates to itself that authority.
Not only Brunner, but Barth is aware of this unrighteous claim to
authority. /
1 Op. cit. , p. 111+.
^ See above p.
3 Op. cit., pp. 1U-15.
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authority. In his tract on "baptism1 he emphasjsestHae need for
individual acceptance of faith precisely "because, as he says in his
preface, he had seen the attempt of the State to dominate the courts
of the church through the pseudo-democratic methods of church elec¬
tions. Official membership of a church through infant baptism is
not-, he concludes, necessarily identifiable with spiritual member¬
ship with Christ. But, as he argues in his tract, "Nein" it is not
o
necessary to repudiate Scripture, and particularly is it dangerous
to introduce a non Scriptural doctrine of nature, in order to achieve
the force of immediate conviction. If necessary the Christian c^n
repudiate contemporary social systems and simply proclaim a "thus
saith the Lord". The Spirit bloweth where it listeth. If there
are now no powers that be which are in accordance with the divine
Will then the Word will no doubt fall by divine grace upon individual
hearts and out of their conviction will denounce the present state
of affairs and perhaps finally reform them to a better mould. But
there must be a "thus saith the Lord".
These ^.ast sentences marlc the separation between the 16th and
the 20th centuries in the European spirit. One of Brunner's main
contentions is that we must do away with the idea of a "relative law
of nature" and base our moral categories upon an absolute law of
being. The relative law, he says, is not a la?/ at all but only a
"regulative /
1 "Die Kirchliche Lehre von der Taufe", (192+3) translated by E. A.
Payne. The preface is not included in the English translation
which is made"from the second edition of Barth's pamphlet.
2
E.g. his remarks updn Brunner's apparent appeal to authority beyond
Scripture. "Natural Theology" pp. 110 ff.
222+
"regulative principle"-1' indicating perhaps the existence of an
Absolute Law, a sort of Kantian category indicating an unknown thing-
in-itself. In medieval society it was perhaps a relevant factor,
since the Church had captured the State and made it an expression of
itself. Calvin himself was a medievalist in the sense that he too
accepted the state not only as a category hut as an actuality. That
is to say, Calvin believed in Christendom and therefore accepted
many of the conventions of Christendom, for example, his peculiar
doctrine of non-resistance to rulers. Brunner's view is that all
such conventions are now vitiated. Christendom is no longer a fact
but merely a sentiment. The true Christian now is where the true
Christian was in third century Rome. He must evolve a new Christen¬
dom.
It is not within the scope of this study to say how or even
whether, this reconstruction can be carried out. One simply recalls
the historical fact that Calvinism did effect a reconstruction of
manners in Europe^ which remained to the end of the 19th century at
least.^ One also recalls the method by which it was done. Entry
into /
1 "Justice and the Social Order", 92: 21+3.
2 This question receives further comment below in Chapter VII.
Walker comments, on. cit. , 2+18 "He was far too polite a man to sug¬
gest that a Henry II or a Catherine de Medici were of the reprobate
3 Trevelyan describes it for England in his "English Social History"
Q;©mpare Grahame, "Social Life in Scotland in the 18th century".
^ Examples could be culled from Victorian literature. For example
Trollope's novel, "The Vicar of Bullhampton" was regarded as
sensational at the t?ime of its publication. He had in mind the
lot of "fallen women", and expresses the current attitude in the
comment of his heroine's relatives that "that kind are better
dead". Reformation society sought capital punishment for
adultery. The 20th century attitude may be compared.
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into the Calvinist Church was voluntary in the sense that each
member professed to have been called as an individual. But as a
member of that body he was aware of sharing in a divine covenant."*"
This idea of covenant gained political expression in the Scottish
Solemn League and Covenant which stated the logical conclusion of a
Calvinist state, namely the imposition of the truth upon every con¬
tract. Whatever Calvin may have professed, therefore, of respect
for established order, the application of his principles was de¬
rived from an absolute ideal of conduct, both private a^d public,
which rested upon the authority of God Himself. Calvin's justice
claimed to be the application of truth to human affairs, the ex¬
pression not only of an absolute revelation in Scripture, but the
expression also of the Covenant which God made and continued to make
with those who committed themselves to His obedience. The Scots,
for example, marched to the assistance of anti-Laudian England
2
under a solemn covenant rather as Joshua marched over J"ordan with
the Ark of the Covenant borne on ahead as a sign that God was with
3 v
His people. In a short but important section Cheneviere shows
how much of this idea was in Calvin's interpretation of inter¬
national law. Here if anywhere would one expect to find some
concession to the idea of a "jus gentium". Calvin however
apparently /
This is brought out even in his doctrine of baptism. It is particularly
forceful in his teaching about the use of the Law. lt was not the
Church as an institution but the faith implied by membership of the
Church, that made for salvation.
^ Trevelyan remarks, "History of England" 399, that Scotland at the time
of the Covenant "had not been so moved since the days of Wallace and
Bruce."
3
Op. cit., pp. 107-8.
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apparently made none. His conception of general grace was wide
enough to cover such moral facts as human responsibility and the
existence of the state. God willed these facts as He willed the
rain - for the just and the unjust alike. In that sense His own
people could be said to share in His common as well as His
particular gracej or alternatively, could be said to disobey even
the lav/ of nature. In one example,1 hov/ever, he shows how, in a point
of disagreement, it was the Israelite and not the natural law that
is God's Will. That is to say, in this instance, it was the
Israelite law alone that represented the Will of God, they being in
covenant with Him.
Interpreted in international terms, this view implies the
logic that drove the Scots over the border to impose Presbyterian
truth upon Anglican England. Barth said something similar in his
"Letter to Great Britain from Switzerland". The justification of
the Allies v/as not to be adequately found in motives that a Hindu




Something has already been said*- of the two facets of person¬
ality - conscience and concupiscence - which Calvin finds in human
personality. /
1 C.R. XXXVIIla pp. 235 ft.
2 In chapter II section (iii) and chapter IV section (iv)
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personality. Responsibility, he contends, is the intieapable
burden of humanity. Nor is he particularly interested to explain
this statement apologetically. It is a mere fact of experience,
like a sense perception. In short, the elucidation of personality
is of less practical interest than its empirical existence. But
the part which the idea, as an idea, played in European thought
cannot simply be overlooked. Even in the hypothetically "natural"
society of the dim Homeric clans, where the individual was not an
individual, as we use the term, the clan itself had distinguishing
marks: had, in short, a persona; and every individual member
represented, and was represented by, it. The idea of representation
remained in Roman law and was still a predominating factor in medie¬
val Europe. The Church itself was legally a persona."1"
The new emphasis of Protestantism is that of the personality
of the individual. His salvation is by faith alone, unmediated by
any human priest; and the means of his salvation, the divine Word,
rests upon his own contact with his Creator. There is thus not
only a question of responsibility but also a question of reason.
The term conscience can cover both factors. "The very things
contained in the'two tables (of the Law) are, in a manner, dictated
to us by that internal law, which ... is in a manner written and
2
stamped on every heart". It will be noticed that Calvin does not
limit his "natural" law to the second table, as Livingstone is
quoted /
1 Troeltsch, on. cit., I, pp. 97-8.
^ INST. 2: 8: 1. "Porro haec ipsa . . . quodammodo nobis dictat
lex ilia interior, quam omnium cordibus inscriptam et quasi
impressam superius dictum est.
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quoted as doing.^ He assumes that the persons whom he is to judge
are aware of the Will of God in all its aspects. i;Le therefore is
"bound to judge of recalcitrance as either madness or deliberate
opposition; and the proper action in each case ig forcible restraint.
There could be no other judgment; for Calvin ignores the modern idea
of toleration which accepts the "reasonable" view that individuals may
» i €■
regard as good things which are different from each other.
Conscience, that is, for Calvin, is not only a goad, an affection of
the will, but also a sort of blue print of reality, an instrument of
the intellect. On the issue whether man can perceive reality he
admits that astronomy, for example, is "real" knowledge while
p
astrology is not. And this faculty is not a special gift of grace
to be obtained only through believing faith. He argues strongly
against those who say that the Pall has reduced human nature to the
animal level. Astronomy is "a sure indication of the agency of God
in man".
The two ideas of conscience, however, cannot be rigidly
separated. If conscience can be described as "un simple organe de
connaissance experimentale du monde ext^rieure" it is always
primarily "un organe exprimant une regie morale".J Conscience,
Calvin says, by distinguishing between good and evil, responds to the
judgment /
1 Miclclem, op. cit., 56-7.
2 INST. 1: 5' 1 ff. Hot only astronomy but also medical and
physical science, and the special activities of His Providence
(1: 5: 7 ff). These proofs would be self evident but for the
"sloth and ingratitude1"1 ("ignaviae et ingratitudinis") of human
nature, to which witness is borne by conscience (l: 5- 15)
^ Cheney-iere, op. cit..„ p. U6.
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judgment of God is an undoubted sign of an immortal spirit.^ But
the conclusion is always negative. He did say "there is no doubt
that certain notions of right and justice are innate in the human mind,
and that a light of justice shines in them" but the sort of innate
religion he means is basically "an irreligious affectation . . .
(which) betrays itself in every age and is still doing so, men always
longing to devise some method of procuring righteousness without any
2
sanction from the lord of God". Even man's supernatural gifts -
"faith and righteousness" - as well as his natural gifts - soundness
g
of mind and integrity of heart - "were corrupted by sin". Man is
immured in the darkness of error, (and) is scarcely able, by means of
that natural law" - conscience - "to form any tolerable idea of the
worship which is acceptable to God . . . Therefore, as a necessary
remedy, both for our dullness and our contumacy, the Lord has given
us His written law which . . . removes the obscurity of the law of
nature, and also makes a more lively and permanent impression upon our
4
minds. Sin, he repeats, is not the result of ignorance but of "passion",
"arrogance", "ambition", "self-love", "lethargy", "lust", "depravity",
2
"pride", in a word, of "concupiscence". Concupiscence is not
simply /
1
INST. 1. cap. 3.
^
INST. 2: 8: 5. So in the Sermons (c.R. LIV 297-8) he says that
morally the revelation of God in the Law presents an impossible
ideal for man. The Law is impossible, but relevant.
® Cheneviere, op. cit., 20 ff.
4
INST. 2: 8: 1.
g
"libido", "arrogantia", "ambitia", "sui amore", "torpor", "cupiditas",
"superbia".
C:&. LIV, 310 "... Nous savons que les hommes, combiens qu'ils
appetent d'estre veus subtils at eigus, ne laissent pas de se
couvoir du bouclier d'ignorance".
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simply the "flesh" in the literal sense, to he purified by ascetic
practice. As for Paul, it is for Calvin always a spiritual
experience, even if that interpretation precludes any rational
explanation of its origin. Just as Paul rested in an irrational
conclusion that there are two laws at work in his members - the
empirical fact of sin and an equally irrational ideal of righteous¬
ness - so Calvin also refuses to proceed beyond what he calls
"experience" and the Word cf God. With Barth he would say that if
there is indeed such a thing as "Wort-machtigkeit" in human nature,
it does not lead to "Gffenbarungs-machtigkeit", but only to condem¬
nation, for behind "Wort-machtigkeit" is the motivating principle of
"concupiscence".1 Intelligence, that is, like instinct, is. rieufijCal,
a mere tool which is manipulated by an inner principle of the will
which in turn is divided between the desire of concupiscence and the
dictates of conscience. Like parallel lines the principles of human
nature recede into an infinite disparity, and ore is left with a
p
simple empirical statement of two facts. The conclusion would be
absurd if it were not the conclusion that must always be reached,
whatever the starting-point. So long as justice is both a principle
of right and a personal fact of responsibility, and so long as there
remains the human fact of disobedience, no system, whether it makes
optimistic or pessimistic observations about human nature, will
achieve anything more than an approximate intellectual balance of
the /
1 See "Nein". "Natural Theology", 107 ff.
2 In the Sermons he suggests that Satan is a motivating force of evil
in us, as if Satan, in combating: Grod, makes the human soul his
battlefield. This is Milton'g argument in "Paradise Lost". For
Calvin, however, the fact of satanic temptation never slackens
human responsibility. (C.R. LIV, 333, 380).
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the factors. However inadequate Calvin's interpretation may "be,
therefore, he is not to he judged on that alone, hut rather on the
contribution which he made by his practice upon the life of his
generation.
The actual progress of salvation is more confidently traced.
The sinner is a person, that is, he is morally capable of obedience
to the dictates of conscience, but chooses the apparently more grati¬
fying path of concupiscence. The choice does not destroy conscience;
"for conscience, instead of allowing us to stifle our perceptions,
and sleep on without interruption, acts as an inward witness and
monitor, reminds us of what we owe to God, points out the distinction
between good and evil, and thereby convicts us of departure from
1
duty . In discomfort the sinner complains that the world is not
what it ought to be, and demands "rigid and austere exaction, which
remits not one iota of the demand, and leaves no transgression un¬
punished"2 - all this from the other sinners. If the sinner ever
comes, by force of circumstances - and Calvin has a few means of
forcing circumstances to suggest - to believe himself to be wrong,
he turns the whole battery of hatred against himself, and falls into
despair.^ If he is reprobate in God's eternal and inscrutable Will,
he remains in despair; but God perhaps has added to him "righteous¬
ness in that forgiveness of sins by which we are freed from the
rigour of the Law".^ All is of God.
This /
-*■ INST. 2: 8: 1. "Hon enim simit nos perpetuum somnum sine sensu
dormite nostra conscientious?, quin intus testis sit ac monitoix
eorum quae Deo debemus, quin boni et rnali discrimen nobis obiiciat,
atque ita nos accusat dum ab officio discedimus"
2 INST. 2: 7: 15
3 INST. 2: 8: 3.
INST. 2: 7: 15
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This interpretation of human nature, however, is that of a
preacher, not a philosopher. Ultimately, that is, it rests upon
the mere statement of human sinfulness and divine revelation.
Before the final mystery of mental deficiency Calvin maintains this
view. "We see," he says, "that there are many simpletons and idiots
who know no more than "brute "beasts . . . Thus, then, (he concludes),
all those who possess mind and intelligence, let them know that God
has given them "by such a grace and that they are all the more
indebted to Him." In other words, Calvin interprets the fact of
personality which he has laid down in terms of a general as well as
a special grace. The general grace rests upon the mere fact of
Creation. Conscience, personality, knowledge of God, is thus a
mere fact like the experience of a sense perception, a neutral fact
in the sense that it precedes any conscious selection on the part
of the individual. This neutrality might "be ascribed in the final
resort even to conscience, for conscience is alien to a man who is
2
dominated by concupiscence, that is, self will. Following this
line of interpretation, one might cite the analogy of a sleeping man
and his alarum clock. When he is asleep, he resents the external
means of his awakening from the flattery of his dreams. In fact,
it is the physical discomfort of the noise that finally changes his
state /
1 INST. 2: 2: 12+. Cheneviere, op. clt., pp. 56 ff.
2
In this sense man is "totally depraved", so that, when he is saved,
he knows it has been by grace alone, and not by conscience in so
far as conscience is any faculty of his own. In this connection
see T. F. Torrance, "Calvin's doctrine of man" (1949) pp. 81+ ff.
for references. Calvin can even say, "There is more worth in
all the vermin of the world than there is in man, for he is a
creature in whom the image of God has been effaced." (Sermon
on Job.)
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state. And yet, when he Is awake he is thankful for the interrup-
tlon of vain flattery \ In fact, the alarum clock is a human device
created fg^SSSSSSBS&f for that interruption. So the man in Christ
regards with thankfulness the pain of his conversion. From another
point of view, however, it is concupiscence that is the neutral
factor. For God made man for fellowship and the fact that he is
outside of fellowship is "unnatural"."'" The painfulness of conversion
therefore may be regarded as being not so much a special device of
God as an inevitable conflict with the true natural order. Man
falls away, but God does not change and God* s purpose does not
change. Until man is in harmony with that purpose he is inevitably
p
uncomfortable. Concupiscence is the unnatural factor, and may then
be interpreted, as Milton does, as the direct action of Satan in his
trespass upon God's territory.
3
The reason for stressing this "irrational" doctrine of human
nature is twofold. In the first place, Calvin sought to achieve
the same absolute reference as the medieval lawyers sought in the
lex naturae;4 but in the second, he did not draw the deduction which
the "monar-chomachists" of the next generation were to do. In terms
of the Law, he identifiedGod with the Absolute of the Stoics which
had been taken into Western thought. Instead of talking about
innate faculties or a law of nature he spoke about the God and. Father
of /
See Note 12at. end.
2
This point is enlarged by Prof. J. S. Stewart in his "A Man in
Christ."
^ See Cheneviere, op. cit., 46.
^ But, as Torrance points out, with a most unmedleval dynamic,
op. cit., p. 29.
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of our Lord and of His self revelation in Scripture and in experience,
particularly Christian experience. In practice therefore he is
committed to a view that the pagan sages could have only the dimmest
knowledge of God - only enough to condemn them, perhaps; or if to
say that were to identify them too completely with the reprobate,
who also know God and despair, then one might say that the pagan sages
knew enough of God - through astronomy, for example - to make them
want to know Christ. But of course they know even less of Christ
than the Fathers of the old dispensation with its types and symbols
which derive from the special gift of God.
This is the dilemma which Barth stresses in his distinction
between "formal perfectibility" and "material" sinfulness.-*- It is
the dilemma which Brunner tries to break down by saying that "we have
to acknowledge the fact that God has ... put us ... into His creation,
whose laws can be known in spite of sin by those who know God in
T O
^esus Christ."^ This view may be accepted since it makes the know¬
ledge of nature depend upon saving knowledge of Christ. Whether
the deduction is admissible is another question. Is there a
subjective as well as an objective natural theology? That is to say,
can we speak not only of "such - knowledge of God in His creation as
can come only to those who are already enlightened by the Christian
revelation of him", but also of "such a knowledge of God as might be
sup-posed to be accessible to the heathen, etc." The "might be
supposed", on the face of the argument, vitiates it. For it is
Christians who do the supposing; and Christians may say many things
about /
1>vNeinj' Natural Theology, p. 88.
^'vNature and Grace', ibid., p. 52.
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about the heathen and the reprobate which they, the heathen and the
reprobate, might indignantly repudiate', for example, that they are
sinners, or that grace is intended for them in Christ.
Brunner's arguments against this restricted interpretation of
personality and revelation are based upon the fact that, as a
matter of experience, the idea of justice, like the idea of God, is
an absolute, and that, therefore, if one is to narrow down the law
cf God to an experience ackno?/le dged only by a section of humanity,
one is denying its essential justice. Even on the lew er level of
interpretation, of course, the Decalogue would have a political,
a paedagogic and an indicative use.-*- In a Christian society it
would be the expression of God's will, the "natural" law of the
community. It would for the same reason have the paedogogic use
since it would point to its Author as infinitely beyond human
conception and yet graciously pleased to deposit a pattern of
obedience in human categories. And it would, again for the same
reason, have the indicative use of driving the Christian citizenship
away from the legalism of mere obedience into the tension of a
faith that should wait upon the moving of the Holy Spirit. But
outside that definite community there would be no such knowledge
and no such development. Brunner argues that not only the facts
are against this assumption but also the theology of man - man
as such - created in the image of his Maker.
Without pursuing this particular controversy one can remark
upon some assumptions of Calvin. He was by no means a sectarian
either /
1
Divine Imperative, pp. Ii+0 ff.
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either in theology or in politics. The very force of his anti-
papalism derived from his conviction that the papacy was a human
assumption of divine right. The Church of Rome, therefore, was
not a church, although it might embody churches.^- That is to say,
its assumptions were fundamentally in error, although one might
say of some of its members that, not appreciating the implications
of Roman theology, they called themselves Roman Catholics but were
in reality true Christians, worshipping in faith, not in priestly
sacrament. Moreover, Calvin asserted that the true Church should
develop a true state: not perhaps an identical state for all
ages or for every community, but a code of living which could
logically be deduced from the revealed Word of God. Finally, it
is clear that what Calvinists meant by political freedom was not
permission to follow their individual conscience but the right of
political propaganda, the right to hold the public conscience.
In this sense, Calvin agrees with the medieval conception of
justice. The Decalogue for him was an absolute subject to only
one conditioning force, namely, the working of the Holy Spirit
in the deliberations of the faithful. And since the Holy Spirit
is one with the Father and the Son, this condition does not affect
the principle itself so much as the application of the Law of God
in special circumstances.
It is significant that that deviation from Calvin's political
theory which is known as "monarchomachism" derived from the principle
2
of the sovereignity of the people. No doubt it might be emphasised
that /
1 INST. 4: see also Mitchell Hunter, op. cit. p. 152.
p
Lang, op. cit. ,p.72.
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that this sovereignly was merely a political fiction and did not
derogate from the final sovereignly - of Christ; that, in other
words, it was the sovereignty'- of Christ insofar as the Will of
God is made known through the Scriptures as interpreted under the
Holy Spirit "by the people of God in council. Calvin did not
accept this view and remained a buttress against it in the isolated
splendour of Geneva. His motives are not hard to trace. Human
life depends upon Grace. Not only the logic of religion hut the
logic of being itself, hangs upon the premise of divine mercy.
Calvin thus cannot forget human sin even in Christians2, or perhaps
one should say, the tendency to sin even in Christians who, as
Christians, know the truth about themselves, namely, their dependence
upon God, but are still subject to the temptation to be independent.
Calvin of course was not against resistance. Just as he
repudiated anarchism on the ground that God ordained the State and
the Church, so also he took an active interest in both institutions
in order that they might be made to conform to the ^ord of God.
But, as Bohatec emphasises^ he did not believe in the divine right
of the individual. The Word of God may be recognised by
individuals but it is recognised as a corporate reference. Thus
there was for Calvin, as for Augustine, no salvation outside the
church: and thus also any criticism of the state had to be based
upon the principle of God's Word, not upon the principle of the
people's sovereignty,*-. "Sovereignty" in fact, is just what Calvin
denied /
1
An argument used by Calvin in his Commentary on MICAH, VII, 19,
quoted by Torrance, op. cit. ,p. 19.
INST. 3: 1U: 1.
op. cit. pp. 611 ff.
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denied to the people. The only sovereignty in his idea of State
or Church was that of Christ, and for that very reason the political
action of Christ's people had to "be purged of any possible suggestion
of personal gain. If the sovereign had to "be opposed, it must be




(i) The "general survey".
(ii) The first table of the Law.
(ill) The second table of the Law.
(iv) The adequacy of the Decalogue.
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(i) "The General Survey".
Assuming the unsophisticated view that Calvin held the will of God
to "be "based upon the revelation in His Law we turn to the "general survey"
with which he precedes his consideration of each separate commandment.
The following are the main points. "In the divine Law human life is
instructed not merely in outward decency, but inward spiritual righteous-
„ 1ness : Christian citizenship, that is, is based upon an understanding
and acceptance of the Law, not upon mere casual, temporary obedience.
So Cromwell sought out men who knew what they obeyed and loved what they
knew; and so too, in our own irreligious but ideological wars are men
and women taught to love the ends for which they fight. Secondly, the
Law is not "a kind of Lesbian code" to be "licentiously wrested and
2
strained to any meaning we may desire." The Law has a definite meaning
which can be understood in principle by every age and under all circum-
3
stances. This is the point which underlies the misunderstandings about
Calvin's /
INST. 2: 8: 6. "non ad externam honestatem modo, sed ad interiorem
spiritualemque institiam."
2
INST. 2: 8: 8. * instar lesbiae regulae" - omitted in the French. A
Lesbian rule was originally a mason's ruler made of lead, a commodity
for which, along with wine, the island of Lesbos was famed. By
analogy, the Lesbian rule became a rule that could be twisted (so
Eth, Nic. v: x: 7) particularly as Lesbos was also noted for its
profligacy, particularly that of sexual irregularity, e.g., Sapphism.
3
This is the main theme of the first sermon in the 1562 series (CLR. LIV,
235 ff) e.g. " En la Loy, il a comprins tout ce qui estoit bon et utile"
(236); "... une doctrine suffisante" (ibid. ); "il n'a rien oubli^
de ce qui estoit necessaire et utile" (237). In it " . . . Dieu
descend ^ nous, afin que nous ayons une declaration familiere de sa
volonte" (240). It is a "reigle perpetuelle de iustice" (287), the
only right interpretation of which is "selon la nature de Dieu" (371).
(It is from age to age both in the sense of applying to the true Israel'
that has succeeded to the Jews (244) and also of applying to all men,
since they are in the image of God (see Note 10 sX ^we))..
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Calvin's doctrine of natural law. What he is saying is that the Law of
God corresponds to a fundamental moral challenge that is felt by every
generation in all circumstances, the Decalogue teing, as it were, the
distillation of that moral essence. He is saying that no generation
is ignorant of the Law, but he is not saying that men, because they know
the Law,therefore obey it. He is simply saying that every generation
has been responsible to God for the measure of obedience that God ordained;
that, in short, the trouble with the world is its sin. Thirdly, he
dismisses the idea that because the Decalogue is the quintessence of the
divine will it is necessary to "restrict the Spirit of the Law to the
strict letter of the words". The best rule, he says, is "to be guided





The principle of interpretation which he suggests is based upon the
view that "in almost all the commandments", there are "elliptical ex-
g
pressions". Every command either requires or prohibits, is either
positive or negative in its expressed demand. The nature of each,
however, "is instantly discerned when we look to the principle of the
command as its end." For example, the fifth commandment enjoins specific
honour to parents, but its principle is that honour should be given to
"those on whom (God) has conferred some distinction", such as teachers,
magistrates, pastors. Such honour, he says, is "right in itself and
pleasing to God", and refusal is "offensive to Him". A second
principle of interpretation which he suggests is the assumption of a
positive /
^ INST. 2: 8: 8 " . . . ut deridiculo iure sit futurus, qui legis sensum
ad verborum angustias restringere velit".
2




positive corollary from a negative commandment - a principle which, he
says, "everyone admits". Passive virtue - the abstention from that
which is forbidden - was not the whole duty of man; one must pass from
the mere negation to the "duties and positive acts" which are implied.
For example, the command not to kill is not exhausted by the mere
cessation of killing, or even by controlling the inner wish to do violence
The full expression of the commandment is reached only when we are
positively set "to aid our neighbour's life by every means in our power".
It covers, in other words, "all the offices of charity which can contri¬
bute to his preservation".
In discussing the division of the two tables, Calvin characteristic¬
ally eschewed mere scholastic argument on the one hand, but was not above
adding a semi-scholastic argument to aid his main statement. He offers
no contribution to the discussion where the division of the two tsbles
1
of the Law is to fall. He himself prefers the division four and six
but he does not quarrel with anyone who makes other views on this
particular point. The main thing is that God be held as the spiritual
sanction of human conduct. But he adds a quaint argument to his asser¬
tion that the main issue in human conduct is sin. God delivered His
2
commandments, he says, "as it were, by halves, using elliptical ex¬
pressions with a larger meaning than that actually expressed" because
"as the flesh is always on the alert to extenuate the heinousness of
sin . . . /
1
INST. 2: 8: 12.
^ INST. 2: 8: 10 - "velut dimidiis praeceptis, per synecdochas . . . quid
peccatorum foeditatem, nisi ubi palpabilis est, diluere, et speciosis
praetextibus inducere semper caro molitur, quod erat in unoquoque
transgressionis genere deterrinum et scelertissimum, exemplaris loco
proposuit (Deus), cuius ad auditum sensua quoque exhorresceret, quo
maiorem peccati cuiuslibet detestationem animis nostris imprimeret.
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sin . . . and so cover it -with specious pretexts", it is necessary to
set forth, "by way of example, whatever is foulest and most iniquitous
in each speciss of transgression". "We are often," he goes on, "im¬
posed upon by imagining that the more hidden (the sins) the less
heinous they are." We have to be made to "touch" them, to "shudder"
at them, before we see them as sin snd not as dare-devilry. And so,
he adds later, "in order to remove every pretext for excuse" the Law
is not simply epitomised under the two heads of love to God and charity
to my neighbour, but is extended to these ten incisive particulars which
in themselves contain and at the same time illustrate the Will of God
for men.
It is important to include in this general survey the statement
that the Calvinist society was essentially a religious grouping. Of
the first phrase of the first commandment, Calvin points out that its
function is introductory to the whole, and designed to prevent the Law
2
being "abrogated by contempt". No Court, of course, can allow contempt
of its findings: and in a theocracy the ultimate sanction is not a
court but the Deity Himself. But, as Calvin remarks, the people of a
theocratic system, admit His "power and authority to command", both
because of His "promise to favour" and because they remember His kind¬
ness. Because they aspire to membership of His Kingdom they endeavour
to please Him. In the "Harmony" he enlarges this view by reference to
the "separateness" of the chosen people, namely emphasis upon the divine
origins of the Law. Because of their calling they were to be marked
by a sign which should have no significance other than its reference to
the /
1 INST. 2: 8: 12. Compare "Harmony" (CR. LII, 329 ff) where he gives
this same interpretation to some of the Mosaic precepts about
cleanliness.
^ 2 inst. 2: 8: 13. " . . ne contemptu abrogentur (leges)".
2kk
the acknowledged Deity. The Law might thus seem an irrational ideal
from the merely utilitarian point of view; its only resson being the
command of the Deity and the obedience of His people. A similar
irrational imposition of the Law has been noted in discussing the Chris¬
tian movement into the Teutonic West, where the Sabbath particularly
was sanctioned by severe penalties. Luther too gave disproportionate
emphasis to the religious practice which derived from his principle of
salvation by faith alone, and thus also Calvin draws into his discussion
2
of the first commandment such precepts as those about leprosy, issues
and uncleanness in general, the agricultural laws of DEUTERONOMY 22, the
distinction of beasts, the ritual of warfare and the prohibition of
mixed marriages as judicial expressions of the commandment, "Thou shalt
have no other gods before me". These judicial examples correspond to
3 4
the ceremonial expressions of the law, the Passover, baptism, end
circumcision,5 the holiness of the first-born, the separation of
Nazarites, and so on.
The /
1
C.R. LII, 331, "Voluit autem hoc symbol©, Deus semen Abrahae monere





Ibid..,285. The Passover really comes under the fourth commandment
(T.e. Sabbath) but may be regarded also as "solemne . . . redemp-
tionis symbolium"•
4
Ibid.. 287. "Sicuti hodie idem nobis omnibus est baptismus, quo
communiter inserimur in corpus Christi". It is worth noting that
the sentence goes on to add "singulis tamen suus baptismus confertur,
quo certius agnoscent se adoptionis esse participes, ideoque ecclesiae
membra".
5
Ibid.. 291 ■ "Primo igitur excludit Moses omnes extraneos" - by circum¬
cision.
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The principle is important; Christian civilisation is not simply
a system of "human" rights; it is a system also of divine rights."1"
A Christian society therefore should not "be simply a "benevolent demo¬
cracy; it must involve definite practices symbolical of its authority -
Sabbath observance, for example. Throughout the discussion of the Law
Calvin constantly returns to the point that these things are done be¬
cause the society under review is Christian; the discussion itself
in fact is a sifting from all the precepts of Scripture of those which
could be applicable to persons who approach God in the Name of Jesus
Christ. He was firmly logical in applying this principle. Much of
his political thought and much of his political opposition can be
reduced to his advocacy of principles that rest upon his interpreta¬
tion of the Decalogue. For example, his urgency of Church attendance:
it might be "reasonable" to suppose that visitors to the city might
have been excused such attendance, particularly if they were of "another
2
persuasion". Calvin did not so argue. WUKtKsmsmm they were in
Geneva they must accept the practices of Geneva. The practices of Geneva
were rigid. During the sermon it was not permissible to hold stall
3
trade in the streets; it was not permitted even to be absent from
4
church. Special commissioners were charged to investigate causes of
absence, /
^
So that perjury is an abomination in God's sight (LII, 562) as well
as a social evil. The Christian was the best of citizens because
God was his Sovereign.
2 Two entries in the "Annales" (March, 1545) C.R. XLIX, 348-9. It is
the theme of the fifth sermon of the 1562 series. Since we sre
"sanctified" (C.R. LIV, 284) we owe this rest from our own interest
to God. Calvin agrees that many can be brought together only by
pressure (292) but "quand les boutiques sont rermees le Dimanche,
qu'on ne travaillers point a, la facon commune: c'est afin qu'on ait
plus de loisir et de liberte de vacques a ce que Dieu nous c'ommande
Tibid.).
3 C.R. XLIX, 207 Other, exaiiroles are that children are not allowed to
USX Sift?"
4 Ibid., 217, 303, 345.
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absence, and if these were not satisfactory they would have to "be re¬
peated in court next day. In England at a later date the practice of
fining for non-attendance at church was regarded as monstrous.^
Actually, it was a form of toleration to non-attenders, a gesture to
O
liberty of conscience not made in truly Calvinist society.
Some of the laws appear ridiculous and even unjust. The prohibi¬
tion of "hosen, or doublettes, cut, jagged, embroydered, or lined with
3
silk upon payne of sixty sous" seems a hard blow at youthful enjoyment.
Defiance of this law, however, was made by Perrin as a direct challenge
of Calvin's position. It was the sort of defiance perpetrated so often
in the form of laughing at M. Calvin in church, the defiance that was
finally offered him under the theological skirts of Servetus. Calvin
was perhaps lacking in a sense of humour, especially when he himself
was the object of attack, but the Libertines were lacking in a sense of
proportion too. They accepted the "commandements de Dieu" when such
obedience was politically useful, when indeed Geneva's independence
trembled in the balance; but they rebelled against Calvin's logically
deduced religiouspractise of these'Same "commandements de Dieu". The
principle at stake was not unlike that of the medieval controversy over
investiture. No doubt the temptation to the church to meddle in secular
affairs, perhaps without detailed knowledge, is considerable. The
temptation /
^
Trevelyan, "English Social History", pp. 180 ff. Gait describes a
similar slackening of discipline in his "Annals of the Parish".
2
Not made in any society which rests upon a clear principle. It is
possible only in a society such as Locke describes in his "Essay",
viz., that has wearied itself in ideological conflict.
3
Quoted from the "Lawes of Geneva", p. 71, by Rilliet, on. cit.
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temptation of the state to use the spiritual power of the church to gain
control of the national conscience is equally strong.
(ii) The first table of the Law.
In the"Harmony" Calvin detaches as a "Preface"1 consideration of
the phrases, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the
o
land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage", but in the "Institutes"
he remarks that this introduction can equally be taken as part of the
first commandment itself. Such distinction as may be drawn is that
between the statement that God is the Deity acceptable to Israel, and
thus the action that may be expected of the said Israel, first in
religious practice, then in charitable practice, between the fact of
adoption and its condition. The argument pursued depends upon the
relationship between absolute Deity and chosen mankind. God is absolute
and is not to be mistaken for any of the forms He might choose to adopt.
"If anyone were to worship angels in place of God, or vainly imagine
any other secret divinity, none will deny that he would place himself
,3
under the ban of this law. His choice of His people, therefore, is
4
strictly of His "free love", and thus the relationship of the people is





INST. 2: 8: 13.
® C.R. LII, 262. "Angelos si quis adoret loco Dei, vel arcanum aliud
numen stulte imaginetur, hac lege reum teneri nul'lus negabit."
^
"Pure bonte et gratuite" - in the Sermons (C.R. LIV, 383).
248
from which they might learn to serve Him". The people of God admit
His power and authority to command.1
Calvin saw in the Decalogue a more than individual reference.
Even in the first table, in the first commandment indeed, he discusses
the status of minister and magistrate in the divine administration.
"Afterwards Moses remembered that God would govern His church by the
hand and work of men in such a way as that nothing should be taken away
2
from Himself". Thus "we see . . . that pastors have been created from
the beginning, not in order that they might themselves have dominion,
or make the church obedient to their own plans, but rather in order
to be instruments of the Holy Spirit."3 Magistrates hold a similar
position under God. It is true that God's truth needs no external
support and magistrates are not to condescend to the Law of God. "It
4
pleases God" to command the use of the sword, and therefore He permits
the existence of a magisterial office. Certainly the office is
accorded dignity and is defended against mistaken piety that argues the
Christian repudiation of the sword; but the place to which it is
restored is a strictly subordinate one. The office that first exer-
5
cised tyranny over the true faith now "kisses the Son". God
accepts /
1 INST., 2: 8: 14.
^ C. R. LII, 274. Yidemus ergo creatos ab initio fuisse pastores, non tt
dominarentus ipsi, v©l suis commentis ecclesiam subiicerent; sed
tantum ut spiritus sancti essent organa".
3 Cf. Sermons: of magistrates, he says, "... quand il y a des magistrats,
si nous leur sommes rebelles, si nous vous nous eslever contre la
nolice . . .que nous ne faisons point outrage aux creatures: ma is que
e 'est Dieu qui est assailli par nous," (C.r. LlV, 317). Of the
preaching office he says "(quand) la parolle de Dieu nous so it pre.schee
par les hommes" it is "ainsi que si nous voyons sa maieste face a
face" (ibid.,400)
^ C.R. LII, 356-7.
5 PSALM II.
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accepts the obeisance and permits the dedication of political power for
the welfare of the Christian state. But the function of magistracy is
strictly useful. The argument that Calvin puts forward is that one
would not expect the magistrate to suffer drunkenness, fornication or
petty theft or sordid murder, and why therefore should one expect him
to suffer contempt of the Church?-'- This is an interpretation of the
civil magistracy as strictly administrative body. It denies the idea
of any "divine right of kings" to legislate. The church is the keeper
of the public conscience, the court in which the Holy Spirit may be
thought to move. Thus in a theocracy any new idea - that is any idea
not strictly deducible from the premises of the declared Law - would
require a first sanction from the court of the church.2
The first commandment is thus given a functional relationship to
the remaining commandments. It lay down the principle that they are
not to be "abrogated by contempt" either from within or without the
Church. From within there is the sanction of membership. Baptism3 - the
4
symbol of membership - and excommunication- the sytbol cf exclusion - provide
the /
1 C.R. LII, 356 "Quid autem mirum si magistratus ubet Deus esse gloriae
suae vindices, qui furta, scortationes, ebrietates, a poena eximi
non vult, nec patitur?" In the same passage is a remark reminiscent
of the Servetus affair. "Caeterum ut praepostera est eorum
severitas qui superstitiones gladio tuentur: ita in politia bene
constitua minime tolerandi sunt profani homines, a quibus religio
convellitur".
2 The king is to be found in the Church so that he will maintain purity
or worship not only as a policy, but from conviction. Ibid, 369>
"En, cur Deus passus non fuerit aliunde peti regem quam ipsofoveret
ecclesiae sinu; ut purum culture quern a pueritia imbiberat, foberet
ac tueretur." So also Nobbs op. cit., pp. 1+: 26-7. What is true
of kingship is true also of "political" laws. They exist not only
to promote mutual equity but also the veneration of God, C.R. LII,
35k- Thus civil discipline requires constant reference to the
church courts. Ibid., 371.
Harmony, C.R. LII, 257 • • • nobis omnibus est baptismus, quo
communiter inserimus in Corpus Christi, singulis tamen suus
h baptismus confertus, etc. . .
Ibid., 320 - Et certe huicticaerimoniae respondet excumminicatio, qua
purgatur ecclesia ..." It is noteworthy that an emphasis is
laid here upon individual responsibility of Christians.
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the limits of the moral separation of God's Israel from the world. But
there is also the problem of enemies without, "certain impious despisers
who regard it as the shortest method, to hold all religious observance
1
in derision". No doubt Calvin was thinking of the Libertines, for
even Calvin's Geneva was not an absolute theocracy in the sense of having
absorbed all opposition. Calvin knew political eclipse. He also
knew the presence of religious apathy and secret opposition. We are
to beware of "superstition" he says, and there is evidence that super¬
stition took the form not only of secret allegiance to Rome but also of
2
positive idolatry and witchcraft. His theocracy had not yet become the
tidy unity of church and state he would have liked. Nevertheless Calvin
offers a description of the city of God as he deduced it from the Word
x
of God;-^ and he did not intend it to be an "ideal" city an
impractical idea like Eden but rather a pattern as yet unattained but
attainable.
The basis of Calvin's practical hopes was the place of the individual
in the system. The visible church was the body of individuals. The
k
preacher addressed individuals and sought to bring them into conformity
fey /
1
INST. 2: 8: 16.
2
Annales C.R. XLIX: 208: 333-4• The second and third Sermons of the
1562 edition treat this matter, e.g. C.R. LIV 252: 258 refers
to pagan superstition. The superstition of the Papacy is a more
culpable error, at least from the hierarchical side.
^
The Word of God is not here simply equivalent to Scripture: it
includes public consent and the suffrages of the people (" . . .
religio non tantum publico consensu et hominum suffragiis
recepta . . .") as well as indisputable proofs ("indubiis testimoniis")
C.R. LII 356. Cf. p. 36O ". . . acquiescendum esse in veritate
cognita, ut clausae sint aureo diversis omnibus figmentis."
^
Ibid. 355. ". . Iam, quid non sufficeret semel esse scripta lege
edoctos de probo Dei cultu, nisi quotidiana praedicatio, diverte
instruit Deus suos autoritate."
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"by their consent. The court of the church was based upon individual
suffrage, as were also the offices of ministry and magistracy."^" The
real power of the Christian state thus rested upon the "faith" of the
individual, his sense of responsibility to his Creator. Calvin developed
the implications of this relationship in his insistence that the
individual must be prepared to give evidence of wrong-doing known to
him, and that in the case of any concerted anti-social activity the ring¬
leader must be sought out and held responsible. In short government
was strictly by consent and no one was to be judged except by principles
acknowledged to be just. The priests, Calvin says, were not enjoined
to pass judgment except upon "manifest symptoms" of uncleanness. ^or is
anyone to be convicted except acccr ding to the"plain Word of God. "2
Consent depends upon incentive. Calvin's state was not "ideal"
in the sense of being divorced from practical advantage. It was not
only a "good" state, it was also a "right" state - that is a state
directed towards the best interests of the community. Calvin does not
ignore the phrase "that thy days may be prolonged in the land which the
Lord /
Doumergu^ V esp. p. 102, gives details of election.
Ordonnances tc.R. XXXVIII a 17 ff discusses the institution, which is
to be according to the primitive order (leglise ancienne) i.e. accord¬
ing to Scripture. The matter is discussed first by brother mini¬
sters, then by the Council, and finally presented to the people (la
compagne de fidelles). This mainly unchanged procedure received
longer treatment in the 1561 "Ordonnances" (ibid. 94 ff). Individual
suffrage for the magistracy applied of course only to citizens: and
the refugee element - including Calvin himself - were thus not
eligible to vote.
2 Ibid., 320. "ifegue enirn de mor.bjcs occulto sacerdotes voluit Deus
cognoscere, sed postquam manifesta indicia emerserant". The
Christian analogy is excommunication, which, however, is to be
administered justly, which presumably means "manifesto Dei verbo-... .
ne suo arbitrio iudicent homines." (Ibid. 357)•
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Lord thy God giveth thee".-*- God offers prosperity to those obedient to
Him and threatens those who disobey Him. ^ Obedience to God is thus not
disinterested in the sense that God requires us simply to bolster up His
authority. God is demanding this obedience of us for our own good.
For Himself He can do without us. His calling is free,^ as His bounty
is undeserved. The right response of man therefore, whether in prosperity
or in adversity, is humility and gratitude; and it is according to the
degree of these qualities that Calvin judges institutions and religious
endeavour, whether allegedly Christian or openly pagan.
In the second commandment Calvin finds a description of the worship
of God's Own appointment.^ The destruction of images was an outward
expression of the fundamental revision of worship and practice that was to bg
introduced. In the "Harmony" Calvin examines at great length the
tabernacle, the sacrifice and the priesthood as they are described in
the Pentateuch. He acknowledges the vastness of the subject and the
possibility of fanciful interpretation but nevertheless expects to find
5the principles of the right ministry.. Rather quaintly he discusses the
ideal of centralised worship in Jerusalem as being without advantage for
all the expense and trouble caused both to offerants and to Revites, but
the principle of the levitical right to tithes is established, and at the
same /
1 DEUT. V, 16.
2 E.g. with dearth* so C.R. LII, 339.
3 Ibid., ^1*1 j "... gratuita vocatione Dei, ccuius est omnia creare ex
niailo. Compare the fifteenth sermon in the 1562 series,
(particularly C.R. LIV, i+18-9 which quote the text DEUT. V,^ 10). It
ends, "Car en ce monde Dieu nous veut faire sentir sa bonte, afin
d'estre attereg- plus haut etc." That is, earthly prosperity is
closely related to spiritual favour.
^ Harmony (C.R. LII, 391) cf.INST. 2: 8: 17.
5 Ibid., 395 : also 326 concerning the cleansing of lepers.
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same time the horror of schism is set forth. The ceremonies of the
tabernacle themselves he excuses on the ground, that God laid down these
in order that His people might "be kept from something worse if they
should turn their eyes to their pagan neighbours, but they are not
without symbolical meaning."'" The candle-sticks, for example, indicate
that we require the illumination of God's presence to understand our
ways aright.2
Under the same typology he describes-"* the levitical priest as an
expression of the true mediation that was to be shown forth in Christ, ^
but he emphasises that they were strictly subordinate officers. The
Popish deduction of priesthood is thus quite wrong, for this reason, that
the levitical priesthood was strictly subject to the divine choice and
not to any human mechanics of ordination. But however subject the
priests were charged to show forth the highest piety to the people,^
and it was in this function that they might be said to differ from the
laity. Calvin mentions several points of this special piety. The
priest was not allowed to mourn, for example, because he was to be so
devoted to God's Will as to exercise a perfect resignation. Again in
private life and particularly in the execution of his office the priest
was to be a model cf modest bearing, not ambitious and yet not backward
in rebuking such as were bringing destruction upon themselves by their
wickedhess /
1 Ibid., 1+03 tt.
2 ibid. , 1+09. Nisi enim nobis praeluceat coelestis doctrina, nihil praeter
meram vanitatem pariet sensus noster.
3 Ibid., 2+21|- ff.
^ Ibid. , l]l[/| ff. . . quicumque creantur hoaie ministri et pastores
ecclesiae, Christo tradi quasi sub manum; ne quid sibi imperii usur-
pent, sed modeste se gerant, tanquam rationem reddituri coram ipso,
qui princeps est pastorum . . . quid eripitus Christo quod suum
est, si alius quispiam fingitur successor Aharon."
^ Ibid. . Uh8. The high priest was forbidden mourning, the others with cer¬
tain restrictions! There is a striking comment upon this requirement
from Calvin's own bereavement of son ana wife. (Reyburn op. cit., p. Hp)
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wickedness. The priest was not to be an ascetic but both in his tablel¬
and in his marriage^ he was to be discreet, so that an example of decency
should be maintained before God's people by God's visible servant. And
for this service the people of G-od are responsible to God for the mainten¬
ance; ^ in other words the priest must devote his whole life to the
adminl strati on of his duty, and the people for whom it is administered
owe to God the duty of maintaining the officiating servant.4 Calvin adds
that tithes ought to be paid for the local administration, not, as in
papal administration, to some distant exchequer.5
Of sacrifice, Calvin says it is a sort of natural law. The motive^
to make sacrifice itself is a condemnation of those who make the wrong
sacrifice, that is the sacrifice that is not based upon the Word of God.
"The true seasoning which gives grace to sacrifice is found nowhere ex¬
cept in God's Word"Lacking knowledge and obedience of God's Word,
the offerant falls into the error of believing his sacrifice to be in
itself or through the person of the priest, efficacious. This is the
supreme error of popery. There is a distinction, Calvin says, between
such /
1 I "bid., 452, 454-
2 Ibid., 454.
^ Ibid., 461 •
4 At the same time he denies that the dictates of Holy Scripture should
be honfined to the clergy. It concerns the common people, and one
of the errors of Rome is the allegation of two spiritual classes - C.R.
LIV, 385.
5 LII, 480-1.
Ibid.., 489. "Mos sacrificandl semper in usu fuit apud omnes gentes . . .
Tt was suggested "arcano spiritus Dei instlnctu", ibid., 418 but
"nescivit tota gentilitas cuo Deum sanguine placari opus esset" . . .
"unde colligimus, reprobatos fuisse omnes gentium cultus, quoniam in
Deo verbo fundati non erant." "Tantum hoc fixum maneat, ipso more
sacrificehdi.., quamvis adulterino, convictas fuisse propriae indlgnita-
tis, est agnoscere deberent, humano generi non allter propritlum esse
Deum quam reconciliations lnterposita. " This view is stated also in
INST 2: 7: 1
7 Ibid Rll. "Perro vera conditura, quae, gratiam sacriflcils concillet,
-WsquaiT reperitur mos inTDei verbo."
255
such an error and separating the priest "by dress and discipline from
others; "he who is the mediator "between God and men should "be free from
all impurity and stain; and since no mortal could truly supply this, a
type was substituted in place of the reality, from whence "believers might
learn that another Mediator was to he expected; hence the dignity of the
sons of Aaron was only typical, and not true and substantial"."1" Calvin
draws here a "high" doctrine of the ministry as an office without allowing
any special privilege to the individual.2 It is the Spirit that anoints
to the calling of sacrifice; the ordinary person brings the sacrifice
and yet does not actually make the offering. The priest takes the
bullock but catches the blood in order to symbolise that "now, the blood
of Christ appears before His (God's) face."3 The priest is an
"instrument" of God.^
As a "civil supplement" to the law Calvin develop^s the theme "in
the world but not of it". "As long as we live among unbelievers, we
cannot escape those dealings with them which relate to the ordinary
affairs of life; but if we approach nearer, so that a greater intimacy
should arise, we open the door as it were to Satan".^ The Israelites
were /
1 Ibid., 501, "qui enim mediator est Dei et hominum, omni sorde et macula
purum esse oportet", etc.
2 Ibid.. 525. This passage is comparable with INST, k: 3: 5 ff. Calvin's
point is the refutation of the Roman "diabolicum figmentum de
satisfactionibus" ( ibid., 528).
^ -'-'bid., 507-8. "Neque enim private homini permittitur manibus suis
immolare ipsam victimam" . . . "Neque enim aliunde sacrificandi
dignitas quam ex gratia spiritus, cuius pignus (i.e. priestly calling)
erat externa unetio". Cf. p. 325. "Non potest ergo absolvere Dei
minister nisi quern ante Deus absolverit . . . secundas partes sustin^t
minister."
k Like the prophet. Calvin constantly refers in the Sermons to the
utterance of God "par la bouche" of ^oses, prophets, or modern preacher.
5 Ibid. 5U9. "Quamdiu versamur inter incredulos, comrnercia quae ad
communem vitam spectant effigere non possumus: verum si proprius
accedimus, ut inde oriatur maior familiaritas, ianuam quodammodo
aperimus Satanae".
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were commanded to smite the Amelekites, their distant kinsmen, not from
mere vindictiveness, hut to punish the sins even of personal relations
with "the same severity as those of other nations","'' God's people
represented God's justice on earth, and were charged to administer it
with their own hands. ^ They were not to seek refuge from wickedness
simply by withdrawing themselves from it, but were to be active crusaders.
At the same time they were by implication permitted to enjoy neutral
relationships with the wicked. This is a doctrine which could be misused
as an apologetic, for so-called "Puritan" capitalism or imperial crusade.
Hiebuhr remarks upon it in his "Children of Light and Children of
Darkness",^ an(g_ -j^g remark may be taken up here although strictly it
refers to property. After discussing the original communism of the
Church and the acceptance of the idea of private property which was forced
upon the medieval church "as either the requirement of natural law or as
an inevitable supplement of positive law," he goes on to say, "It remained,
however, for orthodox Protestantism, particularly Calvinism, to accept
property distinction without scruple or distinction." Quoting a sermon
of Calvin's,^- he points out that the emphasis was not so much upon the
virtue of gaining property as upon the Divine Will that it should be
owned. This emphasis may lead to humility and doubtless Calvin intended
that /
Ibid., 55bf "ut eodem poena rigore persequantur scelera Amelec, que
aTiorum gentium."
2 Ibid. , 557 ff.
J (London 19U5) PP« 66 ff.
^ DEUT. VIII, lU-20 - C,S. LIV, 627. "Que les autres soyent riches devant
que d'estre nais . . . neantmoins que cela n'est point de cas forticit;
mais que la providence de Dieu domine pas dessus".
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ohat it should, since he says also that God permits rich and poor so
that vie may have occasion to do good. But, as Niebuhr points out, the
reference of riches to an act of Providence is less attractive than a
"blunt pride in one's earnings. It leads, he says, to "the hypocrisies
of "bourgeois and plutocratic idealism in which charity "became a screen
for injustice."
The charge against Calvinism can scarcely be rebutted. But it
does not fall in the same damaging way upon Calvin himself. In the
"Institutes" he refers finally to the "threatenings" of God that are
attached to this commandment.^ Rather unexpectedly, they are couched
in the analogy of marriage and family life. One would have thought
Calvin would have avoided, this analogy as savouring too much of humanism.
There is, however, the same emphasis upon the imtimacy of the believer
and his God as the priest exhibits when he kisses the Altar during the
Mass. Calvin's deduction is not, of course, the mystical one. His
emphasis is upon the husband's disciplinary treatment of the wife. In
short, if God provides the believe?with "pin-money", He is also very
near at hand with His threatening Hand, in sickness, misfortune, and
death. Perhaps the danger of later Calvinism was its development
away from this aspect of human circumstances. The money became more
secure, in short, and the danger of its loss becoming less, the charitable
conditions of its use became detached from the reality of religious
duty.
The third commandment is almost self-explanatory. We are not to
think anything that is not "fitted to extol the greatness of His
sacred /
1
INST., 2: 8: 18.
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sacred Name." In particular we are to avoid the utterance of
"blasphemy, the "perversion of His adorable mysteries to purposes of
h
ambition" the throwing "of obloquy upon His works". Blasphemy however
was not simply a matter of bad taste in a Calvinist society, because the
taking of oaths was itself a sincere invocation of God. A comment has
been made upon modern treaties that they are no longer more than
''political" that is to say, opportunist, mere statements of de facto
relationships without any expectation of honourable fulfilment.2
Calvin discusses under the heading of this commandment the making and
fulfilling of vows such as the monastic vows or vows of pilgrimage. •
Their error is not as much in the vow as in the mistaken intention.
The monastic vow, for example, involves denial of equally binding
obedience to serve God in the family and in the world. The vow of
pilgrimage is " a marvellous faScination of the devil"^" since Christ
has laid down the principle of true worship in spirit and in truth.
Moreover the oath, used perversely, could be a real invocation of the
dark powers; it could be employed "for nefarious purposes" such as
"necromancy, cursing, illicit exorcism, and other impious incantations.^
There was a place for oaths, however. "An oath ... is a call¬
ing God to witness that what we say is true", and is therefore a
6
profession of religion" Thus only upon "necessary occasions" could
the /
1 INST., 2: 8: 22. The fourth Sermon in the 1562 edition deals mainly
with this question of "mocquerie". One aspect of mocquerie is
the discussion of holy matters in taverns.' (C.R. LIV, 281-2)
2 For Calvin, a covenant between men amounted to a sacred engagement. i
C.R. LII, 563. See Note 13 for an analysis of the modern politi¬
cal situation by F. M. Van Asbeck. -j
3 Ibid.., 56k ff.
k Ibid.. 569. "diaboli fascinatio".
3 INST., 2: 8: 22.
8 INST., 2: 8: 23-U.
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the practice he used, where, for example, "some purpose of religion or
clarity is to be served". Calvin particularly discusses the refusal
of the Anabaptists to take the oath in a Court of Law, and attacks it on
the ground of blasphemy, since such a person suggests that his private
word is sufficient guarantee of divine truth. The objection they
commonly made to oaths was the prohibition of Jesus. Calvin's reply^
is that Jesus Christ is not to be distinguished from the revelation of
Cod in the Old Testament, so that His words cannot be set against the
Law as a "stumbling-block". Since the Law therefore permitted oaths,
the objection of Jesus must have been directed towards some specific
corruption. Calvin finds this corruption in the pharisaic oaths
"which transgressed the rule of the Lav/". This distinction between
those oaths that are permissible, and those that are "vain" - thought¬
less or superfluous, is Calvin's own. On a point of exegesis he
sharply repudiates the argument that we are to swear "not at all".
"The expression applies not to the word swear, but to the subjoined forms
of oaths" such as the habit of swearing by heaven and earth instead of
boldly taking the divine Name itself. The exegesis may be thin, but
the underlying idea is clear. Calvin was prepared to accept the
principle that in private matters a man's v/ord could be his bond - and
therefore he deprecates the taking of private oaths. But in public
life he did not trust Anabaptists. To him they were "des gens quil
tiennent division"2 and their private opinions were not therefore
tolerable /
1 INST., 2: 8: 26-7.
2 The phrase is not directly Calvin's. It occurs in a minute of Council
October 5th, 1537 as a precis of a statement made by'Me' G. Parel
et Cauvin". In a similar minute dated 19th March, 1537, the treat¬
ment of all convicted "Katabaptists" was to be banishment. (C.R.
XLIX, 210). Compare Underwood, op. cit. . p. 2l\ - "the Reformers
S ^rfL^ib§F"ohS?r??tal??Shing less than the instruction of
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tolerable In a state which valued its integrity.
The fourth commandment-'- "stands in peculiar circumstances apart
hVcc
from the others", ^as f°r Christians a significance
\
it cannot have for Jews.2 Nevertheless the sabbath of the Lord's
day still represents a type of spiritual rest from one1s own works
and dependence upon the righteousness of God. It also fulfils in
the Christian dispensation the synagogue function of meditation
upon the divine Law. Finally, it has a humanitarian and social
purpose. The day, Calvin emphasises, is nothing in itself. The
mere reverence of the seventh day belongs to the "ceremonial" Law
which has been abrogated by Christ with the other legal enactments.
But the underlying spiritual duty that initiated the legal expres¬
sions remains to be fulfilled; and this duty belongs to the human
response to the divine summons. The creature owes to his Maker a
£
regular acknowledgment of duty, a regular "resting"3from his own
works and interests as s symbol of his utter dependence upon God,
and thus the sabbath rest is a Christian obligation.
"There is no commandment", Calvin reminds us/ "the observance
of /
1 INST. 2: 8: 28. Harmony C.R. LII, 577. Sermons 5> P« 6.
C.R. LIV, 283 ff.
P / V
"le jour du repos a este une ombre sous la Loy, iusque a la venue
de notre Seigneur Iesus Christ, pour figurer que Dieu demande
que les hommes se reposent du tout de leurs oeuvres propres . . .
qu'il nous faut mortifier ce qui est de nostre nature, si nous
voulons estre conforme "a nostre Dlett (C.R. LIV, 283).
3 This response is not merely passivity". . . ut se exerceant fldeles
in Dei'cultu. "." Harmony, C.R. LII, 576.
4 INST. 2: 8: 29.
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of which, the Almighty more strictly enforces", and yet it is not
a "superstitious observance of days".^ It is not the day that
matters, but the act of rest. Oalvin therefore derides the
pursuit of what can or cannot be called Sabbath work, but on the
other hand pursues the principle of sabbatic rest in unexpected
(
directions. In discussing the sabbatic year of fallow agriculture
he suggests2 that the rotation farming of his own times had done
away with the necessity, provided that human effort should not be
pursued with a view to "intemperance and luxury". He did not
object to technical improvement provided that the main principles
of duty were not transgressed.
The origin of the "Calvinist Sunday" is the conjunction of
this principle of necessary humility with the principle that
"religious meetings are both enjoined ... by the Word of God"3
and in themselves obviously necessary as a means of religious
observance "to retain decency, order and peace in the Church".^
These duties lay upon Christian men as the responsibility cor¬
responding to their rise in spiritual status. When they had been
permitted by the Church to dance round the maypole on a Sunday
afternoon, they had been excluded from the highest privileges of
faith. /
1
id., 2: 8: 31.
2 C.R., LII, 587.
3 INST., .2: 8: 32.
^
Ibid., 2: 8: 33. - ^oumergue, op. cit.. IV, pp. 183 ff. makes the
point that the so-called "Calvinist" Sunday with its emphasis upon
restriction was really the work of Knox and the Puritans.
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faith. Now they had. to "bear their share of the due worship of God.
The servant was free on the Sabbath, not perhaps to go and play
skittles but to take a share in the Church equal to that of his social
superiors. In short, the Sabbath commandment, like the other command¬
ments of the first table, emphasises the fact that the social pattern
under discussion rests upon Christian principles, and thus is bound to
make acknowledgment of its origins and its goal.
(iii) Ihe Second Table of the Law.
Professor Tawney recalls a nineteenth century statesman who
deplored the "interference of religion with private life". This
gentleman was no doubt of the school of Butler who disliked
""enthusiasm" and thought a dignified balance could be reached between
the Will of the Almighty and the enlightened self-interest of His
creatures. Calvin might have shared the dislike of "enthusiasm", but
"self-interest" was of secondary importance to his main theme.
Material prosperity indeed was not eschewed by Calvin. Obedience
to the Will of God brings to His servants the fulfilment of His
gracious promises not only spiritual but physical. Where Calvin
would have differed from the individual of Tawney's reference is in
the assumption that "religion" is an activity quite distinct from
secular action.1 Even in the second table of the Law Calvin insists
that /
1 "Ainsi ddnce £pieul veut esprouver nostre obeissance, et 1'amour
que nous luy pofcons, quand il nous commande de cheminer avec
nos prochains en toute droiture et equity", et que nous vivions
ensemble en telle communion et concorde, qu'un chacun ne soit
point ordonne a soy . . . C.R. LIV, 309.
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that the ultimate authority is of God."'" It is of God even for pagans
although they at "best only dimly perceive His workings; and for
Christians God is paramount in every detail of the established
ordinances. The only difference "between the first and second tables
therefore is that the first concerns worship while the second concerns
secular - ''natural" - activity. Both are part of the necessary
obedience of God's creatures to Himself.
The fifth commandment, to honour parents, derives its authority
from the mere fact that God has so commanded, and not from any advan¬
tages of a secular nature that might accrue.2 Honour to parents can
of course be drawn out to honour of any persons whom God should place
in office over us and Calvin can say that the magistrates are s sort
3of parent in their office. legitimate subjection is thus a Christian
virtue. In the first instance it is of no account whether the person
holding the office is worthy or not of the authority vested in him,
although it is allowed that no man is to be condemned unheard.^"
Here /
O.K.. Lll. 6O5 ff. "Principibus esse obediendum senus ipse naturae
dictat . "Ergo in hoc pracepto, sicut in aliis, Leus per
synecdochen sub una specie complectitus toturn genus, etc." This
manner of argument is the direction of Calvin's idea of "natural"
law. God does not add to His original principle, although He may
explain it by expanding references (ibid. 609) or by a clearer re¬
petition (INST. 2: Q- l) of His Law (not the law of ''nature")
stamped on the human heart, by His written Law. A reference to
pagans as pnder His Law is C. R. LII, 622 "... lex ad exteros
quoque extenditur . . . quia sine exceptione cunctos mortales
creavit ad imaginem suam, ideo in fidem tutelamque suam recepit...
2 The seventh sermon in the 1562 edition discusses this commandment.
C.R. LIV, 309 ff.
3 Ibid., 610.
2+ Ibid. , 608. Even if magistrates are elected by popular vote they are
to be regarded as - qua magistrates - above mere public utility.
Rather public utility - regular government - is itself God's will
for His creatures so that the office of magistrate fits into God's
ultimate Will, (ibid. 610). This is the line that Brunner de¬
velops in his doctrine of "ordinances" of creation and of
preservation.
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Here again Calvin is resting his social theory not upon a human system
"but upon the divine revelation of a divine justice. Parenthood, he
says, is a natural prototype of the divine demand for our obedience,
"but instead of pursuing the analogy he immediately proceeds to discuss
the possible perversion of the ordinance. Such obedience - to both
father and mother - ought to be a step in our ascent to the Supreme
Parent, but if our earthly parents "instigate us to transgress the Law,
they deserve not to be regarded as parents, but as strangers attempting
to seduce us from obedience to our true Father".1 Presumably this
principle could hold in the case of corrupt magistrates also.2 The
final issue is between each one and His God, in the sense at least
that "the system" of "the home" is never to be blamed for my sin.
In dealing with various appendices to this law, Calvin emphasises
the sanction of life and death which were attached to the original law.
It is an interesting question how far Calvin and the Reformers
generally were prepared to obey the commandment of God in administering
the death penalty. There was much controversy on the subject.3
Calvin himself here turns off to a more general reference to the
blessing of long life, which he regards as a gift of God. "The
duration /
1
INST. 2: 8: 36.
^
Legitimate resistance to authority, particularly secular authority,
falls under the section on monarchomachism (pp.301ff).
Resistance to ecclesiastical authority, e. g. to Rome, was
already established upon the Word of God. (See above under
Luther - Chap. Ill Section i .)
3 C.R. LII, 622 ) ,
INST. 2: 8: 39-40) This is the basis, Calvin says, of "equite
that is to say, equity derives from (l) the Will of God and
(2) the principle of sin in our personality. It appears,
therefore, that equity, if equity is to be the natural law for
Calvin, is a negative principle.
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duration of long life", he says,-^"is a proof of the divine bene¬
volence toward us;" not, he hastens to add, "as if in itself it consti-.i
tuted happiness, "but "because it is an ordinary symbol of the divine
favour to the pious. His judgment borders on the pietistic. Like
the judgment upon material wealth, it is open to misconstruction and
even hypocrisy. No doubt the religious man will regard material
wealth and long life as gifts of God, just as he will regard death
as a translation to "a richer and more substantial manifestation" of
God. Life and death, as riches and poverty, are not quite so simply
distributed; and Calvin was realistic enough to perceive that the
righteous might be cut off in their prime, and too often do the un¬
righteous seem miraculously preserved even "in battle or in brawls."
We can only suppose that they "are ^reserved for severer punishment
in the world to come". In the main, however, Calvin rests upon the
O
comfortable doctrine that honesty and piety are the best policy.
The sixth commandment - not to kill - receives in the "Institutes"
the shortest treatment of the ten. Obviously the matter was more
academic in its interest than the others. In the "Harmony" Calvin
finds opportunity for quoting classical authorities rather more than
in his other discussions.^ Medieval civilisation had moulded the
energies /
1 INST., 2: 8: 37.
^ This criticism would not apply to Calvin himself. Happiness for
him was as follows: "... nous voyons, que si nous recevons la
doctrine en humilit^, que nous demandions d'y obeir, que la fin
ne peut estre que heureuse, que nous serons certains de nostre
salut." (C.R. LIV, 411). That is to say, the criticism of Calvin .
himself is not that he was inconsistent but that his religious
certainty was not sufficiently translated in terms of political
and economic facts.
^ The eighth Sermon in the 15^2 edition C.R. LIV, 321 ff.
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energies of the original Teutonic clans into a "natural" horror of
murder. Calvin speaks of the "unity of the whole human race"-'- and
of man in general as "both the image of God and our flesh" possessing
a right to his life and person.2 The Christian emphasis is thus the
"extra mile" of not only abstaining from murder but positively of
doing "what in us lies to defend the life of our neighbour, to promote
whatsoever tends to his tranquility, to be vigilant in warding off
harm, and when danger comes, to assist in removing it."-' The roots
of the command lie deeper. Wrath itself is to be condemned, hatred
that is, which lacls opportunity of directing any particular action but
which causes secret rejoicing at misfortune in the person hated.
"However you may disguise the fact", he says, "where either wrath or
hatred is, there is an inclination to do mischief'4
Calvin draws out practical deductions from this rather conventional
statement. For example, he infers that "if the safety of the body is
so carefully provided for, how much care and exertion is due to the
safety of the soul, which is of immeasurably higher value in the sight
of God.One deduction that could be drawn from this comparison
is the spiritual exhortation to attend to things of the soul, but
another is the right of the Christian state to direct and perhaps even
pHmp
liquidate spiritual This argument was the justification of
the /
1 INST., 2: 8: 39. "hominun genus unitate".
"imago Kei est homo, et caro nostra".
2
INST., 2: 8: 1+0. The same principle occurs in the Sermons. "
quand au parle des hommes, il y a quelque communaute esgale:
car nous sommes tous descendus de la race d'Adam: nous sommes
d'une mesme nature: tout cela emporte, que les hornmes sont pareils".
C.N. LIV, 321. See also Note on "image1 .
3 INST., 2: 8: 39.
^ Ibid.
3 INST., 2: 8: 1+0. See also above, p. 159 and reference in the
"Harmony".
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the Inquisition, and it is the argument that Banner deplores as
having been steadily reduced in its final authority from God to
Hature and from the anaemic Nature of naturalism to the cynical
authority of nationalism. Thus in order to preserve the soul of a
pure Aryan "A" it might become justifiable to dispose of non-Aryans
"B" to "Z".
On this fundamental issue Calvin does not offer any leading.
Inside the accepted state he developes the many applications of the
right of the individual to protection and just retribution."'' He
enlarges upon the security of person against all bodily harm, includ¬
ing the danger of abortion to the unborn, and the danger of unjust
or excessive punishment for a proved crime. He even refers to the
rights of dumb nature to humane treatment at the hands of Christians.
But he does not supply a satisfactory deduction on the subject of war.
On the phrase in DEUTERONOMY 20, v. 12 - "if he will make no peace" -
Calvin can only say that the permission sounds unjust according to
classical law, and can only be explained either in terms of a permis¬
sion granted to the hard-hearted Jews., or else of a direct fulfilment
of God's vengeance upon certain tribes. This is perhaps the weak¬
est point of the exposition, marking off Calvin as an accepter of the
sword for the settlement of human differences and as the means of ful¬
filling national destinies. Perhaps Tawney is however too unjust in
sneering at the folly which, having at last reached economic prosperity,
cast /
1 C.R. LII. The same development occurs in the Sermon. Calvin
defends civil laws, "... afin que'on se gouveme quant a la police
exterieure seulement, que personne no soit outrage, qu'un chacun





cast it away in wars of religion. We are doing the same ourselves and
have not yet found security for peace.
In the seventh commandment - not to commit adultery - Calvin
O
passes from the abuse of marriage to its institution. In the
"Harmony" he is content to enumerate the various forms of abuse that
are mentioned in the Pentateuch, and to establish the principles of
modesty in body, mind and dress. In particular he supports the
degrees of affinity which are laid down and which Calvin alleges it is
one of the pope's prime offences to set aside in order to make himself
"a fat game-bag".^ Of divorce he says briefly that it may have been
"granted in indulgence to the Jews, yet Christ pronounces that it was
never in accordance with the Law, because it is directly repugnant to
the first institution of God,"^4" namely the family. Marriage is thus
a natural law; that is to say a law of nature as God ordained nature.5
In the'Institutes'^ Calvin pursues a slightly different line. Like
Paul he lays down the principle that "chastity and purity" are basic





The ninth Sermon in the 1562 edition, C.R. LIV 33k ff.
3
ibid 665,"Caeterum hinc perspicitur diabolica papae superbia, qui
novos excogitando propinquitatis gradus, supra Deum sapere voluit.
Astutia quoque eius se prodit, quod ex hoc genere aucupii uberem
fecit quaestum."
^ ibid. 657.
^ ibid. "Vulgo dicitur, iura naturae insolubilia esse; atque semel
pronunciavit Leus ..."
6
INST. 2: 8: 1+1-2.
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virtue not to "be despised". Of marriage he says it is necessary
"because of "natural feeling and the passions inflamed "by the Pall".1
"As the law under which man was created was not to lead a life of
solitude, "but enjoy a help meet for him, and ever since he fell under
the curse the necessity for this mode of life is increased; the Lord
O
made the requisite provision for us ... "
Marriage on this showing is a permission rather than an ordination,
a prevention of sin rather than a return to innocence. One feels that
Calvin would have preferred the Pauline injunction to virginity had
virginity not acquired a spurious virtue "by its association with
priesthood.3 For exactly the same reason, namely the claim of the
pope to make and unmake marriages, Calvin is chary of divorce, and it
is laid down in the "OrdQnnances" that marriages must he maintained
even at the cost of some trouble on the part of the authorities.^-
The question is still too far from resolution for judgment to he passed
upon Calvin. He did not think of marriages as ms.de in heaven in the
sense that they might have heen in Eden; in other words he would not
have supported the idea of marriage as an ordinance of nature, because
human marriage itself in its greatest purity is a sign of our human
sin.3 At the same time marriage, if an expedient, is not simply a
human /
1 Hid- Cf. C.R. LIV, 3li-2. " . . . il y a le remede de mariage pour
ceux qui ne peuvent abstenir."
2 Ibid.
3 At the end of the Sermon he says the Pauline injunction emphasises the
freedom of widows, etc. to serve God. Pc.E. LIV, 3245-6J His
emphasis, however, is that in marriage we serve God with body as
well as v/ith soul.
L!"
C-:E. XXXVIII a 2+2 ff. The Council worked in close conjunction with
the Consistory in these matters.
3 "La couverfure du Mariage est pour sanctifier ce qui est pollu et
prophane". £_C.P. LIV, 3h^J •
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human expedient; it is of God and thus must be entered advisedly.^"
"Purity and chastity" is God's command for us, and marriage is a means in
present circumstances to that end; and of course, even in the marriage
chamber there must be "dignity and temperance".^
Calvin's shortness on the subject of divorce can be traced to his
interpretation of the term.3 The "bill of divorcement"4 mentioned by
Moses was given at the mere pleasure of the husband. The repudiation of
divorce is thus an expression, often repeated, of the rights of the
individual person, particularly women, to consideration as persons. In
the Old Testament there was no case of divorce on the grounds of adultery,3
because adultery was a criminal offence, the punishment of which was
death. The spouse of an adulterous person would in the course of law
become widowed, and thus free to marry.3 If a case for divorce is to be
built therefore it would have to be upon the emphasis which is given to
the individual woman who is to be protected against flippancy* Bucer
developed this argument on the grounds that the Church laid down as a
7
sacrament what was a contract made directly under God. Calvin, however,
does /
* INST. 2: 8: 45. "puritatem . . . et pudicitiam a nobis requirit."
2 INST. 2: 8: 44 " . . . sic agentes (the Christian man and wife) ne quid
omnino indignum honestate ac temperantia matrimonii admittant."
3 C.R. LII, 657 - 8.
4 DEUT. XXIV, 1, 3 : ST. MARK X, 4 and parallels.
3 LEV. XX,10. The question arises how far the orophetic references to
adultery were to spiritual adultery, to ritual adultery, to a disre¬
gard of the Law, or to a loose use of the term to include fornication
- in general.
° Calvin argued that the dismissal by Christ of the adultress - like His
refusal to be made king, was part of His own office as Redeemer.
Adultery cannot be forgiven by men and it is ridiculous for those
"divinitus gladio . . . armati ad punienda scelera" to deny this power
or its responsibility. C.R. LII, 649.
7 But even for Bucer adultery was a capital offence.
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does not consider that a woman even if caught in the toils of a tyrannous
husband, should be allowed her freedom to re-msrry. "There was no means
for her release" he says, because "it was neither just nor right to over¬
throw God's earliest institution"."'"
It is significant that in the eighth commandment - concerning prop¬
erty - Calvin uses the very term which he seems to withhold in discussing
marriage, "Injustice being an abomination to God, we must render to every
2
man his due". Marriage was not a contract involving justice so much
as an institution of God; it concerned therefore the honour of God more
than the rights of man and woman. As he states the problem it is almost
part of the first rather than of the second table. But he brings into
the consideration of contract an instance of sexual relationship, namely
the position of the woman captured in war, dishonoured but not married.
On the principle of none defrauding another she is to go free, "for
although chastity is a special treasure, yet liberty . . . was no trifling
consolation". The example may not be typical enough to build an entire
case upon it, but it is an admission that the woman has interests that
may be different from that of her relationship to man; and this is the
basis /
C.R. LII, 657 "nulla eius liberapdae, esset ratio". He does emphasise,
however, "la foy et la loyaute mutuelle qui doit estre entre le mari
et la femme," which derives from the worth of persons in God's sight.
That is, Calvin raises the status of woman in the marriage bond. The
practical end of his strictures on divorce is to protect her. - C.R.
LIV, 536.
2 INST. 2: 8: 45. It seems almost as if Calvin thought off the relation¬
ship between human personalities as one kind of "equite"' - i.e. equal
as the image of God and equal as under sin, and the mutual relation¬
ships to property as another. Of the first born's rights, he says
they are inviolable since to arrogate the right away (except for a
recognised misdeed) is to take to oneself the right of creation.
(C.R. LII, 709).
3 C.R. LII, 709 "libertas tamren. . . . solatii non vulgaris loco fuit."
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"basis of any justification of divorce.
In the main argument Calvin discloses his affinity to commercial
interests. At a stroke he states the case for private enterprise. "In
substance . . . the commandment forbids us to long after other men's
goods, and accordingly, requires every man to exert himself honestly in
preserving his own".'*' Calvin emphasises the Biblical requirement of
mercy and the most scrupulous honesty in the conduct of business. Theft
can be spiritual as well as material, and can be directed against man.
Prosperity, on the other hand, cannot rightly be sought by the individual
at the expense of the body politic. "Since all men are born for the
sake of each other, human society is not properly maintained, except by
p
an interchange of good offices". But a man has certain rights which
no other person can withhold. For example, the right of primogeniture
cannot be set aside by the father unless he "arrogates to himself the
ability to create", which belongs to God slone.3 Then the purchaser of
a new house has the right to enjoy it even at the cost to the nation of
his absence in war.4 Finally, a man has the right to be succeeded by
children.5
It is in the question of usury, however, that Cslvin states the case
for /
INST. 2: 8: 45. In the Sermons - number ten in the 1562 edition -
he uses the phrase "equite naturelle" - C.R. LIV, 349.
2 C.R. LI I,, 679. "... omnes hominum causa genitl sint, non recte
coli vitae communitatem, nisi inter se officia conferant."
® C.R. LII, 679. Calvin says this view was held also by "profani
scriptores" but is not a full statement of the Divine Will, which is ..
not a negation but an assertion "pars enim institiae est liberalitas".
Later on, Calvin says further - in connection with the quadruple re¬
payment of stolen goods - that though it may seem burdensome, "what
God awards, a man has the best of rights to". Ibid., 690.
Lbid ., 710.
5 IMd • > 712-
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for the individual best; not however that he is a willing advocate. "I
should indeed he unwilling to take usury under ray patronage, and I wish
the name itself were banished from the world; but I do not dare to pro¬
nounce upon so important a point more than God's words convey".'1' The
authority to which in fact he does appeal is rather the "law of equity".
Basically usury is justified on the necessity of business. It is thus
forbidden between rich and poor, and forbidden as a trade; it is allowed
between rich man and rich man.2
Behind Calvin's discussion of usury lies the whole economic movement
of the age in which he lived. During the fifteenth century the old
encircled Europe was gathering its powers to break out of its prison.
"The Discoveries", says Professor Tawney,^ "were neither a happy accident
nor the fruit of the disinterested curiosity of science. They were the
climax of almost a century of patient economic effort. They were as
practical in their motive as the steam engine"; as practical, as material
or as selfish. The thirst for gold, for example, could not be satisfied
by the exploitation of the Tyrol projects; Portugal and Spain ranged
South, east and west, to find ways round the Turkish net to the alleged
riches of the east; and when they found other sources of bullion, the
less favoured states preyed upon their lines of trade. Meantime, at the
other /
1 Ibid. , 682-3. "Nolim quidem meo patrociniousuras fovere, atque utinam
nomen ipsum abolitum esset e mundo: sed non audeo de re magni momentl
plus pronunciare quam Dei verba sonant."
2 In the Sermon, he says, speaking of fraud, "Mais tant y a qu'il appert
par cest acte, que nous n'avons nulle charite, que nous sommes comme
bestes sauvages: que bref nous ne sommes pas dignes d'estre reputez
hommes." C.R. LIV, 351. Usury outside the limits he laid down was
a kind of fraud.
Op, cit., 76.
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other extremity of society, the same ruthless spirit of enterprise
prevailed.^ "It was not the lords of great estates, but eager and
prosperous peasants who in England first nibbled at commons and undermined
the manorial system ... It was not great capitalists, but enterprising
guildsmen who began to make the control of the fraternity the basis of
plutocratic extortion, or who fled, precocious individualists, from the
fellowship of borough end craft, that they might grow to what stature
they pleased in rural isolation". The Reformation accompanied and
perhaps accommodated the new capitalism, but did not create it.
Q
The issue was particularly acute in Geneva. "Credit was an issue
of moment at Geneva, nor merely for the same reasons that made it a
burning question everywhere to the small producer of the sixteenth
century, but because especially after the fall of Lyons in the French
wars of religion the city was a financial centre of some importance".
For political reasons also Geneva was interested in credit. Flaced as
she was almost in France, and yet looking to the Swiss way of life, she
was threatened constantly by wars designed to engulf her. Thus she
borrowed money from her Protestant neighbours, Basel and Berne, for
example. This money was regarded by the lenders as a loan to be repaid,
not as an investment against foreign encroachment of the cantons; thus
Geneva had to administer it as a public debt. The city council redis¬
tributed it by advances to or exchange business with, private individuals
at a fixed rate of interest, first 10% and later 12%. The ministers
of /
■ ■■ '
- . ■ -




of the city raised no objection to this method of directing privately
owned means into the public cause; what they did lay down was the
distinction between those who put their money to merchants for the purpose
of merchandise and those who simply wanted to raise ready cash, whether
because of poverty, extravagance or ambitious speculation. The Reform
movement as such was set against all forms of irresponsibility, whether
the professional beggary that had thrived upon medieval charity or the
speculation of the professional lender who could afford to hold merchandise
and cash till the price should suit their choice.
The problem for this study is not Calvin's standing as an economist,
but his ability to rest this doctrine of money trading upon the Law which
he admits repudiates the principle of usury. He goes back to the
principle of Divine distribution. "What each individual possesses has
not fallen to him by chance, but by the distribution of the sovereign
Lord of all".'1" Thus on the one hand theft is a crime against God as well
as man, since it violates the divine distribution; but "perversion to
bad purpose" of one's own goods is equally fraud against the divine
dispensation. Calvin as an economist, Tawney thinks, would have
preferred a "collectivist dictatorship" to purely individualist system;
in religious terms, Calvin regarded each one as a steward of God's gifts.
Christian statesmanship is thus to be based not upon a distinction of
classes, the one professing poverty as a holy virtue, the other permitted
to /
1 INST. 2: 8: 45. "Sic enim cogitandum est unicuique evenisse quod
possidet, non fortuita sorte, sed ex distributione summi rerum
omnium Domini: non posse igitur praeverti malis artibus facultstes
cuiuspiam, quin fraus divinse despensationi fiat."
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to amass wealth by all permitted means; the distinction was to be
between those who were granted and those who were not granted stewardship
of material wealth. All were subject to sumptuary laws designed to
limit expenditure along undesirable lines, and at the same time all were
encouraged to practise such gifts as were given them. Only in the last
place was charity - in the sense of direct subsidy, to be given. The
resulting pattern of society stressed economic independence, at least
of help from strangers. Perhaps it was rather harsh upon poverty,
casting upon it the stigma of crime rather than the pity of misfortune;
but the fact that such a stigma did attach points to the fact that in
this kind of society reasonable energy did achieve reasonable reward.
The fundamental law which Calvin stresses is thus that of "equity"
in the stewardship of property as in the stewardship of marriage or the
stewardship of life itself. When he is accused of setting aside the
judicial expression of the law in its Jewish code, it ought not to be
forgotten that he set aside also Old Testament instances of marriage, for
example bigamy and divorce, and instances of slaughter, for example, the
liquidation of the Amelekites, as particular expressions of God's Will
for His particular people, not to be repeated in Christian society. But
they are abrogated not so much by the new revelation in Christ as merely
by the change of circumstances of God's new people.1 The basis of their
authority is thus to be' sought not in another general law such as
"natural" law, but in the further manifestation of God's Holy Spirit to
His /
1 "Although the political laws of Moses are not now in operation, "yet
certain analogies remain" lest the condition of those who have been
redeemed by Christ's blood should be worse among us, than that of old
of His ancient people." C.R. LIT, 704.
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Hie people. In other words, the Decalogue is a "body of principle of
which not all the expressions even in Scripture are applicable to the
new Israel. The ceremonial is altogether relevant to salvation but
is fulfilled and thus abrogated in use, in Christ. The judicial
expression is abrogated in a different way, namely, by the change of
circumstance, and thus by the permission of the Holy Spirit. God's Law
remains a divine principle of conduct, but He may direct in particular
instances different details of obedience.
The last two commandments - not to bear false viiitness and not to
covet - for practical reasons may be discussed together. Calvin says
little about them in both his main treatments of the Law.^ They form a
third part of the Law. The first table represented the divine sanction
of the principles to be laid down; the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth
commandments discussed the three basis conditions of human existence life,
family and property; and now the final commandments lay down the inner
obedience that is to accompany outward conformity. Calvin's idea of
society was of a free community of consenting parties, where consent
sprang from a common acknowledgment of the supreme God known in Jesus
Christ. It was not a grouping designed to satisfy the expediencies of
trade /
1 But more in the Sermons. Sermon number eleven deals with the ninth
and sermon twelve with the tenth. The remainder deal with the re¬
maining verses of DEUT. Chapter V and the first of Chapter VI. But
of course in Sermons there was greater scope for emphasising the
spiritual aspect of personal obedience.
Speaking of the Law," ... la Loy n'estoit point und chose forgee des
hommes, mais que Dieu en estoit lautheur, he goes on: "Ce mot done
se doit ainsi prendre: Nous avons cogneu auiourd'huy que Dieu a parle"'
aux hommes ..." (C.R. LIV, 402). Elsewhere he said, "... Dieu
demande des services volontiers, ll ne veut pas seulement que nous le
servions par une creinte servile: mais il veut que nous y venions d'un
courage frane, et alegre, que mesurs nous prenions plaisir 1'honorer".
fibid. 266 (.
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trade or even security, but to fulfil the purpose of the Almighty
in the particular conditions of sixteenth century Geneva. Christian
society was holy if neither Roman nor at • that time imperial. Be¬
cause it was holy it required discipline; discipline particularly
in its own behaviour since human nature cannot obey the divine Will
rightly without constant vigilance and constant refreshment by grace,
and discipline also towards those who were growing up into full
membership or who threatened its existence from without.
Th£ final commandments thus tGuch the motives of human action.
The Law points to the necessity of charity, but human nature is
subject to evil insinuations which d.erive from its concupiscent
selfishness. Hence arise calumnies based, either upon truth or
falsehood. In terms of human rights these commandments may be
summed up in the statement that "whatever each individual possesses
remains entire and secure, not only from injury or the wish to in¬
jure but also from the slightest feeling <of covetousness which can
spring up in the mind."1 Justice in other words includes not only
the preservation of life, home ahd goods, but also the acknowledgment
of the right to such ownership. In the good, sense 'of the phrase
the citizen of Calvin's state lived in public. If any question
arose about his reputation it was not for him as an individual
person to discuss and settle it. Officers had been appointed, in
Church and state to deal with it according to the over-ruling
justice /
"'"INST. ": 8: ^0. 11. . . quod possidet quisque, maneat salvum et
intactum, non modo ab iniuria aut libidlne fraudandl, sed a
minima etlam cupiditate quae animos sollicltet."
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justice of God.
(iv) The Adequacy of the Decalogue.
The concluding paragraphs of this chapter - and in a sense they
are the concluding paragraphs of the whole essay - inevitably raise
the direct question whether the Decalogue has been found an adequate
basis of Christian ethics. There can be little doubt that Calvin
thought it to be so, and for the best of reasons, namely that his
Christian philosophy demanded a basis in revelation and revelation
alone: that is to say, in the active Self-revelation of God in
Scripture.
To review the main argument briefly: the ethics of a Christian
man must adeq.uately account for two factors - the revelation of God
in his soul, and the eternal categories of creation and justice.
In short, what he does is right primarily because God bids him do
p
it, but also because it is eternally right, - right, that is to say,
for all men in all generations.3 Thus, using Cheneviere's phrase,
Calvin's natural law was built upon the will or conscience, not
upon the intellect or reason. The world of external experience
was /
1 Cheneviere, op, cit., pp. 126 ff.
2 So Chenevilre, op. cit., p. 80 - "La volonte de Dieu nous est donnee
par le Decalogue a l'exclusion de toute source humaine de connais-
sanee; le D^calo^ue remplace done prac'tiquement la conscience, au
moins pour le Chretien."
3 ibid. , p. 109. "Pour Calvin, Dieu est a la fois le Createur de
iPordre de/nature originel . . . et le Cr£ateur de la lol naturelle:
cette loi etait percue a l'(origine par tous les hommes au moyen de
la conscience (et non de la raison), et exprimait interieurement a
chaque individu ce que l'ordre de nature exprimait ext^rieurement,
c'est-a-dire, la volont^ de Dieu."
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was not a sort of quarry from which the prying mind might hew
the substance of an adequate philosophy. Indeed, Calvin condemns
overmuch curiosity.1 There is a place in Christian faith for
2
agnosticism. For the true knowledge of God there is necessary
"une sorte de schema",^. to which the moral and intellectual ex¬
perience may give body but which is essentially the key to the right
understanding of the world. And this schema is revealed. In
fact, it is the Decalogue. For the Christian man there are many
channels of divine grace - through Church, state and family, for
example - but these are channels: that is to say, they are ordi¬
nances of God recognised as such because the man is a Christian.
They are ordinances for the non-Christian too, as the Christian
knows, and as the non-Christian ought to know. But because the non-
Christian is such, it cannot be assumed that in fact he does know
or acknowledge the voice of God in him. He has thus no fixed
point for a sane view of life.
No doubt the Calvinist argument has its flaws. Some of theip
have been noted in passing - the inadequate consideration, for
example, of the distinctive qualities of the spiritual man.
There are others: the apparent isolation of the doctrine of pre¬
destination from the fact of the Incarnation, for example. ^ Then
there /
"J ~ ^ ^
Sermons, C.R. LIV, 236 - "cette curioslte diabolique a regne de
tout temps au monde."
2 Ibid, 263, "It est vray que la premiere cause nous est incogneue,
et ne s'en faut point enquerir."
^ Cheneviere, op. olt., 86.
^ Barth, "Gotteserkenntnis und Gottesdienst" (1938)1 P* 192.
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there has "been noted a dangerous tendency towards economic hypocrisy.
But the contribution of Calvin to the ethical issue does not depend
entirely upon his solving all the questions at issue.1 Even in his
system there has "been found something of the dynamic of the Holy
Spirit. That is to say, the Spirit may guide us in each generation
into the wisdom that can appreciate the combination of circumstances
peculiar to that time and place. Calvin was not one to demand a
rigid view of revelation as confined to one particular historical
manifestation, even if that manifestation should be the Scriptures.
On the other hand, he was not so sentimental as to suppose that the
Holy Spirit should communicate to any human mind some entirely new
2
ethical or metaphysical categories. The New Israel is not so
distinguished from the old. Somehow what is relevant now must be
found to have been essentially relevant to the Fathers of the old
dispensation.
Does Christ then make no difference? Ethically, none.^
Christ came to fulfil the Law, not to destroy it. His work is to
bring /
A point noted by Chenevifere (op. cit.. p. 86) - "... dire que
le Decalogue enseigne la parfaite justice ne signifie pas que
le Decalogue l'enseigne dans tous ses details."
2
e.g. Sermon li+ in the 1562 edition (C.R. LIV, 397) which deals largely
with preaching. Calvin speaks of God's "(accommodation) a nostre
petitesse" in revealing what is "propre et utile", but, he adds,
"c'est un appetit fit et desbord6, si nous demandons qu'il nous
apparoisse du ciel, au qu'il face quelque miracle visible."
INST., 2: 8: 7. Christ did not add to the Law. He "only re¬
stored it to its integrity by maintaining and purifying it . . . ."
The Law is thus itself Evangelical. It is the motive, not the
substance of obedience, that distinguishes the elect from the
reprobate.
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■bring sinners to the grace to which the Law was designed to bring
them. It is not the Law which Christ overcomes, but the sin of
man. It is thus a redeeming, not a legislative, work. And thus,
Calvin argues, for us it is not a question of the doing what Jesus
would do. Jesus gave no new law, even about divorce, because the
Old Testament law of divorce was essentially contrary to the Spirit
of the Law of God, permitted because of the blindness of the people,
not actively enjoined. What Jesus may be said to have done and
in His Spirit still to do for spiritual men is so to redeem their
will that they^erceive the Tightness of the Lav/, and perceiving
their human incapacity for obedience take the gracious salvation
which God offers. This grace is God's: that is to say, it was
historically being offered before the advent of Christ into history.
It is the essential spirit of the Covenants. But of course Christ
was eternally in the Covenants as He was eternally in the Law, so
that the Christian believer, though not permitted the sentimentality
of a private revelation or the assumption that his virtue before
men can in any sense be an imitation of Christ, nevertheless is
urged on by the terrible necessity of a perpetual obedience deman¬
ded by an eternal God.
There is undoubtedly the danger in this manner of thinking, of
falling into legalism and moralism.^ The individual plays too
little a part in Calvin's thought. Not that the individual is
ignored. Evidence has been given of his appeal to individuals
and no one could have ministered to exiles for conscience' sake
without /
1
Niebuhr, "Human Destiny", pp. 205 ff.
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without seeing them as individuals called of God to high endeavour.
But perhaps Calvin was too much preoccupied with the fathers who
had dared all to consider the children who would grow up into a
changing set of circumstances. As Niebuhr remarks, there seemed
to "be no safe passage between the Scylla of Lutheran supramoralism
and the Charybdis of Calvinist moralism. If the path of the one
led to pietism, therefore, that of the other led to a self-contained
obscurantism - the obscurantism of the Puritan commercial house
which was economically secure, or the obscurantism of Scottish
poverty which sustained itself with national pride. To some
extent this obscurantism remains into modern Protestantism. Barth's
preaching is itself self-confessed evidence. The world seems to
be addressed almost impersonally. Missionary zeal requires some¬
thing of the "enthusiasm" that comes to men and women from a
1
belief in the direct command and personal interest of their Leader.
The strange warmth of John V/esley and the determination of William
Carey were opposed by the orthodox and were in a sense born in
the men themselves despite their orthodoxy.
Perhaps at this point of history one is tempted to criticise
Calvin and the Reformers overmuch for the sense of failure which
the collapse of our Western civilisation has brought. It is easy
to forget that the period of collapse is not yet fifty years old,
and /
So that Niebuhr concludes . . "it is not surprising that
possibly even greater contributions towards higher {justice
in recent centuries were derived from the sectarianism and
various Renaissance movements" (t han from Calvinism)"
ibid., p. 210.
2 8k
and that the stamp of the Reformation remained upon Europe for
three hundred years. To say so is not to suggest that a strict
return to Calvin's doctrines will solve all our problems. But
it does indicate the possibility that one might underestimate
his social and religious stature. And it is significant that
in the present collapse there are many pathetic appeals for a
return to a Church and a social order built upon the Ten
Commandments. The Decalogue has not been entirely ignored all
these centuries, but as has been said earlier on, the tendency
has been to make it a catechetical exercise rather than a politi¬
cally vital force. The cycle observed in the earlier chapters
has come round again, and, as Calvin said, men are seeking a moral
standard which will apply to all classes and creeds, and not be
simply imposed upon the allegedly ignorant laity.^ His reference
to the supra-moral clergy could aptly be transferred to contem¬
porary party-leaders. Justice, in short, is the cry, an eternal
Justice that is beyond the mere will of man.
If, therefore, one concludes that Calvin suffered from both
"obscurantism and pretension",^- it is a conclusion which refers to
his attempt to particularise the will of God into forms of social
obedience - to fix Christian obedience - rather than his strength
of understanding of the faith. It is, in short, a criticism of
the man rather than of his Gospel; a criticism of his positive
laws rather than of his emphasis upon the Divine Law. It is,
alas /
1 Sermons. C.R. LIV, 385.
Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 210.
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alas, the fault of all men, particularly when they are filled with
zeal, to imagine that they cannot be wrong. With Moses, Calvin has
to pass into the mountain before ne reaches the Promised Land. But
his law is carried forward.
CHAPTER VII.
The Wider Issue -
(i) Bucer's "De Regno Christi" 1550.
(ii) Calvinism and Monarchomachism.
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(i) Bucer1s "De Regno Christi".
No discussion designed to cover the thought of the Reformers could
omit Martin Bucer. If Luther, Zwingli and Calvin are the chief names,
with Melanchthon or Farel of almost equal importance, Bucer is Becoming
increasingly recognised^ as an influence which in Strasburg bridged the
gulfs between Lutheranism and Zwingliism, and between these and Calvinism.
And in England he established, in his last years, an influence of his own.
Bucer belongs to the period of Reform itself. He was in Strasburg
2
from May 1523 till April 1549. One need only recall the events of
those years, many of which took place in Strasburg, to realise the
strategic importance of his presence. The extension first of Luther
from Germany and then of Zwingli from Zurich inevitably met in this
frontier town, end, Strasburg being a refuge of exiles, encountered
conflicting doctrines held by ardent exponents. There were many Ana-
3
baptists in Strasburg, for instance. Thus the doctrines which have
been called "Reformed" had, in Strasburg, to accommodate themselves to
one another, and find their common denominator, and also to express
their common distinction from Romanism on the one hand and Anabaptism
on the other. Thus in Strasburg much of the liturgical and theological
4
distinction of Reform was beaten out, and also much of their
conservatism. /
Prof. August Lang, article "Martin Bucer" in Evangelical Quarterly,
April 1929, pp. 159-166.
2
Constantin Hopf, "Martin Bucer" (1946), pp. 1 ff.
®
Doumergue, article "Calvin - Creator or Epigone" - in "Calvin and
the Reformation", p. 23.
4
Bohatec, on. cit.. p. 460 ff, 507 ff shows, for example, how the lay
emphasis in Church government characteristic of Reformed "faith" was
worked out in Strasburg.
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conservatism. Finally, as a haven for refugees, Strasburg sheltered
such leading exponents and missionaries of the new ideas as Farel and
Calvin. And all these happenings and influences occurred while Bucer
2
was living in the city, and while he was at the prime of his manhood.
When he left for England he was at the full maturity and the "De Regno
Christi" is thus the ripest plum o.m the tree of his experience.
2
Bucer, according to Wilhelm Bauck, was Calvin's "foremost teacher";
not, he adds, that Bucer's was an original mind: rather, it was a mind
"rich in many suggestive iaeas which in their full scope remained un¬
realised . . . forgotten -ana left to emerge in the minds of later
generations under new conditions." One example of this suggestive
influence may "be found in the teaching about predestination which he
4
passed on to Calvin. As has already been pointed out, the "Institutes"
itself illustrate the hardening of the doctrine in editions subsequent
R
to his exile in Strasburg and increasingly throughout his stay in Geneva.
In this sense, Lang can say that Bucer was "the spiritual father of the
Genevan theologian." The reason for this influence may be traced
to /
^ I'bid., pp. 434 ff. For example, Cslvin's rejection of direct assur¬
ance of salvation. Ibid., pp. 339 ff shows a similar conservatism
in the doctrine of communion, and ibr a similar reason.
p
Born 1491; that is, he was 30 when he first settled in Strasburg,
and 56 when he left for England. He was 58 when he died.
® Wilhelm Pauck, "Luther and Butzer", Journal of Religion, Vol. IX,
pp. 85 ff.
4
Bohatec, op. cit., 732-3 gives other examples. He says that Calvin
derived his economic principles, equity and charity, from Bucer's
treatise on usury, and also much of his political theory of church
and state.
5 One of his lst^rwritings, was. a treatise or the subje.ct, - the "De Prae-
destinatione et Provident la Derr \T55ol. written m defence of his
doctrine of Christian^ethics. Much criticism of the systemxeven then
centred upon this doctrine, e.g. the "Demandes et repli^ues a J. C.
r. sur son livre de la Predestination" (1561;.
O-Pv cit . Bohatec develops this view strongly in his treatment of
Calvin. Examples have been given in previous notes.
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to an ethical source. Calvin, in practice, had to find an explana¬
tion for human responsibility towards the divinely, revealed Law, while
denying that mere intelligence could bring one to a saving knowledge
of God. In other words, he had to f in d a just reason for condemning
persons who might deny the justice of God. He found it in the doctrine
of predestination. By God's free election some are brought to an
acknowledgment of Him and some are not. Nevertheless all, as His
Creatures, owe Him obedience. And therefore, His Church has the duty
not only to discipline its own members, who are presumably willing to
accept it, but e^lso to influence those who are not members, whether the
offspring of members or those who stood outside the Church for other
reasons. In short, the Church, by her guardianship of the divine Word,
was bound to claim educational and legislative powers-in the State.
These ideas are abundantly evident in Bucer. He and Calvin, Lang
says,"'" formulated the doctrine of the Headship of Christ in identical
terms. Originally it was peculiar to them; and only later was taken
up by other Reformers. But Bucer's doctrine was carried further than
Calvin's. If Luther remained conservatively at a view of the Kingdom
2
as equivalent to the church invisible, that is to say, at a religious
view, Bucer was socially even more revolutionary than Calvin. The
Gospel is almost moralised.! It is true that he limits the actual





Scott Pearson, op. cit, p. 3, says Luther was "not a politician by
choice but by force of circumstances."
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to work out his obedience in the world.^ In one sense it is a mission-
2
ary ideal. In another sense it is a revolutionary ideal, since it
cannot be restricted to the circle of believers itself. It is never
fulfilled until it permeates the totality of human conditions. If for
Luther the Church can remain the Church even if the prince should happen
not to be a Christian, for Bucer it is the prime business of a Christian
prince to forward Christian reform, where "Christian" implies the
imposition of religious duties which individuals might not accept.
Theologically, Bucer appears more ethical than religious in his
3
emphasis. As Anrich points out, Jehovah, the revealed God of the old
covenant, is closely identified with the Christ, particularly in the
sense that the Law of God, not only in its ceremonial but also in its
ethical aspects, is to be resolved in Him. It is true that the Law
is not allowed to be merely law: it is a law of love, and of the
political laws implied by the divine Law, Bucer held that they must also
4
conform to the Biblical law of love. But the Gospel can be, and ought
to be, a "rule of political laws" so that "religion and its moral
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Bucer's famous phrase is that in the Christian state men are to
live well and happily, here and hereafter. In this latter phrase
is the step beyond Calvin. Calvin's discipline seemed to point only
2
to a consummation of happiness hereafter. The reason may have been
distrust of his contemporaries, one might even say, a nearer contact
with flesh and blood conditions than Bucer ever had, but the result was
on the one hand a cramping of specific Gospel tendencies such as spiritual
joy in salvation, and on the other, a rather mean application of the
conception of prosperity, which could, and did, lead to rank hypocrisy.
Bucer, much more openly than Calvin, preached the "rightness" of the
Christian state as such, and therefore appealed to believers to go
out and, in their own way, work for the reform of the present con¬
ditions. True religion and true ethics are equally Biblical. Thus
the personalities of the Kingdom (the individuals who have given their
assent to God's call) must take up the leading influence in the state,
exerting not only their Christian influence but also their technical
3
expert knowledge, to this end. "Vera theologica non theoretics,
sed practica est. Finis siquidem eius agere est: hoc est vitam
vivere /
1
"De Regno Christi" I, para. v.
2
He did not, of course, despise present prosperity. It was, indeed,
of God. But because it was of God, it was fortuitous. Calvin's
social reforms were a means to the end of saving souls, not an
expression of the Divine Will as in itself a desirable end.
Thus, though Calvin spoke of charity to one's neighbour, it was
a loveless sort of charity, even a selfish charity which ex¬
cluded unbelievers. The idea of serving all men £>r Christ's sake
is not charact:e ristic of Calvin. His eyes were always beyond
this life.
g
Pauck, "Martin Bucdr's conception of the Christian State", Princeton
Theological Review, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 80-9.
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vivere deiformum."
Bucer came to England in April 1549. Cranmer had invited him the
previous year, partly because of the Schmalkaldic wars and the general
persecuting policy of prance, and partly because of his desire for the
advice of sd eminent a Reformer on the morning of the thorough Reforma¬
tion of England. Bucer's final decision to come was made presumably
because of Margaret of Navarre's death, which removed the strongest
protection of Reform in Prance. He never returned to Strasburg. He
2
died in England in 1551, and his secretary took his papers to Basel.
In England, Bucer's field of reform was almost unlimited. The
young king was himself a Reformer - so much so that he himself worked
3
out a plan of reform on the basis of Bucer's contribution, without,
however, either publishing or paying for the original - and the field
of his reform was a nation, not a city. Bucer was not, of course, the
only political reformer of the age. England had already the saintly
More and his famous "Utopia". But Bucer was at the same time more
complete and consistent in his social plans, and, as the respective
titles of their works themselves illustrate, more specifically Chris¬
tian and therefore more realistic in his outlook upon the problems to
be solved. The "De Regno Christi" was, in fact, an "outline of
4
Christian politics"; and the word "politics" here expresses both the
energy /
1 Bucer, "Quatuor Evangelii" (1536).
2
J. R. Green, "History of the English People", p. 361, says that Mary
caused his bones to be burned.
® The "Discourse on the Reformation of Abuses".
4
Baum, "Capito and Butzer".
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energy of the reformer who is prepared to change and the conservatism
of the realist who will not risk the whole by forcing unnecessary or
premature changes upon the existing fabric of society. The Kingdom
was a vital centre with an ever increasing perimeter; and it remained
the centre. The surrounding community of the state - the "natural"
state - was accepted as the sphere to be permeated in the course of the
Kingdom's growth.
Mention has already been made of Bucer's almost complete eclipse.
His own and King Edward's deaths left the work "De Regno Christi" quite
isolated from practical expression. Mary, of course, attempted a
complete sweep of all things Protestant, and when Elizabeth finally
made her settlement she did so on a political rather than a social basis.
Bucer's influence did not return until the PuritanP became sufficiently
co-ordinated to put forward the views on Church and State which had been
thoroughly discouraged and even confused by the overriding political
crisis of Elizabeth's reign. Thus in the 17th century Bucer's influence
affected the thought of the Puritans who in New England sought to
express the Headship of Christ without the interference of the State
and in the Mother country sought to reform both Church and State from
1
within. Translations were made of the sections from the "De Regno





"The Judgment of Martin Bucer concerning Divorce" (London, 1644).
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Bishop Ussher's quotation of Bucer's "De vi et usu sacri ministerii"(1550)
in the often re-published pamphlet "The Originall of Bishops and Metro¬
politans" has also been mentioned. Finally, Jeremy Collier, in his
enormous "Ecclesiastical History of Great Britain, chiefly of England",
(1714) devotes seventeen pages of Book IV, Part II, to Bucer himself,
including some three pages to an analysis of the "De Regno Christi"
itself. The century was by then already turning to the rationalism
of Bishop Butler, and Professor Hutchison, and the characteristically
religious teaching of Bucer suffered a second eclipse which is only
beginning to pass in very recent years.
In analysing the "De Regno Christi" one perceives that its two
books concern the first and the second tables of the Law. Bucer does
not, however, follow out the somewhat elementary plan of Calvin to de¬
duce a pattern of social life from the precepts of the Old Testament.
He has taken a third step in the progress of Reformed ethics. Luther
dismissed the Decalogue as a kind of Jewish Sachsenspiegel; that is,
he left secular laws to the prince and sought an inspirational perfect-
tionism in the Church. Calvin repudiated the ideas both of the alleged
divine sovereignty of the State and also of the suggestion of perfec¬
tionism in the Church.
_ For him the Decalogue was, and cmuid.t be, the
sole means of interpreting the divine will on earth in individual or
in social life. But Calvin seems to want to check every detail of the
social programme against a parallel instance in the Old Testament.1
Even /
1
A point made by Niebuhr, "Human Destiny", pp. 209 ff.
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Even on his own views that could not always be done, since the precepts
of the Old Testament were God's interpretation of the Decalogue for the
Old Testament - God's "political" laws for the Old Testament circum¬
stances - and by His Spirit He might have other interpretations for other
times. Thus Bucer, while retaining the Bible as a strictly necessary
reference for principle, launches out more boldly than Calvin into the
task of interpreting the state of the nation. That he never forgot the
ultimate source of principle is illustrated, however, by a remark by
Jeremy Collier that Bucer desired the State to exact the death penalty
for all the offences which the Mosaic law condemned as capital.
In the first book, consisting of fifteen paragraphs, Bucer begins
by discussing the title of his work.1 It is to be about the Regnum
Christi rather than the Regnum Dei because it is to Christ that we look
for our knowledge of God and His saving grace. It is not, he goes on,
so much a question of the "Kingdom" of Christ, anyhow, as a question
of His King-ship in the hearts of men. The idea that there can or
ought to be, such a theocratic institution, with an Invisible Person
assuming legislative duties which can be carried out by a human person,
is simply ridiculous. It is the duty of Christian kings to direct the
citizens of the realm to piety. Illustrations of this duty and honour
are /
1
Reg. Chr. I, (i). The references are to the Book and the
paragraph.
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are quoted from ISAIAH.
The next paragraphs"'" discuss the Kingdom itself. After saying
something about the history of the Church, Bucer lays down his prin¬
ciple of the Church's business - "the administration and superintendence
(procuratio) of the eternal salvation of God's elect, by which He, our
Lord Himself, and the King of heaven, gathers to Himself by His teaching
and discipline, through the agency of suitable ministers of (His) ad¬
ministration, selected for the purpose, His elect ones (whom He has
throughout the world, and wishes to be subject in no way to the powers
of the world), and incorporates in Himself and His Church and moreover
governs in it in such a way that they are daily cleansed of all sins,
2
and live well and happily both here and hereafter." Several paragraphs
enlarge upon details of this ambitious programme. Doctrine is restricted
to the holy Scriptures, to which nothing may be added and from which
nothing may be taken away, but the methods of teaching these funda¬
mentals may and must be varied, adapted indeed to every occasion.
Bucer then discusses the sacraments, (which he limits, of course, to




"Regnum Servatoris nostri Jesus Christi administratio est et
procuratio salutio aeternae electorum Dei, qua luci ipse Dominus
noster, et Rex caelorum, doctrina et disciplina sua, per idoneos,
et ab ipso delectos ad hoc ipsum ministros administrates, electos
suos (quos habet in mundo dispersos, et vult nihilominus mundi
pgtestatibus esse subjectos) colligit ad se, sibique et Ecclesiae
sua incorporat, atque in ea sic gubernat, ut purgati in dies
plenies peccatis, bene beateque vivant et hie et in futuro."
O




I, viii - ix.
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special paragraph upon penitential discipline, ceremonies such as
1 2sanctification of Churches, holy occasions such as the Sabbath, the
5
keeping of Lent and other fasts - about all of which he is much less
rigid than Calvin. To him there is a need for moderating ceremonies
and developing the Church's responsibility to physical need, wherever
4
it may be found; for the Church s responsibility extends to all men.
The second book elaborates the principles outlined in the first.
It opens with a discussion how Christian Kings can set up the Kingdom
5
here on earth. He must first draw about him Christian counsellors,
that is to say, men who are not only statesmen but professing Christians.
Then he must set about persuading his subjects to acquiesce in his
Christian laws and ordinances. For this purpose it is obviously
necessary to provide spiritual instruction to all parts of the realm.
Thus he has a programme of preaching, education and particularly
education for the ministry.
0
Behind this general plan there lies the detail of the right laws.
Bucer discusses the structure of the state from the elementary unit of
7
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Then, the Church must he a Church. Holy-days, for example, lose their
religious significance if they become mere cessations from labour and
1
occasions of physical relaxation. Nor should the Church attempt to
2
undertake secular business. It must stand in the community as the means
of Grace, and as such alone. Thus it must be adequately served by its
pastors, must at the same time be adequately supported, and finally
must regard as part of its function an interest in such economic facts
3
as poverty. Bucer deals at considerable length with each of these
problems. There was, of course, in the situation, which he was addres¬
sing, the necessity for much detailed r'e-organisation on these heads.
a
At this point a very large section is devoted to the question of
divorce. Henry VIII's divorce was a most important factor in the
succession to the throne. The political and religious constitution
turned upon its legitimacy. On the face of things, therefore, one
might, at this safe distance from the scene of turmoil, sneer at Bucer's
over burdened argument. It should be borne in mind, however, that
Bucer was not simply flattering Edward. Long before, while in
Strasburg, he had oonsiH-^reci the legitimacy of Henry's divorce.
The point he makes here is not that divorce should be permitted on the







ttII, xil - XIV.
4
II, xv - xlvii.
5 Hopf, op. cit., p. 1. But he did not agree that the mar'lage was illegal
THastings Eells, "Martin Bucer11 (1931) pp. 122 ffTj In this view he
agreed with the Swiss Reformers against the Lutherans, who wanted to ?
permit even bigamy. Hence perhaps the stronger Lutheran tendencies
of the Anglican establishment. It is interesting to note that Grynaeus
who was collecting theT opinions of the Reformers for Henrv, urged the
divine commandment of LEV XVill,16 (the prohibition against ui^iveu-.
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the Mosaic legislation, by the execution of the guilty parties. The
question argued in this instance is the rightness of divorce on the
grounds of incompatibility. In an age when women were socially in¬
ferior, this argument could be most important for them, since it was
based upon the individual right of a person to some responsible direction
of his own life under God.
Bucer then returns to the detail of social laws."1" Youth should
be instructed both in affairs and in the use of leisure; and thus he
urged the re-establishment of various arts and healthy pastimes. Mer¬
cantile practice should also be reformed, also public amusements, labour,
arts, games, and even private expenditure. That is, in general he
emphasised the need for consistency. If children are to be directed
to piety they must not be thrust into circumstances where their virtues
2
are prostituted. Whether one can agree with the control of public
amusement and private expenditure raises a question which the independ¬
ence of Englishmen might resent. In fact, of course, both principles
are now practised, even to the detail which Bucer urged that merchandise
which fed extravagance should not be permitted at the ports without
restraint.
3
The final sections concern the more restricted field of law and
punishment. There was a need, he thought, for the clarification and
reformation of the laws. He then discusses the manner of appointing
magistrates, who, he thinks, ought to be local people who are both
acquaint with, and in a sense responsible for, the people under their
charge. As regards punishment, God's law provides a useful guide both
of /
1 II, xlviii.
2 II, xlix - Iv.
3
II, lvi - lx.
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of moderation and severity. The rights of the subject have to be borne
in mind both as regards his person and his property. In short, the
aim of the Christian state is to bring Christian obedience, both public
and private, to the greatest number of citizens.
This very restricted outline of Bucers argument cannot do it
justice; it may, however, serve ©s comment upon the influence which
the Reformation movement was beginning to exert in the larger councils
of Europe. The Scriptural authority was to be tested not only within
the comparatively limited bounds of a city state, but in a national
revolution which would at lsst issue into an imperial policy. Unfor¬
tunately, the experiment was cut short in England where it might have
had the best chance of developing satisfactorily: and by the time it




(ii) Calvinism and Monarchomachism.
If Bucer has to "be included amongst the Reformers, his eclipse
at the death of "Edward is typical of the phase into which Reform was
passing. It is true that the leaders of this new period, men like
Knox and Buchanan in Scotland, Hotman in France, Althusius in Herborn
and Emden, were products of the original Reformers school, and, as Lang1
says, "it was precisely (these) decided Calvinists who, first amongst
the men of evangelical faith, and so early as the sixteenth century,
not merely developed natural law theoretically, "but at the same time,
as political publicists, made it a weapon in the conflicts of the time."
But the principle which they advocated was no longer a purely Reformed
doctrine. All the Reformers, and Calvin was the most positive in
his endeavours, hoped "to find the foundations for an evangelical
Christian conception of the state in the ethical principles of the
Bible"; whereas the monerchomachists, in asserting the right of the
people, even if these people were Christians, to a sovereign right to
determine national policy, were transferring the authority of the
state from its mystical reference to Deity to a mundane contract
between ruler and ruled. At this point medieval society finally died.
No doubt the transition was gradual; and no doubt also the master
in Geneva could be quoted as speaking as if the people, by proxy at
least, could act against unrighteous rulers. But characteristic of
all /
_
In his article, "The Reformation and Natural Law" in "Calvin and
the Reformation", pp. 72 ff.
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all the Reformer's is that they were concerned in the first instance with
religion. For all its concern with the external means of Christian
1 2
obedience, the "Institutes" is a religious book. The state into which
it must be read was a divine ordinance - something which, however much
it might have to be reformed, did not require to be re-created. Thus,
3
as Doumergue remarks, Calvin may in one sense be said to advocate the
sovereignty of the people (that,is, believing people), but in another
sense he denies it. The state needed the Church and the Church needed
the state. The main question for the Reformers was the nature of the
true Church. They were less concerned about the nature of the true state.




been ed as the ideal Protestant prince until the brief reign of
Book IV of the Institutes is entitled, "De Externis Mediis ad
Salutem" (viz., Church and State).
Scott Pearson, op. cit., pp. 3: 76 ff.
3 "Jean Calvin", V, pp. 507 ff.
4
Bohatec, op. cit., pp. 583 ff: 615 ff. The references to Henry VII in
iHarniinjard illustrate his growth in popularity. In a letter from
Sturm to Bucer (November 1535) it is noted that Henry had broken with
the Pope (ill, p. 364}. By October 1538 Calvin is writing to Farel
(in a letter now lost) that Henry is undertaking "la destruction des
abus" (V, p. 155, note) and later (March 1539) of Henry's positive
moves towards Reform (V, pp. 256 ff). In October of the same year,
Calvin wrote to Viret (VI, pp. 72 ff), Bucer (VI, pp. 72 ff) and Farel
(VI, pp. 110 ff) expressing concern over Henry's Six Articles, but
by November, he is reporting the news of Henry's polite reception
of German ambassadors (VI, p. 128). By April 1540 Calvin is
saying "... Anglus spem facit majorem ..." (VI, p. 205 ff) and
hoping that France will be influenced for Reform through him. Henry's
volte-face in 1540 nonplussed both Calvin (VI, p. 237) and Bucer
(VI, 245 - "Anglus totus fierit"). By 1541 Calvin is telling the
Duchess of Ferrara of Capito's book which has been dedicated to Henry
(VII, pp. 317 ff). In the Turkish threats of 1543 Calvin expresses
hopes that England will take part in the defence of Europe (VIII,
pp. 459 ff). Henry, however, had his own political ambitions, par¬
ticularly against France, and the Reformers were on much better terms
with Cranmer. Bucer dedicated his "Metaphrases et Enarrationes" to
him /
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Edward VI had produced an even better example. But Edward was succeeded
by Catholic Mary. About the same time (1549) the death of Margaret,
Queen of Navarre, removed the partial toleration of Protestants which
had been gradually won from Francis. Francis had himself been succeeded
in 1547 by Henry II, and the years 1547-9 were "£un^ e'poque de la lune
de miel dans les relations de Calvin avec le cour £de FranceJ."1
But these fortunate years were overshadowed by the failure of the
Schmalkaldie wars to do more than achieve an Interim security for German
Protestantism. Moreover, Henry II's name was coupled by that of a Medici,
so that when political advantage was to be gained by persecution of
Protestants, their partial toleration was replaced in 1551 by the even
fiercer Edict of Chateaubriand which declared them to be guilty of
lese-maJeste. Here were the beginnings of that internecine strife
which divided France into warring camps.
These French hatreds are the sign of the new period that was begin¬
ning. The formation of the Society of CTesus (1540) and the theological
hardening of the Council of Trent (1545) were taking their effect.
Protestantism was now a political as well as a religious creed. In the
Netherlands and in Scotland, and to some extent in France, the appeal
was not only to religious faith but also to the national independence
which that faith - because it was opposed to that of hated authorities -
symbolised. /
him (VI, p. 76) and held correspondence with him as a particular
friend (VI, p. 109). These references show the interest of all the
Reformers in Henry's policy and also indicate the point of contact,
through Bucer and Cranmer, of Reform to England.
de Crue, op. cit., p. 32.
2
de Crue, op. cit., p. 35.
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symbolised. It is thus particularly in France and Scotland that one
finds the strongest exposition of Monarchomachism, open revolt, that is
to say, against legally established authority: and its justification
there is that it represented clear rights of the citizens to a measure of
assent in their affairs, rights which had been recognised in the middle
age, and rights which were ignored by the parties in power. In England,
religion was not opposed to national liberty, and for that reason Monarcho¬
machism did not flourish to anything like the same degree in that country.
Politically, however, Elizabeth looked back beyond Mary and Edward,
to her father Henry, for her pattern of sovereignty. She supported the
Calvinists of Scotland and Holland, but she distrusted the political
influence which, in their struggle for existence, they had begun to claim
over the government of their countries. If she was a Protestant, she
was also a Tudor. Thus Thomas Cartwright, in advocating his doctrines
Q
of Puritanism, had to be above all things mindful to avoid politics.
In England, Puritanism was always open to the charge of disloyalty.
Monarchomachism appealed, as Dr Lang points out, to rights that
were essentially "natural". The Reformers themselves had not required
to do so. Their concern was not with the right state but with the right
Church. At bottom they had assumed the acceptance by the sovereign
(himself a servant of God) of the logically uncovered truth of God. This
comment applies to their social as well as their ecclesiastical thought .
There is no inconsistency in the fact that most of Bucer's writings,
for /
The Netherlands, unlike Luther's Saxony or Calvin's Geneva, had no
tradition of political independence, and the Reformation remained
therefore a personal matter until later in the century. Lindsay II,
pp. 224.
2
Scott Pearson, op. cit., pp. 6 ff.
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for example, concern the Church, and only the "De Regno Christi" the
state, for he was addressing a sovereign who agreed with him in matters
of faith. The monarchomachists, however, had to revise their ideas of
the more ultimate problem - of the state itself. The prince was no
longer being presented with the one true faith. Religion itself was
divided into warring alternatives, each claiming to be the truth and
each therefore demanding his absolute support. The principle "cuius
regio, euis religio" was an inadequate measure of the situation; for
faith must propagate, and states must have spheres of influence, warlike
if not peaceful. Since both faiths cried, "Thus saith the Rord" it
followed that more ultimate references than Scripture or the Fathers
were also cited. They were thus philosophical rather than literary.
Grotius' "de belli et pacis" exemplifies this appeal as well as the
pathetic cynicism that descends upon the unfortunate layman who is tossed
about by conflicting ideologies. He seeks a justice that would stand
even if the God Whom the contestants were so loudly invoking should be
unjust.
The naturalism of monarchomachic thought thus leant heavily in the
direction of secularism. The worship of God having failed, to provide a
unifying force in social life men were seeking one that would, be so.
They do the same to-day in circumstances of similar religious disillusion;
and they seek the alternative truth in the same physical alternates of
state, family and individual. The monarchomachist argued his case on
the assumption that society is a contract, in the first place, between
the /
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the individual and the monarch, the monarch being responsible for such
matters as defence and justice, the individual agreeing to refer all
such matters to the sovereign. The king's power was thus mandatory.
He was a servitor servitorum in a real sense, politically first amongst
spiritual equals.
It may be said that such an argument is not necessarily "secular"
in an anti-religious sense. The political economy of the Old Testament
'rests on just this relationship between king and people, and behind it
lay the ovpr-ruling covenant made by the nation in a mystical figure
with the Deity. Moreover, it was upon such a covenantal relationship
that medieval society had been built. Thus Knox might be, in one sense,
called a monarchomachist insofar as he bargained with his monarch: but
his appeal was based upon Scripture when he said that, "the people
assembled together in one bodie of ane Commounwelth, unto whom God has
given sufficient force" could lawfully "nocht onlie . . . resyst, but
also . . . suppres all kynde of opin idolatrie",1 he meant by the
qualification, "lawfully" the authority of God as revealed in His Word.
One's mind springs immediately to the judgment of Calvin even in 1536
2
that image worship should be forcibly suppressed. The sanction of such
actions was the revelation of God. Thus, the relevant term of relation-
3
ship was not the secular "contract" but the religious "covenant", the
covenant made between man and man, and between man and his Society
precisely /
1
Quoted from Scott Pearson, op. cit., pp. 79 ff.
2
In the "Institutio" - see above, p. . 13 0..
3
Doumergue, op. cit. , pp. 479 ff.
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precisely "because of, and with strict reference to, the Covenant between
God and historical men like Adam, Noah, Abraham and Moses.
The primary issue of monarchomachism was not, however, its secularism
although, of course, it belongs to that stream of political thought which
flowed throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. There were Jesuit as well
as Protestant monarchomachists. Moreover, there were completely secular
interpretations of the principles at issue, tinged with cynicism as with
Hobbes, and to a lesser extent with Locke,"1" with romanticism as with
Rousseau or brutality as with Swift. The primary issue was the justifi¬
cation of action, if necessary, the action of civil war. Doumergue,
as has been already said, makes out a case for the "passive resistance"
of believers even in Calvin's political thought. But passive obedience
does not win wars or gain territories. It implies a secular authority
which is actuated by good-will and open to reasonable advice based upon
an ultimate Truth and justice. Such was the British rule in India and
thus the ground of the success of Mahatma Gandi's pacifism. And such,
as has been said, was the assumption of all Reformers. The issue for
the monarchomachist was much more like the situation in Nazi occupied
g
Norway of the established Christian Church. Its opposition to the Nazi
policy of evangelisation brought it into close alliance with the
political opposition of patriots to the invading forces. The alliance
was embarrassing because of the danger that patriotism would confuse
itself /
_
See Lang, op. cit., pp. 85 ff.
2
"The Universal Church in God's Design", pp. 89 ff.
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itself with a religious faith that had not been practised in times of
peace. To make quite clear to invader and. patriot alike that the issues
at stake were matters of Christian conduct alone the Church authorities
obeyed the German order to refrain from making prayer for the Royal
family in the course of the service. In this searching of heart Luther
was re-discovered. It was proved that, although he taught the doctrine
of the two realms he emphasised that both realms were God's, so that
as long as - but only as .long as - the authority of the state acknowledges
God as the highest moral authority the state is an "order of God".
Melanchthon's teaching of the two tables bears the same significance.
The special duty of the Church is to carry out the precepts of the first
table, and the special duty of the state is to carry out those of the
second. "Magistratus est vox decalogi"; but Caesar may not presume
upon his power to speak about the precepts of the first table. He
cannot ascend higher than his own place and even in the second table he
cannot alter one commandment.
This issue faces the Church in many different forms to-day. In
the Germany of Nazism, for instance, there was a "Church struggle" which
involved in many cases a conflict between patriotism and conscience.
And in Western civilisation generally there is an inner conflict between
Christian faith and materialist belief. Perhaps, however, these con¬
flicts are less like those of monarchomachism than the first conflicts
of the faith with a pagan Empire. The conflicts of the monarchoma-chists
were civil wars, - wars of ideologies claiming to be alike Christian,
and the toleration which Locke at last preached to a weary Europe was
not /
3° 9
not perhaps altogether untouched with disillusion. Monarchomachism
was itself a phase which psssed from the fury of a Knox to the sectarian
interest of the Non-conformist churches1 which sought liberty of con¬
science for themselves rather than the establishment of the Kingdom of
God upon earth.
In this change the Decalogue suffered an eclipse. The will of God
could no longer confidently be proclaimed. One turned to the "inner
l
light" of the Quakers or the idea of "conscience" of which the English
moralists were to become the noted exponents. The Decalogue was not,
of course, ignored. The Church still used it in its liturgy and its
catechisms; and there was a steady flow of devotional literature on
S
the subject. The Decalogue still, indeed, affected private life, but
its acceptance as a dynamic medium of the divine will W8S not single
minded. Secular standards were replacing it. For confirmation of this
view it is only necessary to glance at such a work as Heppe's "Reformed
Dogmatics". The theology of Reform as theology became more and more
exact in orthodoxy, but at the same time more restricted in application.
Although the chapters pass through the familiar argument that begins
with knowledge of God and passes through the doctrines of man's fall and
Christ's redemption to the actual historical institution of the Church
with its sacraments, there is lacking that lsst discussion of the state
and our obedience to it. In the Chapter on the "Covenant of Works and
the /
1
Niebuhr, "Human Destiny", pp. 210 ff.
2
See Note 14- -at end.
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the Righteousness of the Law" there is no mention of the Decalogue at
all. For these theologians, God's covenant belongs to Ur-Geschichte
rather than Geschichte. It is with Adam's conscience that we are con¬
cerned, and with men here and now only insofar as they are represented
in-him. It is little wonder that by the end of the 17th century the
fixed form of preaching and the ponderous theological orthodoxy was al¬
ready becoming unreal to the actual conduct of life. And onca preach¬
ing and theology lost their real point of contact, Church discipline
began to lose its meaning too.
In this eclipse of vital faith in a dynamic Word of God one msy
see a situation similar to those that have been described in Old
Testament and medieval times. The Decalogue had its revivals, and
supremely in Calvin. Perhaps, therefore, it is sufficient to remark
once more in conclusion that our own times are witnessing a most
energetic revival of Calvin's work and that, apart from theological
studies altogether, there is a popular concern for a renewed emphasis
upon the Will of God as the sanction of human conduct, and particularly,




Note 1, p. 2. Three books appeared recently on the subject of
Freudian ethics:- "Ethics for Unbelievers", by Amber Blanco
White, "Man for himself", by Erich Fromm, "Man's Quest fbr
Significance", by Lewis Way. The titles explain the point
of view common to all, viz. the rejection of' religion as a
primary factor in human experience. Religion is at best a
means to an end. It is, however, significant that such terms
as "conscience" are freely used in the discussion of human
failure. The point for this study is that Freudian psychology
is at last being forced to give a constructive rather than a
critical analysis of the human situation.
Note 2, p. 2. The question, "What ought we to do*?", the great
question of humanity, is the entrance to the Christian faith;
none can evade it wh):wish to enter the sanctuary. But it is
also the gate through which one passes out of the sanctuary
again, back into life; but the question .... has gained, new
meaning. No magic transformation has taken pla.ce within the
sanctuary of faith; the human being who passes through thos e
portals, both on his way in and on his way out, is the same
human being: erring, Imperfect, wesk. But something has
happened to him within the sanctuary, which, although it has
taken place in secret and is only partially visible to the
eyes of the world, has made him a different person, something
which has opened his eyes and. his heart toarehllty which he
never knew before: the reality of the living God.. There he
stands - as one who has been touched by God., whose heart has
been pierced by Him, as one has has come under the stern judg¬
ment of God and has tested the Divine mercy, as one who can
never seek the meaning of his life and the answer to that great
human question anywhere else save "There" - there he stands,
this weak human being, in the midst of life, among other people;
but because he comes 1 from thence' , he now has another "posi¬
tion" in this world., and it is this which makes him a Christian."
Note "5, p. 15. "Revelation and Reason", E. T. (1946), Preface, p. ix.
A standard work like Newman Smyth's "Christian Ethics" (1894)
illustrates the point. Ethics there is said to be fulfilled
in religion and. the Christian revelation, thus, appears as a
sort of climax of an "ideal". Calvin, incidentally, is men¬
tioned only twice - once for his "crushing logic", and once as
an example, with Melanchthon and Hooker, of the Reformation
practice of having a wife chosen for one.
Note /
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Note 4, p. 17. This idea of "Augenblicklichkeit" in Brunner is
like Barth's idea of the Church as an "Ereignis". Paul
mentions in COL. 1, v. 24 the necessity of a continual filling
up in believers' experience and action of the work of Christ.
The question to be settled is the balance of this active
faith, and the actions that have been done once for all.
B, B. Warfield in an article, "Calvin's doctrine of the know¬
ledge of God" in "Calvin and the Reformation" (I9O9)
illustrates the Reformer's insistence tha.t Scripture conveys
its immediate i.e. its saving reference in itself by the con¬
current action of the Holy Spirit.
Note 5, p♦ 29. e.g. ROM., 7, vv. 21 - 23 - By the"law that when
I would do good, evil is present with me" is meant "the
observable fact of disunity in human nature." This fact is
distinguished from the "law of God" in which the apostle
delights, namely, the divine revelation pointing to the
primeval harmony. The "law in my members" is both the
observable fact of disunity and the fact of "sin" which is the
cause of disunity; but sin is itself known only by a revelation.
It is the law of God and the law of sin that are in conflict.
This is the train of thought in Calvin's remark (INST. 2: It?.)
that Paul "because he had to dispute with perverse teachers . . .
was sometimes obliged ... to speak of the Law (i.e.. the
revelation) in a more restricted sense, merely as law (i.e. the
observable fact of an order referring beyond human comprehension) .
It is the argument "If ye then, being evil, know . . . how
much more . ."
Note 6, i). 4.6. The distinction between a "king" and a "tyrant"
lay in the fact that the king ruled "according to law, while
the tyrant ignored or violated" it. So A. J. Carlyle, op.
cit., 18. Ideally, the Christian idea of community was
equalitarian, "$ordship" making its appearance "as a consequence
of the Fall of man" - Gierke.00. clt., JQ. The idea of the
"divine" right of kings was not in evidence before Gregory
the Great, who appealed to the O.T. for support; but the idea
lapsed until the 17th century - Carlyle, 26-7. Fundamentally,
therefore, the medieval idea of State was of a "Right State"
where the law of the community was the basis of justice and
the individual, each in his own place, was the unit of society -
Gierke, 7: 12: also Pollock, op. clt., 47.
Note /
3
Mote 7. p. 98. He exclaims against the Roman officials, and points
out the difficulty of opposing them since they claim to
speak in God's Name. But he does use the word "resist"
(zustreben : zusteenn) . His conclusion, however, is, "Savon
ein ander Mai m ehr" - referring no doubt to his "Address to
the Christian Nobility" and his "Babylonian captivity".
Note 8, p. 99. The paragraphing is rather loose. Luther apparently
added to an original work that dealt mainly with the first two
commandments. Perhaps the first sketch of all contained only
the first seventeen paragraphs, for the eighteenth is headed
"Von dear anderen guten werck", as if it was itself an, appendix
t© a thesis alrea.dy complete.
Note 9, P. 197. Not that the Church is to aim at being an earthly
state, or that it can tolerate the desire of the State to the
functional rights of the Church, but, as Barth points out
"Rechtfertigung und Recht", E.T., "Church and State" Ronald
Howe (1939) PP- 71 ff , the Church looks to an eternal state, not
a Church, as its consummation. Thus, as Prof. Georges
Florovsky, "The Church and her Responsibility", C^lie Universal
Church in God's Design" pp. /\2 ff.) says, the Church may be in
opposition or in power, but its ethics remains the same, viz. the
revealed will of God. This principle is abundantly true of
Calvin,vbecause his ethics was so firmly based upon revelation -
Cheneviere, op. cit.t passim, e.g. p. 80; Lobstein, op. cit.,
p. 62:
Note 10, p. 201. T. F. Torrance, "Calvin's Doctrine of Man" deals
fully with the subject in chapters 2-6. The image of God is
always of God's initiation, whether in the universe or in man
himself. It applies therefore to man's existence as a
creature as well as to his regeneration in Christ. It is, in
fact, a reflection of God, and it applies particularly to man
since God has made man to be appreciative of His Work - the
spectator in the cosmological theatre. In a sense this is a
specifically Christian view but in another sense it is a cosmic
philosophy. That is, it is true even of unbelievers, to whom,
nevertheless, it may remain unknown until the Holy Spirit reveals
it.
Man's function in the universe is of course gratitude and
adoration for the Creator. There are several passages in the
"Sermons" which illustrate this point, e.g. "... la vie des
hommes /
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hommes luy y( a Dieu) est precieuse, comme 11 fut hier declalre:
ce sont creatures faltes a son image." (C.R. LIV, 339).
. Nature a voulu comme lier les hommes en union ensemble,
et Dieu les a tous formez a son image." (ibid, 351.)
Note 11, p. 221. Cf. ^Cheneviere, op clt., p. 75# "LaJLoinat'ur"elle et le Decalogue ont . . . une seule et meme origine,
mais 1' une, la loi naturellg tel^e que nous la connaissons
aujourd'hui, n'est que le pale reflet de 1'autre Quoting INST.
2: 8: 1, 4: 20: 16, ibid, p. 80, "le Decalogue remplace done
gractiquement la conscience, au moins pour le Chretien." (ibid.4/ "La loi morale^contient la seule ^regle parfaite de
justice, main son role n'est pas le meme ,pour la vie spirituelle
individu et pour la vie du monde, consldere comme un organlsme
compose d' etres dechus vivant naturellement loin de Dieu."
That is to say, from the point of view of Christian thinking,
but only so, the morality of the non-Christian is identified with
a natural law which is identical in turn with the Decalogue.
Only the Christian says so: it is precisely the authority of
G-od in Christ that the non-Christian denies. Bohatec (op. clt.,
pp. 383* points out how Calvin, by looking to the Scrip¬
tures for positive instruction, retained a stronger Christian
emphasis than Luther, who sought in it only the limits of pro¬
hibition. Cheneviere' s conclusion is (p. 88) "il est impossible
a un Chretien de connaitre et nyenye yde concevoir, la 'justice' en
dehors de celle qui nous est revelee dans le Decalogue et dans
la Parole de Dieu en general." ibid, 9"Nous croyons volon-
tiers, av4c Lang et Peter Barth contre Brunner, Doumergue, et
G-loe^e, que 1' ordre de nature ne peut nulleinent Jouer dans la
pensee de Calvin le role d'un guide en matiere de science poli¬
tique.", ibid, p. IO4. H. . . pour trouver ce qui est licite,
le "chretien n'a pas a he'slter entre le sentiment de la con¬
science et le texte precis du Decalogue; c' est au Decalogue
qu'il doit s'en re'ferer. "
Note 12, p. 233. Because his "esse" is "cognoscere". See
Torrance, op. cit., pp. 29 ff for references. "Cognoscere"
implies dependence upon God, so that human life is not an
absolute, as diVi-fie life is. It is the assumption on our part
that our life is an independent function that makes us sinners.
The "esse" which we lose in sin is not, of course, a physical
withdrawal. But the fact that we are not mere brutes is due
to the desire of G-od for us: so that our "esse" is the "per-
cipere" of G-od, which is dynamic in the sense of its making us
constantly aware, if in disguised forms, of His Majesty. Thus
sin is deformity, disease, living death, all the more so since
G-od maintains us in our special status above the brutes. Only
when His "percipere" is matched by our "cognoscere" of our state
as "percipi" do we attain true humanity.
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Note 13. p. 258. "Man's Disorder and God's Design" vol. IV, pp.
47 ff• ^"he point he makes is that the Una Sancta is as a
fact broken, and with it has gone the sense of ultimate justice
in international dealings: and yet it is upon this sense that
the world can alone reach security. There must be a power
more ultimate than the individual state. At present we are
unable to reach a greater interna.tional security than that
offered by the International Court of Justice, which is at best
tentative. Treaties between states are thus "political"
arrangements, that is, depending for their motive and their
fulfilment upon the relative strengths of the participants.
The small state is regarded as being unable to defend itself and
thus having nothing to offer the commonwealth of nations.
The Una Sancta was not, and could not be, the political basis
of European unity but it represented the power of European
opinion, which, based upon the ultimate of divine justice, was
strong enough to make international treaties morally secure.
With the dilution of Christian faith Europe has become less
secure.within her .owfi" borders? States treat one another with
the scant respect they ohce kept for their colonies. Ware,
once fought for specific ends and ending in agreement, are
now no settlement. The vanquished wait for their opportunity;
and the only security the victor ean hope for is the annihilation
of the enemy.
Note 14, P. 309. For example, Edward Elton's "God's Holy Will,
etc. "' Xl625) published in London. James Durham, in Glasgow,
published "The Law Unsealed" which was in its fifth edition by
l677> and was reprinted at least four times later - 1715> 1777
an<^ 18O4. In France Nicole published his "Instructions
Theologlques" in 1769> "but it is not directly a commentary upon
each separate commandment.
There is a curious lapse in the production of new work -
apart from John Owen' s'Lectures" of 1675 and W. H. Stowell' s
"The Ten Commandments" (1824) - between these early works and
the revival of the subject in the 187°'s onward.. Dale wrote
his "Ten Commandments" in I87O and it ran to several editions.
Dean Farrar wrote "The Voice from Sinai" In 1896, and George
Jackson His "Ten Commandments" in 1898. Most of these books were
based upon sermons; and there were many more by lesser known
authors.
By 1902, F. S. Schenck was writing "The Ten Commandments
and the Lord's Prayer - a sociological study", in New York.
H. S. Coffin could still publish on the same subject in 193°•
It is interesting to note how in post-war Germany there is
a cry for a Church based on the Ten Commandments. Thomas Mann
has written on "The Tables of the Law".
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